


JPRS Report



Soviet Union

Political Affairs

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Political Affairs

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20 November 1991

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'Top Secret' Program Interviews Yakovlev on Yeltsin

*LD1011075791 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1955 GMT 9 Nov 91*

[Interview with USSR presidential adviser Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev, by "Top Secret" program presenter Artem Borovik; date and place not given; from the "Top Secret" program—recorded]

[Text]

[Borovik] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, I hope you will be a regular viewer of our television program "Top Secret" [Sovershenno Sekretno]. Today is the first program. What would you advise and what would you like to warn against? [Borovik shown interviewing Yakovlev at round table with a copy of TOP SECRET monthly lying on top of the table with the title page visible, another newspaper lying open in front of Yakovlev]

[Yakovlev] I will speak about what concerns me. Democracy has gained power, quite unexpectedly, for itself. In good time or not in good time, in a natural or unnatural way, it does not matter, it has gained it. History has ordered it thus. The question is now raised in a very tough way. It gained it at a time that could be called the most unfavorable. Will democracy and the democrats be able to cope with this power? If not, it will be a tragedy for the country, a tragedy. I will say that, according to the laws, the political pendulum, the recoil, has swung only to the right. That pendulum will swing and one will await an enlightened dictator or a villainous dictator. That is the choice, a very narrow one.

[Borovik] In this connection, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, what is your opinion of the new economic program by Yeltsin? What is your attitude to it as a man and as a politician?

[Yakovlev] I support the general direction. We delayed these reforms three or four years. The most substantial aspect lies in the butts, meaning that there can be no free prices without competition.

[Borovik] A number of politicians who feel that the center is moving away from real affairs tried to go over to the Russian White House, to Yeltsin. How do you feel, as part of Gorbachev's team? I will ask the second part of this question right away: How have your relations with Yeltsin taken shape?

[Yakovlev] Let me answer the first part of the question. I worked here and did not intend to go anywhere else. The only place I intended to go after I retired was into science. As far as my relations with Boris Nikolayevich are concerned, I will tell you that from the very outset they have been normal. It is funny to mention personal aspects now, but when he joined the construction committee, he mentioned in an interview somewhere that he had received festive greetings from somebody, postcards from me. He said that somewhere. I remember that I was criticized by the Politburo for continuing to write to him.

[Borovik] Did you send him greetings on 7 November?

[Yakovlev] You know, I do not think I wrote to anyone this time, nor did I last year.

[Borovik] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, the court undoubtedly will pass judgment on the fate of the State Committee for the State of Emergency members. If their fate depended upon you, what decision would you make?

[Yakovlev] My first urge would be to let them go, as they are elderly people, but you realize that is dangerous. As a person, I do not know about putting people away or whether they are evil. I do not know. Judging from their actions, on the whole, it was not a good thing, on the whole.

[Borovik] After the putsch, did you try to find out whether the Committee for State Security, chaired by Kryuchkov, had a case against you?

[Yakovlev] I was told yes.

[Borovik] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, now over to a somewhat different sphere of activity. I was told that you secretly love detective novels. Is that true?

[Yakovlev] Yes, that is true.

[Borovik] Do you have time for that?

[Yakovlev] By force of habit, unless I read for an hour before I go to sleep, I simply can not fall asleep. That is the truth. I can not get to sleep.

[Borovik] I would like to thank you for being with us on our first broadcast. I hope it will not be the last time.

[Yakovlev] Thank you. OK.

Premature To Claim USSR No Longer Exists

*PM0711112791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Nov 91
p 4*

[Anatoliy Karpychev article under the "My Opinion" rubric: "Do We Exist or Not?"]

[Text] We must have done something wrong if the Western world is agonizing over Hamlet's question of whether we (that is, the Soviet Union) are to be or not be? That question would have been appropriate to a geography lesson, but instead it is being asked within the walls of the U.S. Congress. Recently, during a discussion of the question of aid to the USSR, a respected congressman chairing the discussion asked for a comment on the unusual statements that "as a state the Soviet Union no longer exists."

"I do not think that this is completely correct," a diplomat explained. "The Union continues to fulfill certain important obligations from the U.S. viewpoint, for example, in the military sphere and in control of the nuclear arsenal."

So, do we exist or not?

I should like to believe that at the moment we do. Everything else depends on us alone. If we really want it, the union state will exist, if not—the result is also clear.

During the nationwide referendum our people supported the idea of a renewed Union. Nevertheless, the Union is disintegrating and, it seems, there is no force capable of halting the decline. The present center clearly cannot do that because its authority is thoroughly undermined. The republics, driven by the ideas of freedom and sovereignty, act most often in isolation even though it is common knowledge that any so-called "absolutely sovereign state" in our era is an anachronism (this is the opinion of French Sovietologist Edgar Morin). But we pretend that this does not apply to us as we continue to heroically combat the diktat of the center, which no longer exists, while being unable to forget or forgive the old injuries it has caused. Everyone is a loser in this "battle" because the point has been passed where justified dislike of the center ends and unjustified destruction of the Union begins. It seems that we are throwing the baby out with the bath water.

Seeing this, the West sighed... The pluses of the perestroika processes suddenly begin to turn into minuses as far as it is concerned. On the one hand there is the loss of an "adversary" in the form of the Soviet Union and of communism—that is good for the West, but is the loss of the Soviet Union as a single state good in general? I somehow doubt that. For the West it would be good if there were no superpower that the Americans respect for the sole reason that in the event of a conflict it could stand up for itself and destroy their country, but on the other hand what good would it be if the fragmentation of the USSR leads to the appearance in the world of several states equipped with "privatized" lethal weapons when there is no way of knowing in whose hands they may end up.

Generally speaking we have posed quite a few riddles. There are many things interesting our partners today: the fate of the Union, to begin with; will there be a center; what are the powers of the USSR president; what about mutual relations between the center and the republics; with whom should Western businessmen maintain business relations in our country; who will pay back the debts, and so forth?

You know that President Bush received first-hand answers to questions on the situation in the USSR during his meeting with M.S. Gorbachev in Madrid. Judging by the responses, the meeting had a great impact only this time it left a somewhat bitter aftertaste. The USSR President tried to show that both the Union and he as its head are in calm and confident mood today, that the difficulties are natural and surmountable, but it did not escape observers' notice that the Union is becoming weak, it no longer exists as such, and this is affecting our international prestige.

Oversight Committee's Findings on Procedure for Registration of Citizens

924B0079A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 16 Oct 91 p 3

[Article by S. Alekseyev, chairman of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee: "The Findings of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee: On the Authorization Procedure for Registration of Citizens"]

[Text] In connection with the USSR Congress of People's Deputies' adoption of the Declaration of Human Rights and Freedoms, the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee at its own initiative resumed its review of the issue of legislation on registration issues and established the following.

The findings of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee of 28 October 1990, No. 11 (2-1), acknowledged that the provisions on registration restrict citizens' right to freedom to move and freedom to choose their place of residence and should be removed from legislation by reviewing it for the purpose of replacing the authorization procedure of registration with a simple registration procedure.

The necessary measures to abolish or change the provisions on the authorization procedure for registration were not adopted after these findings were adopted, however.

The provisions on registration contained in the Statute on the Passport System in the USSR (ratified by USSR Council of Ministers Decree No. 677 of 28 August 1974), which has been in operation up to the present time, and the USSR Council of Ministers Decree No. 678 of 28 August 1974 entitled: "On Certain Regulations for Registration of Citizens," the Statute on Registration and De-Registration of the Population in the City of Moscow (ratified by USSR Council of Ministers Decree No. 585 of 25 June 1964), and the decrees of the USSR Council of Ministers on restricting registration of citizens in St. Petersburg, Kiev, and other localities, as well as departmental enactments and enactments of local organs of power and management issued on the basis of decisions of the USSR government, place on each citizen the obligation to obtain authorization to live or be in the place he chooses and thereby envision universal administrative control over citizens' movement within the country and establish liability for failing to fulfill the corresponding points. Moreover, the possibility of a citizen obtaining such authorization in the form of a residence permit is made dependent on various types of conditions and the discretion of the administrative organs which handle the registration.

The legal foundations for leaving the decrees of the USSR Council of Ministers and other subordinate enactments which envision an authorization system of registration on the country's entire territory fall away with the adoption and implementation of the Declaration of Human Rights and Freedoms.

Article 21 of the Declaration fixes each person's right to move freely within the country and choose the places he lives and visits.

The Declaration, as well as international-legal enactments (Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 12 of the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights), does not permit the restriction of this right by governmental or departmental regulations. Moreover, there are no legal foundations to establish subordinate enactments that restrict freedom of movement for all citizens on the country's entire territory. In accordance with this International Pact and according to the terms of the Declaration of Human Rights and Freedoms, restrictions on freedom of movement may be envisioned only by the law and only in cases when this is necessary to protect state security, public order, the health or morals of the population, or the rights and freedoms of other persons.

An authorization system of registration, by improperly restricting citizens' freedom of movement, prevents citizens from realizing other rights and freedoms as well.

Job placement has been made dependent on the existence of a residence permit. The liability of officials who hire citizens who are living without a residence permit has been established (Point 36 of the Statute on the Passport System in the USSR). Point 2 of the USSR Council of Ministers Decree No. 585 of 25 June 1964 places a direct ban on hiring citizens who live in other localities to work in the city of Moscow. These and other similar regulations contradict Article 40 of the USSR Constitution, which establishes citizens' right to choose an occupation and type of pursuit or work, Article 23 of the Declaration of Human Rights and Freedoms, which proclaims each person's right to freely choose a job or refuse a job, and Article 5 of the Fundamentals of Legislation of the USSR and the Republics on Employment of the Population and similar provisions of the laws of republics which establish the freedom to choose a type of pursuit or work.

Registration rules contradict the provisions of Article 11 of the USSR Constitution, Article 24 of the Declaration of Human Rights and Freedoms, and Article 7 of the USSR Law: "On Ownership in the USSR," and similar articles of republic laws on ownership which establish citizens' right to own, use, and dispose of property which they own at their own discretion. A citizen selling or giving as a gift a residence or apartment, dacha, or garage, putting them up for rent, or making other deals with them is now conditioned on whether the person who is acquiring or renting those buildings has the right to a residence permit in the given populated point. By improperly obstructing the development of the housing market, registration rules also prevent free enterprise and free movement of money, goods, and services.

By placing administrative obstacles on choosing a place to visit or live, the authorization system of registration directly affects a citizen's right to free association in

social organizations, to a beneficial environment, to education, to protection of health, and to leisure.

Bearing in mind that registration and records of citizens by place of residence, like setting conditions and procedures for verifying information on their permanent or temporary housing, which do not involving receiving the authorization of administrative organs to be, live, work, study, or vacation in the given locality are in themselves not a restriction of the right to move freely or choose a place to live or to visit;

taking into account that the authorization system for entry, visitation, and exit may be instituted in border regions or in places where defense installations are, and in other cases when this is necessary to ensure state security, public order, the health or morals of the population, or the rights and freedoms of others;

bearing in mind that questions of introducing valid restrictions on the freedom to move should be decided only in laws adopted by the supreme representative organs of state power for whom the provisions on the authorization system of registration instituted by subordinate enactments are not mandatory;

guided by Article 124 of the USSR Constitution and articles 21-23 of the USSR Law "On Constitutional Oversight in the USSR,"

the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee has reached the following conclusion:

1. The statutes on registration (USSR Council of Ministers Decree No. 585 of 25 June 1964: "On Ratification of the Statute on Registration and De-Registration of the Population in the City of Moscow"; the Statute on Registration and De-Registration of the Population in the City of Moscow ratified by USSR Council of Ministers Decree No. 585 of 25 June 1964; points 6, 23, 26, and 34-37 of the Statute on the Passport System in the USSR ratified by USSR Council of Ministers Decree No. 677 of 28 August 1974; the USSR Council of Ministers Decree No. 678 of 28 August 1974: "On Certain Rules of Registration of Citizens"; the USSR Council of Ministers Decree No. 351 of 10 April 1981: "On Restriction of Registration of Citizens in the Cities of the Caucasus Mineral Waters and Populated Points Adjacent to Them"; the USSR Council of Ministers Decree No. 183 of 5 March 1982: "On Restriction of Registration of Citizens in the Prigorodskiy Rayon of the North Ossetian ASSR"; the USSR Council of Ministers Decree No. 203 of 4 March 1985: "On Restriction of Registration of Citizens in the City of Sochi"; the USSR Council of Ministers Decree No. 737 of 6 August 1985: "On Restriction of Registration of Citizens in the City of Kiev"; the USSR Council of Ministers Decree No. 1476 of 24 December 1987: "On Restriction of Registration of Citizens in Certain Populated Points of Crimean Oblast and Krasnodar Kray," as well as other decrees of the USSR government on issues of registration in the part which obliges citizens to obtain the authorization of administrative organs to live, find a job, study, or

acquire ownership of residences, apartments, dachas, or garages or the part which establishes liability for violating these obligations do not conform to the USSR Constitution, the Declaration of Human Rights and Freedoms, and international enactments on human rights.

2. The adoption of these Findings does not rule out the application of the registration rules as rules for recording and keeping track of the movement of citizens or verifying information on their permanent or temporary place of residence, nor does it rule out the introduction by law of restrictions on citizens' freedom to move when this is necessary to ensure state security, public order, the health or morals of the population, or the rights and freedoms of citizens.

3. The registration statutes indicated in Point 1 of the Findings become invalid starting on 1 January 1992. This is based on the idea that before this time the supreme representative organs of state power will adopt enactments on the procedure for recording and keeping track of citizens by place of residence, as well as on the sphere and conditions of application of the authorization system of entry, residence, and exit in certain localities.

The registration statutes which limit owners' rights, at their own discretion, to own, utilize, or dispose of residences, apartments, or other property which belongs to them, as well as statutes on citizens' liability for violating the authorization system of registration, become invalid from the moment these Findings are adopted.

4. It is deemed necessary that the organs of procurator supervision appeal departmental enactments and enactments of local organs of power and management which set invalid restrictions on the right to move freely or to choose a place to live or visit, as well as actions by state organs to sell the right to register.

Excerpt From Gorbachev's Book on Coup

924B0079B Moscow TRUD in Russian 2 Nov 91 p 3

[Excerpt from book *Avgustovskiy putch. Prichiny i sledstviya* (*The August Putsch: Causes and Consequences*) by M. S. Gorbachev: "The Conspirators Were Doomed"]

[Text] [Editor's Introduction] We are publishing an excerpt from M. S. Gorbachev's book *The August Putsch: Causes and Consequences*, which is coming out at the "Novosti" Publishing House.

To the Reader

The August events continue to be a focus of heightened attention here and in the world community. Serious attempts are being made to analyze the course and meaning of what happened and the causes and consequences. Unfortunately, there are also attempts of another kind—to turn these events into a subject of superficial speculation in order to arouse base feelings and unhealthy

sentiments. Irrespective of the intentions of those who are involved in this, this causes harm to the trend toward consolidation of society and toward political harmony in the main, which is vitally important to our country today.

Of course, I also am constantly pondering what happened. I have already said something publicly. I have talked about a great many things in interviews over the past weeks. And now, after gathering all this together, I would like to present my reflections to readers. Further analysis, new facts, the course of events itself, and, needless to say, the investigation of the state criminal case will provide food for more comprehensive and thorough interpretation of all the circumstances and for extraction of lessons. However, I am certain that on the basis of my evaluation, the views I have presented here will not change. [Signed] M. Gorbachev.

The subject of a violent coup and rumors of preparations for it had been circulating in society for many months. So the coup did not break out unexpectedly like thunder on a clear day. In responding more than once to the direct question, I said: a coup is impossible in the present situation, it is doomed from the very start, and only madmen could undertake one. But at the same time I was by no means underestimating the danger of the right wing's building up hysteria in the press and at Central Committee plenums, of provocative statements by certain generals, or of sabotage of my perestroika decisions by party and state structures at all levels.

Casting a retrospective glance at the events of 19-21 August, I should say that the logic of profound reforms did not rule out this turn of events. I assumed the possibility that extreme forms might develop. The reasons for such assumptions? Fundamental changes affected the entire social organism and the basic interests of all social strata.

Above all I had the party in mind, the party which ruled in the name of the people without receiving authority from the people to do so. Those changes affected the army, which was drawn into deep reforms as a result of the realization of the policy of new thinking, the process of disarmament, and the adoption of a defensive doctrine. The conversion of the military-industrial complex has become a reality. It is going forward with difficulty, with many negative consequences. But those involved in this sector of the economy are the most organized, intellectually strong, highly skilled part of society, and in addition enjoy certain privileges.

Now put the nationality aspects of the perestroika process on top of this. Add reform of ownership focused on changing labor motivation and changing to the market. And many, many other things. Everything came together here.

The country had crawled into a systemic crisis. The very logic of the development of society dictated the need for profound changes during which a mass of contradictions arose. The break-up of the old system produced instability and chaos. And, if fact, the reforms could not have

occurred easily in such an enormous country which for decades had been in a totalitarian condition with a power monopoly and the complete domination of state ownership. The process of the reforms proved to be excruciating and had a heavy impact on the life of the people.

In this situation the putschists made an attempt to turn the country back to totalitarianism. But the situation itself is also linked to the sluggishness and inconsistency which were permitted in politics and practical activity, especially as regards reforms of the former mechanism of power. I mean the delay in eliminating the party monopoly on power and the party-bureaucratic structures, which in many respects were retained from the previous regime, and the unjustified tolerance toward those who did not accept perestroika and remained loyal to Stalinism and everything connected with it, or at least professed post-Stalinism. And an exhausting struggle between the advocates of democratic transformations and those who tried to block them in every way possible went on at the 28th Party Congress and the subsequent Central Committee plenums. The same thing happened in local party committees. The old system had already been undermined and disorganized, but it continued to hold back everything it could and prevented progress.

What happened during the coup, the decisive confrontation of the forces of reaction and of democracy, had to happen in some form or another. It was the resolution of the built-up contradictions.

Many people are now saying: Did Gorbachev really not foresee this? Of course, I theoretically accepted the possibility of a sharp confrontation between the forces of renewal and of reaction. And I was not the only one. But what conclusion followed from that?

From the very start of the crisis processes related to the fundamental transformation of society, I tried to prevent an explosive resolution of the contradictions and used tactical steps to gain time in order to allow the democratic process to acquire sufficient strength, supplant the old, and strengthen the people's attachment to the new values. In short, to bring the country to the stage where any such adventurism would be doomed to failure. My main goal was despite any difficulties to preserve the course of transformations and keep the process, regardless of its painfulness, within political and constitutional forms.

The confrontation between the forces of progress and the forces of reaction had increased over approximately the last year and a half. Beginning in December, even since the autumn of last year, it took on very harsh forms. And, the positions were not even concealed. Appeals for emergency measures were heard constantly, and the Central Committee plenums became real battles. Such was the April 1991 plenum, which shocked society. Such was the last plenum, on whose eve 32 of the 72 secretaries of RSFSR CP obkoms announced that Gorbachev should be called to account.

I remember the talks between Felipe Gonzalez and myself in Moscow in the summer. At that time I stated, and he agreed, that an extremely sharp confrontation was underway between the old sociopolitical structures and society itself, which had already changed profoundly. These structures were doomed and should have been replaced. My constant desire was to do this bloodlessly, democratically. Just once in the history of this country to avoid bloodshed during a period of revolutionary changes.

And, anyway, how could the initiators of perestroika act otherwise? What kind of democrats would they be then? As on the international arena, we held firmly to the course of refusing to use force to solve problems and preventing any attempt at a reactionary coup.

In a talk on 11 September with the U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker, I heard: "During these days George Bush and I have reflected a great deal on your policies, Mr. President, and we now understand your tactics of maneuvering and compromise. You wanted to gain time so as not to give the conservative forces the opportunity to destroy the course of the reforms."

Yes, it was really that way. A compromise line was necessary to reduce tensions in the moments of serious conflict. So it was in September and December of 1990, when the air was filled with calls: "Down with the General Secretary! Down with the President!" And the appeals came from different sides. I had to construct my line of behavior to create conditions for strengthening the reforms so that society would be permeated with them and find the strength to defend them. It was in such a critical situation that the President of the USSR and the leaders of nine republics met in Novo-Ogarev and made the now well-known joint statement, which played an indispensable role. The Novo-Ogarev process brought society to a new understanding of the need for harmony in the country. I repeat: my task all these years was to preserve and rescue the political course of perestroika. For these purposes, I believed it was necessary to more quickly move toward a Union Treaty and carry out radical economic transformations and reform the party.

The draft of the Union Treaty was ready to be signed. And delegations of six republics were intending to sign it in St. George's Hall in the Kremlin on 20 August. As President of the country I was supposed to make a speech.

The meeting of the Council of the Federation to discuss a plan to radicalize the reforms, questions of food and fuel, financial stabilization, and so on was set for 21 August.

In short, the point was a profound and decisive democratic breakthrough in the main directions of the transformations, a change to a new level of those transformations where there was no longer a place for people who did not want or were unable to tear themselves away from the command-administrative way of thought and action. The conspirators saw that their time was passing

quickly. And they chose precisely this moment for their adventurism. The putsch was a reaction to the Novo-Ogarev process and its most important result, the Treaty on the Union of Sovereign States.

Parliamentary Hearings on CPSU, RSFSR CP Coup Role

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[Unattributed report: "At the Bottom Line: Parliamentary Hearings on the Role of the Organizational Structure of the CPSU and the Russian CP in the Government Coup of 19-21 August, 1991"]

[Text] Hearings have begun in the Russian parliament on CPSU participation in the government coup. Even after the parliamentarians' first day of work, it was clear that documents had appeared in the course of the preliminary investigation and would appear in the future that spoke directly of the communist party's leading role in organizing this state crime. The scandal will not be limited by the boundaries of our country but, most likely, will spill over into the international arena, affecting the careers of many political figures, the existence of communist parties abroad and numerous commercial structures that are based on party funds.

The parliamentary hearings will be, one may expect, long and thorough. The basic goal of the hearings is, as formulated in the draft of an appeal to the RSFSR president, "...to take measures to prohibit the operation of the RSFSR CP and the CPSU on RSFSR territory as organizations that have taken part in a forcible change in the constitutional order of the RSFSR, in the undermining of its security, in the instigation of social and national dissension."

The editorial staff of ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA has at its disposal the stenographic record of the beginning of the parliamentary hearings. On the first day, 22 October, presentations were made by V. G. Stepankov, procurator general of the RSFSR; N. V. Fedorov, RSFSR Minister of Justice and RSFSR people's deputy; A. P. Surkov, people's deputy and member of the commission for the investigation of the causes and circumstances of the government coup in the USSR; A. V. Kozyrev, RSFSR Minister of Foreign Affairs; A. A. Yevlakhov, sector head of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee on the Mass Information Media; People's Deputies Yu. N. Afanasyev, Yu. D. Chernichenko, V. K. Varov, A. M. Adamovich, V. N. Travnikov, Yu. F. Karyakin, A. F. Chaykovskiy, N. I. Travkin, G. P. Yakunin, D. E. Stepanov, V. I. Morokin, O. V. Plotnikov and V. A. Kuptsov, RSFSR CP First Secretary and USSR people's deputy.

We offer for your attention their presentations in abbreviated form.

Chaired by S. A. Filatov, RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Secretary

[S. A. Filatov] Today, on the initiative of several Supreme Soviet committees, parliamentary hearings begin that are dedicated to the question of the role of CPSU organizational structures and the Russian communist party in the government coup of 19-21 August, 1991.

The parliamentary hearings have access to the Supreme Soviet as the legislative organ that must have the final word on this issue.

Picking the state's pocket means "adopting a political decision".

[V. G. Stepankov] ...My information does not contain the findings of the investigation, which according to law are not subject to publication.

Documents from the inquiry that have been received from the oblasts, krays and republics of our Russian Federation bear witness to the fact that the actions of the State Emergency Committee [GKChP] were supported by the Samara, Lipetsk, Tambov, Saratov, Orenburg, Ulyanovsk, Tomsk and Irkutsk CPSU obkoms, the Altay and Krasnodar kraykoms, the Adyge and North Osetian SSR republic committees. In Lipetsk Oblast, the obkom first secretary was a member of the oblast emergency committee, in Samara and Ulyanovsk oblasts and Altay and Krasnodar krays, telegrams were sent by the obkoms and kraykoms to city and regional party committees on the necessity of supporting and assisting the GKChP. A telephonogram from the Krasnodar CPSU kraykom said, for example, "To all party committees regarding the implementation of an emergency situation: take measures for communist participation in providing assistance to the State Committee on the Emergency Situation in the USSR in the execution of appropriate measures in the kray. Keep in mind the possibility of provocative calls for general strikes, insubordination to GKChP decrees and local organs of Soviet power. Explain in full the folly of such actions."

In the Udmurt, Bashkir and Kabardino-Balkar SSR, Belgorod Oblast, in Tyumen, Sakhalin, Kursk and Murmansk oblasts, all incoming and outgoing documents were destroyed. But investigatory actions conducted simultaneously locally and in the central party apparatus made possible a search for telegrams, coded telegrams and the like. For this reason, attempts to destroy traces in one or another place are not reflected in the results of the investigation.

[N. V. Fedorov] It has been said that the leaders and managing organs of certain obkoms and republican communist parties within the RSFSR managed to destroy documents concerning the execution of the government coup.

I think that these documents will be found eventually. Specifically, there is one such document originating at

the Udmurt RSFSR CP republican committee that we have acquired from the CPSU Central Committee archives. Allow me to read from it. Telegram number—No. 689-3 from Izhevsk. "19 August, 21.45. To the members of the State Committee on the Emergency Situation in the USSR. To USSR defense council first deputy chairman, Comrade Baklanov. To the members of the Politburo. To CPSU Central Committee secretary, Comrade Sheynin. Regarding the proposal to create within the GKChP USSR an organ of control.

The secretariat of the Udmurt RSFSR CP republican committee expresses its full support for the first steps taken by the State Committee on the Emergency Situation in the USSR.

At the same time, we express our serious concern at the absence of a permanent system that would control the local execution of GKChP USSR decrees. We propose the creation within the GKChP USSR of a control organ with republic, kray and oblast representation. We are ready to assist in this undertaking.

Udmurt RSFSR CP Republican Committee First Secretary Sapozhnikov".

And there is one more series of documents that is also, in our opinion, essential in evaluating the legality of the actions of the organizational structures of CPSU and RSFSR CP leadership organs.

The document is called: "On the Indebtedness of Soviet Organizations to Friendly Firms".

I will permit myself to acquaint you with the contents of these documents.

Since the end of 1989, "friendly" firms from France, Portugal, Greece, Cyprus, Austria, Sweden and Uruguay have had to deal with growing difficulties due to non-payment of funds to Soviet contractors for goods delivered to our country. Several times, firms have found themselves on the brink of bankruptcy because of this, and only the intervention of M. S. Gorbachev in response to a direct appeal to the CPSU Central Committee has made it possible to defuse temporarily a critical situation.

One more case. The French CP (the "Interagro" company) supplies grain, butter, meat and meat products to the USSR. Towards payment, it has presented bills for 138 million dollars, of which 67-70 million dollars are for payment of back debts. M. S. Gorbachev reported on this on 8 October of this year. Vneshekonombank was directed to take urgent measures. According to the YuS bank "Moskovskiy", 9 million dollars were transferred to Paris 11 October of this year, and another one and a half million dollars is yet to be transferred. It is intended that the remainder will be repaid out of French credit, negotiations for which have not yet begun. It would be very interesting to find out with what sort of confidence the leadership of the government and the USSR CP are operating, in the light of the practice that has evolved for

the solution of these problems. What cynicism: negotiations for credit on an intergovernmental level have not yet begun, but according to established practice, everyone is confident that the funds will go towards these goals.

One more example. A peculiarity of this aspect of our indebtedness lies in the fact that we are talking about, as a rule, amounts that are insignificant by government standards; that is, from the point of view of the volumes of a government budget, as far as hard currency goes, this is small change (in the opinion of the Soviet Union CP leaders), but these funds are, however, of vital importance to the friendly firms, and without deductions from their profit into the party cash register, the party's financial situation would be taxed in a most serious manner.

In M. S. Gorbachev's memo of 22 June, 1990, it was underlined that "if we cease to fulfill our financial obligations to friendly firms now, the CPSU will be faced with the necessity of coming up with resources for the support of friendly parties at the expense of the party's budget. Attempts to resolve this issue at the departmental level do not yield the necessary results. In our opinion, a political decision on this issue by the CPSU Central Committee is required, with a direct appeal to V. S. Pavlov.

Picking the state's pocket means "adopting a political decision".

The signatures on this document are: Falin, people's deputy and CPSU Central Committee International Department chief; Vlasov, people's deputy and Social and Economic Policy Department chief.

There is one more document that is characteristic of the CPSU's working style. "Completely secret". To CPSU Central Committee deputy general secretary, Comrade Ivashko. I am reporting in accordance with a directive from CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Falin. During an official trip to FRG, 7-12 March of this year, I met with PDS Chairman Gizi, who confidentially requested that I inform the CPSU leadership of the following. "The archive contains—I will quote words that were put into Gizi's mouth by the Portuguese consultant to the CPSU Central Committee International Department,—a large number of secret documents. Documents, the archive of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SEPG], the publication of which would have had extremely undesirable consequences not only for the SEPG, but for the CPSU as well. Specifically, we are talking about the detailed protocol recordings of practically all the meetings and conversations that took place between SEPG leaders and the leaders of communist and workers' parties, starting with the CPSU. In documents concerned with the operations of illegal communist parties that had received material aid from the SEPG in accordance with agreements with us (the CPSU), on the accounting of SEPG financial aid to FRG's "progressive organizations" before the unification of Germany.

We are speaking, then, of illegal communist parties, unlawful parties speaking out for the overthrow of the existing constitutional order in one or another state or country.

And there is still one very small subject. It is a somewhat delicate topic, but certain investigatory actions must begin with one aspect of it, since it, too, verges on plundering the state till. A member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo left for FRG on a lecture tour 7 August of this year for 10 days, on the invitation of Hamburg University. His trip was approved by CPSU Central Committee Secretary Falin. Frolov was accompanied by his wife, at the expense of the party budget. And two USSR KGB employees—at KGB expense. And why? On what legal basis? Each day, those two KGB employees receive payment for travel, salary and the rest from the state till—both in rubles and hard currency...

In our opinion, a study of the nature of the CPSU's character and operations based on the materials available already bears witness to the fact that we are dealing with, from a legal standpoint, a unique political form. This type of organization probably has no analog. In the entire political history of modern and most recent times, it is impossible to find a system as stable and long-lived as the Soviet order—whose organizational positions and ideological spirit were provided by the Bolshevik party, which built its activities on the rules that have been cited today. In violation of a whole series of articles of the USSR Constitution and the Constitution of the Russian Federation, in violation of Article 17 of the Union Law on Public Organizations and of Article 17 of the Russian Federation Law on Property, the CPSU leadership has engaged in commercial activities both in this country and abroad that are quite far removed from the goals stated in the party's charter.

Besides this, the majority of these operations were executed anonymously, secretly, the profit was hidden, in this manner violating a statute of the Law on the Mandatory Publication of Complete Budgets of Public Organizations, including the party budget. The CPSU and the Russian CP committed serious violations of Russian legislation on banks and banking operations, which prohibits political organizations to form commercial banks. It is possible that the question of long-term payments made to the party by affiliated companies is also subject to investigation. The party leadership has been using the state till and the state budget as its own purse, systematically spending state budget funds, including deficit hard currency reserves, on the party's needs, which also extend to the material maintenance of foreign "friends", as well as their spouses (there are long lists of managers and their spouses, on whose relaxation millions in hard currency funds have been spent).

In many materials, we find indications of one more violation, this time, of international law—interference in the internal, what's more, the political affairs of foreign sovereign states. Isn't that what you would call the secret

financing of foreign communist parties' election campaigns, their direct, albeit carefully concealed, cultivation? Because a whole series of organizations and officials are mentioned in the documents named who committed actions that indicate criminal acts, I feel that they must be investigated on all articles.

Further, N. V. Fedorov gave a detailed legal evaluation of CPSU activities.

The CPSU does not conform to international or domestic standards.

[A. P. Surkov] ...One hears that this putsch had been in the makings for a fairly long time...

As early as 12-13 August, the first secretary of the Tomsk Obkom spoke at an obkom plenum on the necessity of implementing an emergency situation in the country...

In that we are a parliamentary commission, we are more interested in the political aspect than the criminal. Were these actions of the party structures coincidental or planned?

If we look deep into the history of both our state and the party, we, naturally, will see that scorn for the law and the achievement of goals at any price, including through government coups,—this has been the essence of the Bolshevik party from the very moment of its formation.

We understand that civil society cannot exist without parties, but on the territory of the former Soviet Union, the party as a public political organization and its republican structures have for all practical purposes been transformed into unconstitutional anti-state structures with secret apparati, holding as a monopoly in its hands the puppet ornamental soviets and their executive organs that it, itself, has created. Essentially, this power has been a continuation of the party, itself. The fact that the CPSU has become a party-state, not a public political organization is borne out by Politburo, party committee and obkom agendas that deal with issues concerning the economy, diplomacy, politics, cultures, the Armed Forces, the organs of law and order and so on. The monopolistic decision of personnel policy through the system of nomenklatura appointments has been a tragedy for the entire society. You could be a Solomon, but if the party raykom or obkom instructor conceives a dislike for you, you'll won't get promotions at work, you'll be nothing at all.

[A. V. Kozyrev] I think that the time for these hearings is ripe. We are speaking of the gigantic volume of CPSU international operations, which include the financing and perhaps other forms of support for foreign communist party organizations, and possibly not just parties, but other kinds of movements, as well. In many countries, it is forbidden for parties and organizations to receive foreign aid. In many countries, this is regulated by law. On preliminary examination, one can note only one thing, that, of course, operations that provide support for foreign organizations are nothing new. Yes, and

the leadership of the CPSU Politburo, itself, was also legitimate in its international activities, although even then it was highly doubtful. But, evidently, it was a sort of custom that was tolerated by foreign states, as well...

Of course, this question is especially important after the declaration of the so-called new political way of thinking and the adoption of a series of acts. For example, in a Copenhagen document on a meeting of the SBSE last summer, the Soviet Union directly took upon itself the obligation not to combine party and state structures. And this poses the question of the unlawfulness of these actions. At the same time, although the party was combined with the state, I think that it is advisable to think about the fact that the state cannot be the object of claims by foreign governments against the activities of the CPSU, as they must be in reference to the activities of only certain structures and certain persons.

Evidently, we should draw moral and political conclusions in order to inoculate society against an allergy to any forms of illegal activity within and the utilization of state and financial organs outside. The prestige, role and place of the Russian state in international relations will depend on this.

And lastly, I am speaking now not as the minister of foreign affairs but, it seems, in conducting all of this work, one must avoid situations that foster passionate feelings or an atmosphere of condemnation towards the CPSU's whole mass membership. Evidently, here we are dealing with the operations of a peculiar organization, and the rank-and-file members of the party simply didn't know, nor did people who occasionally occupied higher posts, what was happening on the level where this structure merged with state organs. In any case, specific persons bear the responsibility for these actions.

[A. A. Yevlakhov] ...More than 20 million dollars went into the so-called "Fund for Aid to Leftist Workers' Organizations", which was generated each year by decree of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. The share for the communist parties of Eastern Europe was determined each year. And in accordance with special Politburo decrees, the financing of communist parties was carried out according to an elementary scheme: the sums would be deposited into account number one in the USSR Vneshekonombank; the money would be withdrawn by a call from an employee of the Central Committee International Department; a transfer would be made of, let's say, two million dollars for the French CP to the appropriate employee of the Committee for State Security; the money would be transported across the border in cash bonds and there, would be handed directly to one or another representative of the communist party in exchange for a receipt, which would be entered in special notebooks. The facts of the financing of foreign communist parties have already been admitted, specifically, by the advisor to the USSR president, Vadim Zagladin, in his interview with an Italian newspaper: he confirmed that this indeed took place. And the proposals that I would like to make? First. It is

completely clear that we are speaking of suspending the operations not only of a political party but of a structure that is dangerous to society. Second. Foreign investigators, Jacques Montaldo in particular, in the newspaper QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS, recognize that it is lawful to demand from various countries, France included, significant portions of real estate in what are today sovereign states, including the Russian Federation. However, naturally, the formulation of this problem requires more detailed study, and for this reason, in my opinion, the most efficient solution would be to form a special working group. There are a series of new aspects of this problem.

Many other issues concerning the GKChP's ideological basis are becoming clear. The Portuguese newspaper POLITIKA has conducted a special investigation on a publication in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, the author of which was Kurginyan, where it was asserted that some Portuguese businessman planned to buy up rubles here, causing economic destabilization in the Soviet Union. But, luckily, telephone and fax numbers were given, and the newspaper had conducted an exhaustive investigation. It all turned out to be the purest fabrication.

And the last thing I would like to say. The completely secret notebooks that were kept by employees of the Central Committee International Department definitely provide a documentary legal base, as they allow us to give a more substantive answer to the question of how actions were committed at the expense of the state's pocket with only one goal: that the "specter of communism", which first appeared in the last century, continue to rove over the globe.

[Yu. N. Afanasyev] ...Speaking about the CPSU—this is an enormous subject, one which we will not exhaust in the course of the parliamentary hearings, due to the specific character and form of these hearings...

Another complication is that we must act with the utmost legal purity, and, in our examination of the question of the CPSU, we must firmly, rigorously and consistently be guided by the law. But the tragedy lies in the fact that the law that could be used as a basis for a complete and comprehensive examination of the question of CPSU activities does not exist in Russia. But this isn't all. The fact is that today in Russia, in the public, ordinary person's consciousness, there exists a distorted image of the CPSU, or at least one that is incomplete. The quality of life today is worsening, considerably.

In the ordinary person's consciousness, at this time, there is no conception of the fact that things are bad now because we have lived according to the CPSU for all these decades. And this is compounded by the fact that the quality of life will continue to worsen, but the CPSU has accumulated an enormous amount of experience in speculating on the people's interests. And it seems to me that very soon, some kind of resuscitation of the CPSU will become possible for this reason.

And there is one more complication that must be, it seems to me, kept in mind. An end must be put to the "epoch of the CPSU". This must take place not years, or even months after the Conference of People's Deputies, but possibly in the weeks immediately following it. Society needs sugar, bread, milk, and a minimum certainty that people will survive, that the children will not begin to sicken. If, at that time, we start work on a matter that is just as necessary, that is, finding an explanation for the causes of all of our disasters, failures, misfortunes,—but not right now, we could find ourselves contradicting the sentiments that are uppermost in society. It is with consideration of these complications that we must adopt the most weighty decisions on both the continuation of these parliamentary hearings and on later examinations of the question in the Supreme Soviet.

The party was never what it pretended to be.

[Yu. D. Chernichenko] I agree that to call it a party is wrong; it should be called Leninism. Leninism is the practical application of Marxism to Russian conditions. Ethically, this means: "Everything is good that is good for me". Economically, this means: "Transform the Russian peasantry, and Russia in general, into steps on the road to a world proletarian revolution."

We see an example of this in the blocked agricultural reforms. We are unable to pronounce the word "AgroGULAG" calmly, we cannot fail to see signs of the dependence between the party structures from above and the kolkhoz from below. The kolkhoz is an extremely unusual method for the exploitation of man. There has never been anything like it. There was nothing like it in the time of Tutankhamen and Ramses, or Alexander II, or the Japanese mikado. It is a completely unique, purely party, purely communist economic structure, consuming the given population, looking upon it as a disposable commodity. Neither the earth nor the population is supposed to replenish itself or multiply, because the revolution was custom made to fit the population. And its exploitation goes on. Now, we have heard from the lips of the first presenters examples, delivered with the greatest semblance of calm, of this unconscionable act whose guiding ethic is "you can do anything for a profit": that it was the bribery of certain parties...

It is very amusing for us to obtain the details and specifics of the manifestation of communist ideology in today's Gorbachev, today's Kuptsov, today's Antonovich, and so on.

The devastation that communism has wreaked upon the Russian lands cannot be repaired in the 20th century; the first quarter of the 21st will undoubtedly be spent on it, as well. This is not Stalin, he is a poor imitation—not the Stalin of 1929-33, who, having destroyed 7 or 8 million people and having created the AgroGULAG, the system that enslaved the peasantry and anyone who worked on the land in the USSR, one sixth of the world, then turned it into everything that we called the socialist camp. It

wasn't Stalin who did this—it was Leninism. Take "State and Revolution", take all of Lenin's speeches in May, 1917, his own postulate that the proletariat leads the peasantry... We cannot understand how during the six years of Gorbachev's administration none of this could be torn down. And now, over the years of political gabble, only 0.67 percent of the land in the RSFSR has escaped the sovkhoz-kolkhoz monopoly, and, practically speaking, the CPSU monopoly. The fact is simply that the world's only landed gentleman, a genuine feudal lord, the absolute owner of all 23 million hectares of arable land in the USSR has in fact lost nothing of its original power, and all past-tense verbs do not apply. The CPSU is also strong in myth, dangerous in the people's knowledge that for it, there are no boundaries, that there is nothing it would not do!—this kolkhoz chairman, this former yesterday's secretary. It is this that stops agrarian reform from going anywhere. It is this that fosters a kind of phobia of the land. When every year half a million is spent abroad on foreign land—only 10 thousand people are in line for land in Russia—the population of one small rayon center. The dam has allegedly been, we say, removed, but the water stays in place and doesn't flow out?

I propose that what has been begun today in words should have a practical continuation in agrarian reform in Russian, and that we seize from the CPSU, seize what is most important—the land!

[V. K. Varov] ...And now I will touch upon another aspect. We are always trying to find some kind of term for the party. It is a supergovernmental organization of a criminal type, I underline, super-governmental, controlling such structures as the KGB, the army and the like.

On just one aspect—on the KGB. What should we do with counterintelligence, which now employs tens, if not hundreds of thousands of people? And I am not at all sure that those people are engaged only in counterintelligence. And if we were to speak of all of the KGB structures, then I would single out one more aspect that worries me even more,—the question of the secret service. It is still functioning, and it is functioning extremely intensively in all organs of state power, from the so-called "renovated" USSR parliament to the corresponding foreign policy and economic organs. I have in mind not only informational activities, but purely provocative activities as well, directed towards the destruction of the democratic movement.

Without a solution on this issue, we will be unable to move further. I believe that we have in a way made a mistake in organizing the hearings as a kind of meeting. I propose that they should have begun at an official session of parliament. I believe that the Russian parliament should adopt legislative decisions on criminal liability for the conduct of informational and provocative secret actions both in state organs and public organizations.

Just imagine if the GKChP had won...

[A. M. Adamovich] I understand Afanasyev's fears that if three, two years ago the people might have been enthusiastic in taking legal action against the party, then today, it might be taken the same way as... Do you remember how when economic matters didn't work out for Khrushchev, he would "drag out" right there "Stalin's corpse", and begin dragging it through the mud. The people, of course, were somewhat upset. Well, the same thing could happen to us.

There is a fear that this will affect the mass party membership. But I think that if those who remain members consider the situation, they will realize that they are being protected from a very frightening future, for which they might pay an even greater price. Well, imagine that the GKChP was victorious, and that again, countless party members and party people have been drawn into repressive actions, into acts against their own people, and you can imagine what would happen then to rank-and-file party members when the terror of the putsch finally broke...

And so I think that the party itself has turned out to be incapable of repentance. I read recently that when Rudenko began reading the list of Beriya's crimes, Beriya's response was simple: he covered his ears. Rudenko is reading, and he is sitting there with his ears covered. And all of this reminds me very much of our party's behavior.

[V. N. Travnikov] In accordance with the president's Decree, communist party activities are suspended on Russian territory. But let's look ahead a little bit. These leading structures have gone into hiding, they are preparing themselves, they are discussing and developing programs. But if these programs become operative, what kind of prognosis can we make? Do you remember the appeal of "the six", the introduction of troops into Moscow, the putsch and everything else? If they are unsuccessful in doing this the official way, that is, by force, does that mean that they must look for another way? It means that literally tomorrow, maybe the day after tomorrow or in a month, the CPSU (it will be called something different) will mobilize and will be conducting its policy on the very same issues legally, but under another name. It is here that we must be vigilant. And as far as the parliamentary investigation goes, you will understand me if I say that we are only taking what is on the surface! We must draw the root out of the earth, pull it out; it is only then that we will understand just what this organization is. Now, we are already hearing voices saying: "The democrats are responsible for everything, just look at what the democrats have brought the country to,—there is no bread, no nothing"... I say again that the old structures are still in power and will remain there until we fight them (here, President Yeltsin is at fault: I will say frankly that after the putsch we should have taken the most serious measures in rooting out this structure all over the country)...

[Yu. F. Karyakin] What has been started here is absolutely unprecedented... The voice of the people that

we—Kuptsov is sitting right here—have yet to hear, the voice of the people, but an informed people,—and you have all alluded to the fact that on the 19th, you had no information, Dzasokhov also made reference to it,—the voice of the people around this building, the voice of the young people said immediately: "Down with the CPSU!". My speech is not only accusatory; it is self-accusatory. I believed in this, I thought that the party was like a pyramid, where the higher you are, the more honest and intelligent, and the greater your conscience...

They always felt—I didn't realize this at first—towards us, towards you, towards the people in this country, as they did about that bank in Tbilisi (for those who know the story); there was no difference.

We won't get confused, we won't let them scare us with shouting about witch hunts. Let's give a historical explanation: Joan of Arc was burned as a witch. Is Ligachev really our Joan of Arc?

But let us not forget what is most important, let us not forget about ourselves, about the millions of people who have been deceived, people who were shamelessly deceived and exploited. Let us not forget about them. For us and for them, this was a tragedy.

I hung onto this world view with my fingernails. Why? I realized what was happening. Because I was poisoned from childhood. I hadn't figured out, just what Lenin-style democratic centralism was. "Democratic centralism" was pounded into my 14-year-old head when I joined the Komsomol. And what is democratic centralism? It is slavery, pure and simple. They give the order—you carry it out!

This is what it really is. When Lenin, with cynical disregard for the decisions of two conferences—the fourth and the fifth,—under no circumstances to resort to taking action, called in Stalin and Kamo and organized a robbery. This is the model for our political economy: "Steal what has been stolen". Then he threw this slogan to the masses.

Lenin writes—"completely secretly, under no circumstances give out this secret information", he knew, having taken advantage of raids on Soviet Russia by some sort of bandits who were actually from Estonia, to hang onto their shoulders... Think about this, hang onto their shoulders—and slaughter, eliminate a thousand officials and priests. What is an official, what is a priest? For us, Florenskiy was a priest, so was Bulgakov. Everybody is an official. Who isn't an official? This is something children know! Can you imagine the cynicism? And parenthetically—blame it on them. And his favorite hero—and this is carefully hidden, soon I will publish reliable evidence of this—his favorite hero (I don't know a more cynical type than Nechayev here in Rus'!)—here is a hero, says Lenin. This is who in advance devised the idea that it was all a big ektenia [part of the Orthodox liturgy consisting of versicles and responses], that is, that the tsar's entire family must be destroyed, from the tsar to the child,—but Dostoyevskiy has ruined the entire

liturgy for us, continued Lenin,—in his slanderous novel "Demons". And when we hear these facts... In these four years, a mass of facts have been dumped on us, and the solution is already supersaturated. And I foresee that we will be shaken by just one millionth portion of the facts. An event awaits us that will cause the world to shudder and curse it. Jesuits—at the end of the XVIII and XIX centuries, the Roman pope and kings dissolved them in various countries. And they did not do one billionth of what they were dissolved for.

Where was the party? Even so, Lenin was a smart one, cunning, prudent and "compsecret". Look at the 14th Conference—there you'll find the past incarnation of our, yours and mine, party—the real party, Comrade Kuptsov. This conference was in ecstasy about itself, alone, having declared that it is every party member's duty to be an informer, an agent of the ChK. They say frankly that here, this cannot be called informing. It is a heroic act.

And just one small detail. Dolores Ibarruri. I knew her very well. Poor little Dolores, who always supported us, suddenly spoke up against the movement of troops into Czechoslovakia. The next day they had cut her out of the Kremlin bunch. All in a day's work!

It seems that the democrats have not led us to a one-party system...

[A. F. Chaykovskiy] For a person who has also concerned himself with the party, and who does not regret this, it is a complicated matter to speak after such emotional presentations. It is complicated for two reasons. Yes, indeed, for people like me, this has been a most difficult year. It has added its gray hairs, it has added its uncertainty and so on, and on the 19th, I made a decision that was for me most difficult. At the session on the evening of August 19, I announced my complete lack of support for the GKChP; this is what a member of the Russian CP Central Committee, a KGB colonel, announced.

However, I am absolutely unable to agree with a series of statements, some of which have issued from this tribunal. Having terminated my membership in the party and my membership in the committee, I retired voluntarily. I have been working for a year in the parliament, and all the time I am thinking...

It seems to me that we are committing the tragic mistake that the Bolsheviks made in 1917, when they dissolved the SR party, the Menshevik party, they dissolved or condemned them, legally or illegally, this was the past of exactly the leaders who were guilty of those evil deeds. This will be a very expensive mistake for us. Sooner or later, we will create the very same one-party system, sooner or later we will create the very same notorious unanimity of opinions, and this will be a tragedy not only for Russia, but for our parliament; this will be a tragedy for the common people. For this, it seems to me, we will not be forgiven. But I came to realize one thing while I

was in Moldavia,—800 thousand Russians for all practical purposes at least in their actions supported the GKChP. Whether we want this or not. I saw villages that drank to its health for two days, then—to its peaceful repose, for a week.

Do you see what we are doing now? After all, we, too, give our sanction to the arrest of a deputy, without even listening to him! Voices cry out that the RKP program was allegedly prepared by communists. And the other sides didn't prepare programs for the conference? Can you name for me a party that won't prepare itself for any kind of conference? If we are moving towards a multi-party system—a parliamentary system, then this is a normal phenomenon. If we are going to begin pointing out who made what mistakes over a period of 70 years, then suits could be brought against any of us in any situation for something. Can we say honestly that other movements are not now being subsidized by western firms and so on?

Maybe, it seems to me, we have made an error in speaking now of the party as a whole, and not of individual people. I will never forgive these people for their merciless treatment of what were on the whole honest communists....

[N. N. Travkin] All the same, our examination of today's question is narrow. Yes, swindlers were in charge of the country and the facts cited bear witness—how could they not have been swindlers, if they traveled with their wives at the government's expense? It is disgusting, you can stamp your feet. But if we think that we are drawing the line, and have turned over a new leaf, then in this we are, most likely, mistaken. What do we have instead of the CPSU? We have a state structure that can, first, stage a coup from above and, second, in the form of these structures, we have an impediment that does not allow the implementation of any reforms whatsoever. In order to avoid a second coup from above, we must dismantle the state-party structures. We have done this at the very top. Will they be able to come back? They will, if they have a material base. We definitely need a legal juridical decision on where the property of the former CPSU should go,—a legal decision, not the kind where those who are closest to power decide.

[G. P. Yakunin] All the elements of a religion are present here—both the Holy Trinity—Marx—Lenin—Stalin, or the other alternative—Marx—Engels—Lenin. And the Holy Scripture—"Dialectic and Historical Materialism", and, naturally, cathedrals and relics, and, finally, religious processions, icons, and most characteristic is the fact that when they blew up the temple of Christ the Savior, they were attempting to construct a temple, at the top of which stood the new Savior, arm outstretched, urging us forward along the road to nowhere.

Party conferences are the cathedrals. Plenums are the Holy Synod, the Politburo is Christ and the Apostles. In a word, that is the system. But it was the most frightening, negative characteristics that were taken from

religion. In any church's religion, there is both positive and negative. It is not for nothing that Travnikov, and even Deputy Chaykovskiy, have said here that the rank-and-file CPSU members are not responsible. I agree completely, because this caste system, seclusion—this frightening, hierarchical, one might say pseudo-ecclesiastical system was built the same way as the Greek caste in Egypt, probably. The Egyptian priests were a secluded caste that protected the mystery. The most simple, ordinary things become completely secret. For example, how to send two clergymen to South America at the expense of the Moscow patriarchy. I hope that the documents will be revealed, that it will be demonstrated that even church organizations were managed by the very same Propaganda and Agitation Department directly through the Council on Religious Affairs, which was under their authority, and through the KGB, which conducted the selection and even placement of religious church personnel in the church itself...

The Union has fallen apart—why does the procuracy remain silent?

[D. E. Stepanov] ...I did not think that I would ever speak in a hall where literally the flower of anti-communism was gathered.

I will begin with what the procurator general warned us about, that now we can talk only about the responsibility of individuals, and that by no means should we talk about the responsibility of the party. And it was no accident that the procurator general was unable to answer my question.

The reason is simple, that in order to adopt a decision prohibiting the party under normal conditions, more exactly, a decision prohibiting the party under normal conditions in the absence of an emergency situation, according to our own laws, only a court can do this. Not the president and not the Supreme Soviet. They do not have the right.

The president has the right to make a decision suspending or prohibiting the activity of one or another party, public organization or mass information medium only under the conditions of an emergency situation. Neither the president of the Union or the president of Russia implemented the emergency situation here.

As we recall, the GKChP implemented the emergency situation, and only after this was the decision taken suspending the printing of a series of democratic publications. The majority of them. But, even so, this was done legally. Here, these prohibitions are legal. An action preventing the normalization of the situation can serve as a basis for prohibiting a party, organization or medium of mass information.

The communist party and its leaders were not inciting people to actions preventing the normalization of the situation 19-21 August. On the contrary, and telegrams

have been quoted here in which the population was urged to keep calm, maintain public order, normal work and working discipline.

Now, as a result of the wave that has been unleashed and is now traveling through the countryside, bringing terror and repression towards communists and those who sympathize with them (and if anyone says that this is nonsense, I can give my own example, even though I am nonparty and was never in the party), in this situation, it is easy to beat a new argument into people's heads: the basis for guilt is such that, they say, the party did not support the actions of the Russian government, the Russian president. However, again, I can ask both the minister of justice and the procurator: where, in which of our laws is it written that a party must support its president, its government, if it is conducting policy with which the party, public organizations and the mass information media do not agree?

And as far as the judge goes, I would like to turn the procurator general's attention to one detail: in his speech, just as in the presentation made by the minister of justice, he said that here, the Soviet Union has for all practical purposes fallen apart. Yes, for all practical purposes this is true, comrades. But why does the procuracy remain silent? Does it intend to bring to trial those persons, thanks to whose actions and active efforts this occurred?...

[V. A. Kuptsov] I would like to announce that not one employee of the party Central Committee was invited to the hearing today. Neither the CPSU Central Committee nor the Russian CP Central Committee were informed. Of the character of these parliamentary hearings. I understand them first of all to be a new, extremely important process for illuminating the truth and searching for justice. Because it is clear that in closed sessions of the court, as a result, we cannot learn everything. And, probably, there is a possibility, through parliamentary hearings, to attract public attention to this extremely important and topical problem...

The hearings that are taking place are one-sided, nonobjective, prejudiced and premeditated. At first, the goal that was set was to designate a law. Think about it; at the first hearing, you received a draft, a future decree, where everything is said.

Now, I am accused of being first secretary of the Russian CP Central Committee, and I have worked at this post for exactly 12 days. Once again, I will tell you that neither the Politburo, nor the Russian CP Central Committee Plenum, nor the secretariat, not the organizational structure alone adopted a decision supporting the committee, or sent a single document to oblast party committees...

And one more thing. The 36 cases where materials were definitely adopted on support. Does this truly characterize today the criminal character of the party as a whole?

And lastly. It seems to me that questions related to the party's financial operations, I am hearing many of these cases for the first time from the lips of the minister of justice, we will prepare them specially with the aid of an expert commission. We will request permission for access to the archives. Right now, we do not have access to them. We will prepare with the aid of specialists. We are ready to participate along with you in the analysis of these materials.

We will have to pay for Bolshevism. And dearly...

[V. I. Morokin] Comrade Kuptsov, I think that your anger at the hearings being biased is in vain. Taken as a whole, they have not only touched upon recent events, but our entire lives. And how the CPSU has influenced them... Remember how in those long-ago years people, who for various reasons were hard to eliminate (they were too well known), were simply taken away. The first stage. Those who were not so well known were taken to GULAGs, eliminated, crushed. I, incidentally, grew up in places like that.

1961. Remember how we were striding towards communism, which was scheduled for 1980? There was then one, literally, sinister phrase that you and I will take years to get over,—the blending of all nations and nationalities into one people. A culture that is national in form, socialist in content... I am a representative of the Committee on Science and Public Education. Thousands of hours are spent on the parasitic sciences, and I am not ashamed of that word.

The history of the CPSU, political economics, Marxist-Leninist philosophy—those well-fattened textbooks...

And the sum: we have lost intellect, started disagreements between people, wiped out religion. But who ignited our anger in this great land where there is room for everyone? Were are the 200 nations? How are we to live now, when you don't know where to live? And it was you and your party who did this! Some you enticed with populism, while others you lured, caressed with paternalism. It was a well-chewed bone, but you threw it. I, myself, am from Issyk-Kul. You should see the sanatorium that was built there for the CPSU Central Committee! Inside, there is a pool with fishies. And next door—a pioneer camp: a stable! And not one person was ashamed.

[O. V. Plotnikov] I would like to tell Comrade Kuptsov—you know, in this world, sooner or later you pay for everything. And now, naturally, the party will have to take responsibility for what the it hasn't wanted to pay for from its accounts over the last few years. Sooner or later someone has to pay for any kind of Bolshevism, often not the actual perpetrators of the crimes, but those its heirs.

And secondly. I would, all the same, like to give a word of warning. Emotions under these circumstances are natural. But we are still parliamentarians. It is a very large danger that in criticizing Bolshevism, one can

oneself facilitate the growth of a new Bolshevism, that will bear, possibly, different colors and, maybe, will even be anticommunist in some of its ideals, but if it preserves the elements of force, the ideas of intolerance towards its opponents, towards its enemies, it will be exactly the same Bolshevism, and, in exactly the same way, sooner or later, unavoidably, because of it there will be something to pay, someone to pay it to, and someone to demand payment from.

Possible Motives Behind Interrogation Tapes Leak Explored

924B0054A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 22 Oct 91 p 3

[Article by Yuriy Petrov: "Is It Not an Incredible Fact That the DER SPIEGEL Journalists Have Outwitted Both the Procurators and the Chekists"]

[Text] And so, here are the versions: How, why and for what purpose did the video recording of the interrogations of the main personages in the August putsch end up in the West?

The answer to the question "for what purpose?" is quite simple: In order to be publicized. But why should they be publicized prior to the conclusion of the investigation? Here everything is not quite apparent. Although, in my opinion, this marks the clearly fixed beginning of a long-playing action toward softening the sentence of the putschists, or simply toward their total rehabilitation.

We must keep in mind the fact that the putschists, before they came to be called this by the victors, had numerous supporters in the country. I believe that even today far from all have denounced them and consider the cause for which the conspirators tried to overthrow the USSR President to be a just and even a sacred one: Gorbachev, they said, had weakened authority, sold out to the democrats, destroyed the country, and with the aid of Shevardnadze and the socialist alliance, together with Yeltsin and Yakovlev, opened the door to capitalism... But they would bring about order with a firm hand. As they had promised.

Many believed in this. Even now, it seems, they believe it. Especially on the background of the continuing disintegration of the state, the fruitlessness of the economic transformations, the progressive growth of prices, and the impoverishment of the main mass of the population. And the worse things become in the country, the more all this, if you will pardon the expression, plays into the hands of the conspirators. We warned you, they say, look at the risk we took in order to prevent it, but they put us behind bars. But it is the people who must pay for the Gorbachev-Yeltsin experiment...

Let us leave aside for the moment this populist-speculative reasoning, its inconsistency and primitivism. However, we must not forget that such reasoning still pulsates among the people. The presidents, the KGB, the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], and the army are all

well aware of it. Of course, the intensive witch hunt has closed many mouths, but not so much that the professionals in their work are not able to learn the truth.

Certain coincidences draw attention to themselves. Even before the publication in DER SPIEGEL, the procurator's office announced that the investigation of the GKChP [State Committee for Emergency Situation] will hardly be concluded this year, and that the trial will be held sometime in February or March of 1992.

Political scientists, economists, and smart people in general predict: We must wait for the peak of civil dissatisfaction in the country to be reached in the spring of next year. Or perhaps there may even be some excesses due to the shortage of food products.

If we consider the fact that the membership of the investigative committee which allowed (if not facilitated?) the unlawful leak in investigative materials from the investigative offices should retire in full complement, together with the RSFSR Procurator General, then the investigation will drag on even longer, and the trial will be pushed back specifically to the spring. (Obviously, if such retirement occurs, which, honestly speaking, we do not believe).

Will the hypothetical worries in the country (whose realities no one dares deny) which are caused by the natural dissatisfaction with the new authorities not influence the results of the judicial investigation? And will the future court, under conditions of increasing social tension, dare to condemn those who "suffered for the people"?

Yet there can be no doubt about the fact that the "information leak" was organized, since this operation, in my opinion, was performed in such an amateurish manner that it is impossible to overlook.

We know that the interrogation which was tape recorded took place at one of the KGB bases outside the city. Even the place is specified—in the region of Solnechnogorsk. One need not be a procurator and high ranking investigator to guess that one should check for the presence of eavesdropping, videotaping and recording apparatus in such an "office" prior to undertaking such a crucial action as the interrogation of the coup leaders.

There is one of three possibilities: Either they did not check thoroughly enough and did not find anything—and this raises the question of the qualification or casual work performance of the investigators; Or the KGB workers carefully concealed the fact that the interrogation was recorded on the "conspired" videotape, thereby casting doubt upon their loyalty to the new authorities and to the law; Or finally, neither the procurator's office nor the KGB are not at fault here, but the leak was organized by permission from above, we might say.

Or perhaps the solution to what happened is as simple as can be? Perhaps the effectiveness of the DER SPIEGEL

intelligence is an order higher than the effectiveness of the KGB counterintelligence?

It is true, any sensation is still a means of achieving an end. But what end?

We may assume, and even synonymously affirm, that there are forces which are concerned by the situation forming around Mikhail Gorbachev. I am referring to the campaign undertaken as if on command—to tie the name of the USSR President with the putsch and the putschists in a definite manner, marring his reputation as scandalously as possible. After all, even the publications which consider themselves super-objective could not hold back from publishing: M. Gorbachev knew about the putsch which was in preparation, he was apprised of it...

This statement is just as laughable as it is malicious. The target of this campaign is not the USSR President himself, and—through him—the discreditation of perestroika, the democratic transformations, and the new thinking as an inevitable historical process, which was just as long-awaited and necessary in the West as it was in the East. The very process cannot be stopped now by any forces. However, the source of this process may be polluted, if they try hard enough. And so they are trying.

And here the forces, I would call them the forces of perestroika, have opted for removing all the gossip around Mikhail Sergeyevich at once. There is one method for this: To publicize the confessions of the putsch leaders themselves, made by them at the very beginning of the investigation, when the subjects of the investigation are not yet guided by calculation, but by the desire to express themselves, to cast off from their soul a load so heavy that it sometimes appears unbearable for one of them. In such a state they did not shield each other. They also did not shield the President.

Yet in their confessions we did not even see a hint of anything that would allow us to suspect the USSR President in any way.

We might even say that these forces—whether they were in the West or here—achieved their set goal: Gorbachev stands before us worthy in the highest degree in the light of these publications.

It is true, one other version remains, which is no less plausible: Someone who had access to the tape simply stole and sold it, so as to get rich, consumed by jealousy of the wealth of Artem Tarasov. And this action has almost no political moment. Let us recall the leak of N. S. Khrushchev's memoirs to the West... Particularly since, under conditions when officially, by licenses and without them, the country offers everything for sale—gold, tanks, furs, cosmodromes, bread, and even islands—to get rich off of the protocols of an interrogation of unsuccessful conspirators is not an unpardonable sin.

And in this case these were professionals. They took everything into account: The fact that the KGB was dissipated and its people were scurrying about in panic so as not to fall under the steamroller of repressions, and were more concerned with their own personal problems; the fact that the euphoria of the Russian procurator's fraternity had reached its apogee—just look, they have in their hands the chief of Lubyanka, untouchable by law or investigation; and evidently even the fact that the USSR President, during his forced isolation, somehow managed to organize the sending of a video tape bearing his statement through the impenetrable "zone of vigilance".

But, it seems, we will never learn the true reasons for the leak of these documents—the price of this operation is too high, it would have had to make a breach in too many spheres in order to go beyond the zone of interception. And the official investigation ordered by the Procurator General will most likely lead to naught: The cheese has been eaten, but the mousetrap did not work. Moreover, his statements to the effect that the investigation is not related to the leak in interrogation protocols leads us to certain thoughts. After all, is the official investigation already completed? Then how can we explain the hastiness of the conclusions?

Nevertheless, we believe, we should not treat this occurrence as a curiosity arising from the general bedlam which has permeated even into the sphere of the law enforcement organs. The curiosity lies elsewhere.

The leak, the worldwide publication and the multimillion copy echo by the most democratic publications in our country represented the figures of the conspiracy leaders in a different light than they were depicted at the meetings and at the barricades on Krasnopresnenskaya Street. Not as villains, not as criminals against their people, not as bloodsuckers, not as hirelings... They arose as such not in the shouted populist "appeals" and "announcements", not at the meetings for show, but in the discussions with investigators, as in the spirit. Such talks are even more believable than the television announcements of idols. Since they, the latter, are intended for the public, and the former—as the repentance of sinners, when the more sincerely you speak, the more you will be believed and forgiven.

Just so this repentance does not come back to us as an unkind echo in the forthcoming and inevitable shake-ups.

And in conclusion: By all indications, this is not the last of the sensations which will accompany the investigation in the case of the state overthrow.

Leniency for Coup Leaders Advocated

924B0054B Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 22 Oct 91 p 3

[Article by Aleksandr Oskin: "Why the Junta's Tanks Stopped at the Signal Light"]

[Text] Two months have passed since that memorable August day when the three-day race of the group of GKChP [State Committee for Emergency Situation] leaders began, with its start at the Kremlin offices and its finish at Matrosskaya Tishina. It seems that since that time only a lazy person has not written about the attempted state overthrow in the "world's first state of workers and peasants"... Nevertheless, I will dare to present for the reader's attention several ideas regarding the putsch leaders and their GKChP-ism.

And so, the most important and principle question in this entire putschist history is why did the plot fail? Certain observers even allow themselves free thinking such as—but was there a boy? In other words, was there a plot in general?

One of my very good friends, a worker at the USSR MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] told me that on the morning of 19 August he, like all his colleagues, watched closely from the window of his office the events taking place in Sadovoye Koltso, over which tanks were moving. Suddenly he realized in amazement that the column of armored vehicles was obediently stopping at the red light signal. Can you imagine? There is a state overthrow in the country, and the tanks are stopping at a red light!... The MFA worker immediately decided that this entire overthrow was an operetta.

I do not share his conclusion about the "operetta". But this noted detail, in my opinion, best characterizes both the putsch itself, and its organizers. This was really a plot of the ill-fated. Nevertheless, it was still a plot.

However, I will allow myself to express my own hypothesis: The overthrow was unsuccessful only because its initiators were to a significant degree infected with the virus of change, the virus of perestroika. All of them were already different. If you like—these were high-positioned children of perestroika. They were already playing by new rules, and this is specifically why they were incapable of implementing their project by the old methods—through direct violence, through blood, arrests, and camps.

I believe that any sane-minded person understands quite well that the modern army and this very same KGB, even with all the spontaneity in the organization of the putsh, could easily have taken the "White House" by storm. The order had only to be given. Yet this order never came. Yazov labored long in his office, and finally came to the point that he gave the order—not to storm, but to withdraw the troops from Moscow. Kryuchkov, the main motor of the putsch, as we learn from the protocols of the interrogation published in *DER SPIEGEL*, gave an explanation over the telephone about the inexpediency of introducing emergency measures in the regions without acute need. Pavlov and Yanayev were simply "precipitated". The other GKChP members were obvious marionettes, so to speak, candidates for the wax

museum. (I am not speaking of Pugo: About the deceased one should either speak well or say nothing at all).

And so, in the three days and the subsequent weeks, this entire cohort stimulated such radical changes in the country which, with the normal course of events, would have taken long and difficult years to realize. As it became clear from the USSR President's television interview, his primary secret goal was to forestall a possible putsch for as long as possible. That is, to put it off to the point where it would become impossible, or, if it were to happen, would be doomed to defeat... And M. Gorbachev achieved this goal. I will note that in this sense many observers see in him the main "conspirator". I would call this not the plot of M. Gorbachev, but a fine political calculation, a skillful strategy. Gorbachev won. He began this hand. He counted it out and realized it.

For six years, M. Gorbachev has consistently and delicately destroyed the Stalinist legacy in the country. He shuffled the cadres. He did not throw anyone too far away. And the entire country, slowly but surely, drifted toward common sense. If we may say so, the President "duped" everyone. And so skillfully that long before the putsch, he made its future organizers bloodless. He drew sound conclusions from the fate of N. Krushchev and won out over all his "comrades in arms"...

Today, when the putschists are sitting in the "quiet house" and are being accused of treason to the Homeland, I think we should stop and think about their fate. Thanks to their efforts—just think!—we all immediately bid farewell to the totalitarian party, to the totalitarian structures, and freed ourselves from the all-powerful nomenclature. Democracy has won the long battle with relatively few casualties, largely accidental... For what should the putschists be put on trial?

And what Homeland did they betray? I am not trying to get into a discussion—do the GKChP leaders fall under Article 64 of the RSFSR Criminal Code? Let the jurists argue over this matter. I am simply testifying to the results which turned out to be the opposite of their spirit and goals. I am calling for leniency.

Leaf through the independent Soviet publications and read the letters of the readers. Many propose pardoning the putschists, letting them go in peace, but placing them on equal living conditions with the people, with the pensioners, forcing them to stand in lines, to redeem coupons, to economize on groats and sugar, etc. In general, the people do not thirst for blood. They thirst for justice.

I will say more. Within the public consciousness, there is a certain atmosphere of compassion which is beginning to be formulated toward the political prisoners held in Matrosskaya Tishina. Why? Because, alas, not everything around them is done blamelessly and in strict accordance with the law, and even with the nobility of victors. T. Gdlyan even announced that the circumstances surrounding the arrest of A. Lukyanov led him to

the thought that the former leader of Soviet parliament was being pushed toward suicide. Film producer S. Govorukhin went even farther, announcing his sympathies and kindly feelings toward Lukyanov in a television interview.

Just take a look. Are not the former putschists by this, i.e., by the chain of errors and oppressions in the investigation, not being turned into martyrs?

...Of all the putschists, for me Yazov evokes the greatest sympathy. I am writing about this frankly because in the past I had been his irreconcilable opponent. A year ago in OGONEK, in an article on the problem of the Soviet military presence in Poland, I wrote what I thought about the leadership of the Ministry of Defense. I also know that Yazov, in one of his notes addressed to the President in the summer of last year, "tattled on me", so to speak, for my announcements in the Polish press regarding the SGV [northern military group] (during my term as first secretary of the embassy in Warsaw). And it is specifically for this reason that I have the right to say today that we must treat the former Minister of Defense in a Christian manner. We must give a full and strict evaluation of his behavior, but we must show mercy.

I am not calling for a justification of the putsch or the putschists. God forbid. A crime was committed. A most terrible crime. The trial must be held. A righteous trial. I believe this is necessary for all of us, for all of society.

The trial will come to pass. I hope its sentence will be a civilized and humane one. The main thing for all of us is to learn the whole truth, to hear a juridically unimpeachable evaluation... And perhaps not so much even in regard to the putschists as in regard to the structures involved in the putsch. Because the putschists may be destroyed, but the "pardoned" structures will give rise to new ones. The sentence for the people must be, in my opinion, a merciful one.

We really will have to judge the children of perestroika. They must necessarily be judged also, among other things, to discourage others in the future.

However, we must not forget that the tanks of the putschists nevertheless did stop at the red light. And this already is a mighty victory of our time.

Expert Points to Legal Aberrations in Interrogation of Putschists

924B0054C Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Oct 91
Union Edition p 8

[Article by V. Rudnev: "The Case of the GKChP Through the Eyes of DER SPIEGEL TV, With Commentaries by a Soviet Criminologist"]

[Text] We have already seen the film clips chronicling the coup as presented by Russian television. Actually, we did not receive any new factual data from the interrogations of the GKChP [State Committee for Emergency

Situation] leaders. Everything that V. Pavlov, D. Yazov and V. Kryuchkov spoke about was in general already known from the journalistic investigations. Except maybe that the "Senezh" sanatorium, the site of the first interrogations, was news to us. Therefore we, supplementing the DER SPIEGEL viewing series, are publishing our own photograph of the first place of confinement of the putschists, taken from the IZVESTIYA files.

Nevertheless, there was a sensation. We saw how the investigators worked on the GKChP case. We must say directly that the impression we got from their work was not the most favorable. They often interrupted the subject being interrogated, not giving him a chance to fully express the thought which he had begun. They asked leading questions, persistently trying to get the accused to accept the investigator's version of a conspiracy for the purpose of overthrow of authority... But am I not being too picky? Perhaps these are only a viewer's emotions?...

Let us listen to a specialist in the tactics of conducting investigative actions. Vladimir KRYLOV, candidate in juridical sciences and senior scientific associate at the MGU [Moscow State University] juridical faculty department of criminology, comments on the video tape of the interrogations of Valentin Pavlov, Vladimir Kryuchkov and Dmitriy Yazov.

[Correspondent] Vladimir Vladimirovich, to what degree is the application of video taping justified in such cases?

[Krylov] A video tape, from the standpoint of criminology, is the best means of recording the course and results of the investigative action. Such a measure not only reflects the essence of the interrogation with absolute precision, but also makes it possible in the future—during court review—to control the work of the investigator. However, an interrogation should be video taped in accordance with certain rules. Specifically, the time of the interrogation should be recorded on the screen. Unfortunately, from this standpoint, part of the video tapes of the interrogations, as for example that of Marshall Yazov, is faulty. Some of the frames do not contain any indications of the time. Then again, such shortcomings may be explained by the fact that our investigative organs are extremely poor, and usually are simply not equipped with special technology. Nevertheless, they should have found the necessary equipment for such an important case...

[Correspondent] Then let us turn to the essence of the interrogations. We know that Yazov and Kryuchkov were brought to the "Senezh" at about 4-5 o'clock in the morning on 22 August. Judging by the information published in the press, however, Yazov's interrogation began, at the minimum, at 8 o'clock on the morning of that same day. That means that the detainees, considering the fact that they had not slept during the night, had practically no time to rest prior to the interrogation. What does criminal science recommend in such cases?

[Krylov] By law, interrogations may be conducted only in the interval between 6 o'clock in the morning and 10 o'clock at night. From this standpoint, there would seem to be no violation. On the other hand, the psychological state of the subjects of the interrogation, of course, significantly affects the quality of the testimony. For example, it is useless to interrogate someone who is drunk or under the influence of drugs. It is difficult to evaluate Yazov's condition on that morning. Evidently, he was extremely excited or depressed by his detainment. And if this is so, he should have been given time to rest. Otherwise, the testimony value of the interrogation is reduced in this situation. By the way, please note that the interrogation of V. Pavlov on 23 August was begun at around 6 o'clock in the morning. Considering his sickly condition, early morning was hardly the best time for his interrogation.

In general, I doubt the expediency of detailed interrogations of the persons detained on 22 August. I believe the investigators opted for this more for the sake of reporting "to higher-ups" than in the interests of the case. After all, in order to substantiate the suspicions which had arisen, other proof was first of all necessary: documents, testimony of witnesses... The investigators did not yet have any of this. Therefore the interrogations were conducted in a sloppy, unplanned manner.

[Correspondent] Yes, it seems to me too that the questions were asked, as they say, "off the ceiling"...

[Krylov] Not only "off the ceiling". This is not yet the greatest sin of the investigators. They went in direct violation of the law by asking leading questions, those which suggest or imply a certain answer.

[Correspondent] And how should the interrogation be conducted?

[Krylov] The interrogation begins with the request to tell everything one knows about the case. Here the person interrogated must be allowed to tell his story freely, without being interrupted by the investigator. The investigator must ask his questions to clarify the facts and the position of the interrogated subject after the subject has finished talking. However, we saw something entirely different on the screen: From the very beginning the investigators literally disoriented the subjects with their questions. The putschists tried to explain something, and the interrogator, without letting them finish, would ask a new question. You cannot conduct an interrogation that way. Then again, it is difficult to draw a final conclusion: We saw only a fragmentary montage of the interrogations.

From the editors: As we have just learned from informed sources, most, if not all of the video recordings on the GKChP turned out to be in the possession of DER SPIEGEL. Our information is also indirectly confirmed by the German side, which announced that it has 15 hours of video taped interrogations in its possession. And if this is so, then DER SPIEGEL, in the words of

lawyers, has information even from those interrogations which comprise state secrets.

Seamen Who Smuggled Gorbachev Videotape Identified

924B0049A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 15 Oct 91 p 1

[Report attributed to "our own information": "Will Noncom S. Lavrikov Make Admiral?"]

[Text] The man has been located who helped send the videotape of M. Gorbachev's speech from Foros.

This was the statement of V. S. PODZIRUK, people's deputy and member of the USSR Supreme Soviet investigative commission on the August 18-19 coup:

—It was a serviceman from a marine unit of the USSR KGB border troops commanded by Igor Alferyev. After Captain 3rd Rank Mikhail Krikunov made the following report by radio on 19 August at 1035 to the unit commander from the border patrol ship guarding the President directly in the body of water where his residence is located: "The president is alive! I see him and his family walking along the beach",—Alferyev decided to sail the president's personal yacht "Krym" from Yalta to Balaklava, refuel it, and attempt to make contact with Gorbachev in order to get him away from Foros, to save him. But how? Alferyev had already lost contact with the president's dacha, known as "Zarya" by the border guards, on 18 August at about 1600. At the border post in Foros there was also no contact with "Zarya".

As the border post informed Alferyev, on 18 August at 1700 its technician, Ensign Nikolay Khvorov, at the Foros signal office detected his countrymen from the KGB service guard, who had shut down communications. At 1600 on 19 August, Alferyev was informed of the absence at "Zarya" of General Medvedev, the only person who knew the president's entire security system. And then, at his own risk, Alferyev called NCO Sergey Lavrikov. This was the only one of the marine border guards that the president's personal guards knew: every summer Sergey drove the Gorbachev family on a small recreational boat. And it was through none other than him that Gorbachev's personal guard passed the package with the request to send it on to the address indicated. Which Lavrikov did.

P.S.: We received this information from a person who wishes to remain anonymous. The prize that was promised earlier (Gorbachev vodka—see the October 12 edition of KP) has found an owner.

Privileges Commission Investigates Embezzlement by High-Level Officials

924B0049B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 15 Oct 91 p 4

[Article by S. Sokolov: "What Was in Gorbachev's Black Folder"]

[Text] In spring of this year, after a whole series of scandals concerning state dachas that had been feverishly acquired for next to nothing by many members of the government, the president of the USSR (not without pressure from the deputies) gave the order to study the activities of the economic administration of the former USSR Council of Ministers [KhOZU]. Towards the middle of summer, the investigation was completed. Its results evidently stunned even the president. In any case, on 10 July Mikhail Gorbachev signed a drastic resolution: "that order be imposed and the guilty be punished". He was supposed to receive a report on the measures taken in fifteen days. But the president's order was not executed on 25 July, nor was it executed in a month, or now, almost two months after the events of August. And it is being ignored, as you can guess, by no means not because the prime minister has turned up in Davy Jones' locker, and his administrator of affairs—in the hospital. The fact is that all of the main actors in this dossier made it through the recent shocks completely unscathed and are either safely residing in their old positions or settling into new, democratic seats.

None of the directives that seriously infringed upon the interests of this clan were ever fulfilled. Ella Pamfilova, secretary of the USSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Questions of License and Privileges, has at her disposal a unique document, the timely publication of which could very naturally lead to a government crisis and the resignation of Prime Minister V. Pavlov. It makes clear that besides his love for government coups and changing money, in his post as premier, Valentine Pavlov always had great success in the field of forging documents and deceiving parliamentary commissions. One day in February, the prime minister received a letter from the Commission on Questions of License and Privileges in which the deputies demanded that the sale of dachas to ministerial and departmental ministers for next to nothing cease. What does Premier Pavlov do? On 7 February, he signs two resolutions with different content, but under the same number—PP-3985. The first version of the resolution was compiled especially for the Supreme Soviet Commission on Privileges, and in it, Pavlov is indignant, demanding that the ministries accept deputies' criticisms "for leadership and execution". But in the second version, the premier only sends a note from the parliamentarians to their colleagues "for witnessing"—careful, don't get burned... And further, naturally, the first version is sent to parliament, and the second—to the ministries. (On the copy intended for xeroxing, the cynical signature-instruction is preserved: "USSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Questions of

Privileges and License—...make no copy”, in other words, the deputies get the first version).

E. Pamfilova: Not long ago in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, I read the sincere confessions of Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov. He made high-sounding pronouncements about how he had never worked for his own advantage—“...we had pure thoughts and clean hands”. I don't want to be biased; for a long time I respected Ryzhkov, but after what our commission has managed to discover, I cannot believe that his hands are clean.

How can one trust the pure thoughts of Nikolay Ivanovich and his colleagues after hearing, for example, the results of an inspection of the distribution of living space in the Council of Ministers:

From the Black Folder

“1025 people, out of a total of 7156 employees, are waiting in the line for all categories of workers for improvements in living conditions. Over the test period, 1200 apartments were distributed (45 thousand square meters of living space), out of which 315 apartments were allotted to apparatus employees and members of the government. Violations of housing legislation were committed in the distribution of 492 apartments, of which 200 were for apparatus employees and members of the government. The basic violations consisted of the assignment of living accommodations for family members, children and grandchildren not residing with their parents. They concern members of the families of Comrades Shcherbina B. Ye., Aliyev G. A., Mostovoy P. I., former USSR Council of Ministers deputy chairmen; Comrades Semyonov Yu. K., Tolstykh B. L., Kolesnikov V. G., Systsov A. S., Shkolnikov A. M., Isayev A. S., ministers and state committee chairmen; Shkabardnya M. S., former USSR Council of Ministers administrator of affairs; Comrade Nazarbayev N. A., Kazakh SSR president; and a series of others.

Especially flagrant violations were committed in the distribution of apartments at building 7-a on Savelevskiy Lane. I would like to direct your attention to the unjustified assignment of apartments to Comrade Sterligov A. N., former KhoZU chief; to the daughter of Comrade Ryzhkov N. I., and to Comrade Savakov V. A., former assistant to the USSR Council of Ministers chairman.

As you recall from your reading of the dossier, Mikhail Gorbachev requested that “the guilty be punished”. In accordance with the findings of the commission, the main parties guilty of violations are M. Shkabardnya, former Council of Ministers administrator of affairs, and the leadership of the economic administration, A. Sterligov, V. Kozelko and N. Mironov. In the end, only Shkabardnya was unlucky—he was not sent as an ambassador to Turkey. The rest are in the pink. Sterligov is an administrator in the apparatus of A. Rutskiy, the RSFSR vice president; Kozelko is head of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers financial and economic department; Mironov is working there, also, as the chief accountant.

One might ask, who is this Kozelko! But it is to us that he is Kozelko. While for the entire nomenklatura of Moscow, the favor of KhoZU head, Kozelko, is everything. It means the well-being of your family—an apartment, furniture, clothing, food, a car brought to your doorstep. Kozelko is a man to whom everyone is indebted—from members of the government to the last driver or security guard. And at whose expense! Who is interested in the fact that last year, expenditures for the maintenance of the Council of Ministers apparatus were 7.4 million rubles greater for a total of 124.4 million...”

[Pamfilova] And maybe we should recall the old Russian word “embezzlement”? Embezzlement, which has become the norm for our government and its apparatus. Embezzlement, elevated only to the order of deserved privileges. For example, what would you call a minister's purchase of a suite of furniture that is completely new, but has been obligingly marked down and reserved for him by the head of KhoZU, Kozelko? Just last year, Council of Ministers executives “reserved” in this manner articles at the cost of 748.5 thousand rubles. And, along with this, another 1 million 801 thousand worth of goods had already been purchased towards the next “reservation”!

From the Black Folder

“At the given facilities, home appliances, rugs, suites of furniture and other property was sold in large quantities at prices marked down up to 75 percent with the permission of the KhoZU leadership. The percent discount and the technical condition was determined arbitrarily.

And so, for example, at the pension ‘Zhukovka’, Comrade Shchadov M. I., coal industry minister, acquired property worth 7772 rubles; Comrade Biryukova A. P., former USSR Council of Ministers deputy chairman—worth a total of 1520 rubles; Comrade Katushev K. F., minister of foreign economic contacts—4946 rubles; Comrade Bugayev B. P., former minister of civil aviation—9378 rubles.

At the health complex ‘Sosna’: Comrade Sterligov A. N., former KhoZU head, acquired material commodities with a value of 14,200 rubles; Comrade Savakov V. A., assistant to the USSR prime minister—8200 rubles; Comrade Voronin L. A., former USSR Council of Ministers deputy chairman—12,000 rubles; Comrade Belousov I. S., former USSR Council of Ministers deputy chairman—3600 rubles; Comrade Shkabardnya M. S., former USSR Council of Ministers administrator of affairs—4102 rubles. In all, property worth 89 thousand 840 rubles were sold to 24 people.”

And, naturally, the bosses' staff was not going to be left out. All the more, as it had long ago and solidly made the switch to complete self-maintenance. Let's say that 60 percent of the staff of the famous government sewing shop (now a consumer services agency) is made up of employees of KhoZU and its system—the motor depot,

the buildings administration, the furniture factory, the print shop, the catering group, cafeterias, rest homes, subsidiary enterprises.

One can see the very same picture in the famous Kremlin buffet No. 4, which serves the Council of Ministers chairman and members of the government. Nearly 80 percent of the deficit food products that are sold there, incidentally, at no extra cost, don't make it to the ministers. But the consumer activity of KhoZU employees increases significantly right before a price hike.

From the Black Folder

"In March of this year, the portion of KhoZU system employees out of the entire number of customers at men's and women's outer clothing factories and fur farms grew to 48 percent. They received 64 percent of all of the women's fur hats sold this month, and 33 percent of the men's muskrat hats.

Privileges for members of the government are often transformed into the unlimited provision of services and goods for their families and relatives. For this reason, for example, in the name of Comrade Smirnov L. V., from the end of 1990 to the beginning of 1991, three custom-made women's coats were ordered, mink, karakul, and karakul with marmot; in the name of Comrade Katushev K. F. in March of this year, the sale of three women's fur hats was documented. Fairly frequently, family members continue to take advantage of preferential treatment, regardless of changes in their situations. When this happens we see, in the space for "work place" on the one-time order blanks issued by KhoZU, the signatures of 'fiance of A. F. Gorkin', and 'daughter-in-law of A. I. Mikoyan'..."

In the mean time, the suite of furniture or the sausage at a quarter of the price are merely trifles that make life more pleasant; they are not the chief articles of income for the active people from KhoZU. This is the comfort of distinguished retirees, former members of government, who, over long decades, became accustomed to the state's care and, thank God, didn't see the need for any sort of private business. In joining the ranks of former members, they very likely should have felt the whole depravity of the system they had created and, consequently, all of the humiliating dependence on some administration or the head of some financial agency. It is doubtful that former Council of Ministers chairman, N. Ryzhkov, or his deputies, L. Abalkin, I. Belousov, L. Voronin or V. Gusev, or the executive staff of the USSR Supreme Soviet are experiencing any great satisfaction from the fact that they now are granted admission to their beloved Kremlin buffet No 4 as an exemption obtained through an oral order by Kozelko.

The appointment of personal automobiles to the former rulers of our destinies is accomplished in much the same way, like a charity or an allegiance to clan traditions:

From the Black Folder

"By a directive of KhoZU issued 29 June, 1977, motor depot managers are ordered to provide automobile service from the general pool for personal retirees and members of their families on a priority basis. This decree has still not been revised.

Official automobiles are also issued cost-free and without the appropriate government resolutions to members of the families of former USSR Supreme Soviet deputy chairmen: Comrades Voronin L. A., Gusev V. N., Belousov I. S., Biryukova A. P., Sitaryan S. A.; to the families of Stalin I. V., Zhdanov A. A., Voznesenskiy N. A., Kuusinak O. V., Khrushchev N. S. The adopted daughter of Ulyanov D. I.—Ulyanova O. D., received a limit for automobile use of up to 90 hours a month. A series of former USSR Council of Ministers Administration of Affairs deputies and KhoZU chiefs have the use of up to 30 hours of free services a month."

[Pamfilova] It is hard to say what the chief source of income for KhoZU employees is,—let the consequences tell us that. The one thing that is clear is that the "lower ranks" have definitely been taking their cue from the generals. That same Valentin Pavlov found nothing shameful in the fact that he obtained accommodations for the commercial association "Business World", of which he was president, in the center of Moscow completely free of charge. And so, why should KhoZU's motor depot managers refuse themselves the satisfaction of using the state garage and 100 thousand rubles in the bargain for their own small business "Avtotemp"? Or why shouldn't they be reselling cars at commercial prices? In last the year alone, 110 cars and 33 buses were sold. And the profit made was not entered into the state budget. Over three years, almost 25 million rubles has been accumulated in a special KhoZU fund in a similar manner. For its own use. The laws that were established by the heads of the Council of Ministers for the whole wide world were unanimously violated within the bosom of the Council of Ministers itself. All that was acquired and swindled out of the state budget and state funds using plausible excuses was shared out in the form of bonuses, trips, and cheap sales. Under the protection of the highest officials of the USSR, vulgar embezzlement was taking place. Their privileges became their "share", tips for their silence, for complicity. And while the democrats' factions and divergent movements work out their democratic nuances between themselves, the perfectly preserved party-state bureaucratic clan stays in power the way it was before. A power that, just as it did before August 21st, belonged to the nomenklatura. All privileges are preserved in just the way they were before. And the good old 208th depot services the entire Moscow elite just like it did before. Only its name has changed—now it is the rental agency "Prodskab". (From the editor: it offers 57 kinds of wine and vodka products, a pack of Marlboros costs 3 rubles, and a can of German beer costs 1 ruble 20 kopecks, and so on).

But the strangest thing I see is the fact that now an impetuous merger is taking place between the old and the new democratic nomenclatura. In practically all of the republics, the system of privileges has remained untouched. Only the owners have changed. Nothing has changed in the RSFSR, either. Despite Boris Yeltsin's orders revoking all privileges, they have been preserved. Both in the RSFSR Council of Ministers and in the bosom of Moscow's power. Except that here we are not talking about sausage, but most often about combining state service with private commercial business.

The materials from the investigation confirm yet again the findings of the commission on privileges about the complete lack of control over the higher structures of power in this country. Corruption, embezzlement, massive abuse of one's official position. But where are the guarantees that something like this won't happen now (in the light of privatization), on an even more rapacious scale? On the threshold of radical economic reforms and shocks, people should be 100 percent sure of the sincerity of those who are asking once again that they "tighten their belts". I am convinced that besides the Declaration of Human Rights and Freedoms that we finally adopted a month ago, it is extremely necessary that we adopt one more—a Declaration of Income. Yearly, each person, politicians, government activists even more, must declare their incomes, their real estate and other property. Besides this, we must legally prohibit the combining of government service with commercial business. We must adopt a law on government officials.

Immediately after the events of August, I had the hope that very soon, there would no longer be a need for our commission. I hoped that the new authorities would finally begin to take advantage of this enormous social-consumer sphere in the interests of the people. Unfortunately, this is not happening. Instead of directing its multi-billion dollar profit towards aid for the poor portions of the population, the summer home-health spa complex for the former Cabinet of Ministers continues to serve a select few. It is exactly for this reason that our commission considers necessary the immediate creation of an investigative group that would develop a program for the rational utilization of this and similar complexes.

From the Black Folder

"With the goal of decreasing the expenditure of budget funds, we would propose the prompt revision of the privileges offered to members of the government and employees of the central organs."

Fellow Inmate Recounts Conversations With Kryuchkov

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Union Edition p 7

[Article by Andrey Illesh, Sergey Mostovshchikov: "Several Days in a Cell With Vladimir Kryuchkov: Life in Jail for the Former Chairman of the USSR State Security Committee"]

[Text] Unfortunately, we cannot name the sources for this article. In the published text you will not find any indications of where, when, and under what circumstances IZVESTIYA correspondents were able to obtain information from a person who was held at USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Detention Facility No. 4 in the same cell as Army General and former USSR State Security Committee Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov. The cellmate of ex-Chekhov No. 1 gave us rather convincing reasons as to why he wanted to remain anonymous. First, a final decision has yet to be taken on his fate, and second, he realizes that the new authorities are still trying to keep secret any information concerning the State Emergency Committee with the same enthusiasm with which they urged all progressive mankind to resist the State Emergency Committee. We agreed to withhold the identify of the source on the grounds that this confidentiality would not very greatly harm the quality of an article about life behind bars for the former top officials of the Soviet state.

At present one can only speculate as to when which members of the State Emergency Committee were taken to USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Detention Facility No. 4. After their arrest, their movements were carefully concealed, and the country relied on rumors and conjecture. It was thought that the ideal place to isolate such serious suspects would be Lefortovo Prison—the USSR State Security Committee's detention facility, which enjoys a reputation as the institution with the most reliable security, a highly intellectual inmate population, and quite good conditions for holding them.

At the time, however, the State Security Committee structure was not trusted, and another location was readied for the State Emergency Committee—USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Detention Facility No. 4, which was converted about five years ago from some sort of dormitory into a facility for holding persons under investigation in major mafia cases.

The State Emergency Committee was apparently taken there sometime on or about August 26, late at night; in any event, it is the evening of August 26 that the "clients" of Detention Facility No. 4 remember with a shudder.

Judging from their stories, it was like a nightmare. Without any explanation, they were driven out of their cells into basement rooms that, in prison jargon, are known as the "holds." Wholesale searches got under way. Criminals who had seen everything figured that beatings would follow, that something had happened.

However, there were no beatings.

The panic was triggered by the fact that the administration was completely reviewing the list of detainees at the facility and all criminals were being transferred to other Moscow detention facilities. During the next few days, Detention Facility No. 4 continued to take in members of the criminal elite—mostly bribe-takers, white collar

criminals, and mafia masterminds. Dangerous criminals were moved to other locations.

The purge affected not only the inmate population. All the prison guards and service personnel were replaced. The internal troops were replaced, to all indications, by officers of the Russian Special Police. In any case, according to the person from Detention Facility No 4, he has not seen a single prison guard with a rank below senior lieutenant in the recent past. The officers wear different kinds of uniforms—most often camouflaged fatigues, and all have a tricolor Russian badge affixed to their caps. They are correct but rather strict in dealing with the prisoners. They are apparently not very familiar with prison operations, because everything is like a standard American hit movie: "Hands behind your back," "Face the wall," and so on—things that in Butyrka, for example, which does not enjoy the best reputation, are heard rather infrequently.

In about mid-September, the prisoners of Detention Facility No. 4 had another surprise: Butter suddenly appeared in the prison. They started getting it in the morning and evening. The usual culinary delights in the form of mushy oatmeal and soup made out of canned fish was suddenly accompanied by buckwheat porridge with meat twice a week, potatoes, and—something totally unprecedented—kissel or stewed fruit for dinner.

It's possible that those whom fate sent ordinary cellmates still don't understand just what was going on: What was happening to the Soviet prison system? However, much became clear to one prisoner when he one day wound up in a four-man cell and one of the prisoners, dressed in a warm hand-knitted sweater and sweatpants, introduced himself:

"Kryuchkov."

The anonymous inmate says that never would he have imagined that he would spend several days in the same cell with a former top Soviet official who supervised the most secretive organization in the USSR. He noticed nothing extraordinary about Vladimir Kryuchkov, except for the fact that the former State Security Committee chairman spoke in a polished manner—as if at a podium—and often began his conversations with the words, "Comrades..." He slept on two mattresses for some reason, dressed very warmly, and slept with his slippers on, which promptly became a constant source of jokes in the cell.

Kryuchkov does not give the impression of being a broken man, at least not outwardly. But he is very concerned about his family and even declined a meeting with his wife because his lawyer said she might not be able to take it.

"I somehow thought that he would be a forceful personality, demand that constant attention be paid to him, and so on," said Kryuchkov's cellmate. "But that wasn't the case at all. He behaves himself in an extremely modest manner. I would even say that he does nothing to call

attention to the fact that he's Kryuchkov, he doesn't take the attitude that everyone around ought to know that. For example, I can't eat that oatmeal—it's disgusting. But he sits down and eats it. I asked him: 'Listen, how can you eat that garbage?' And he answered: 'That's the way it's supposed to be.' And he ate it. He also drinks prison tea, without sugar, he's doesn't drink strong tea at all."

Vladimir Kryuchkov begins each morning with 20 minutes of calisthenics. In general, it seems that his attitude toward his own health was of interest to his cellmates. Kryuchkov categorically refused to take any pills, said another criminal who was also a temporary cellmate. On one occasion Vladimir Kryuchkov had a cold, and the whole cell gave him prescriptions and asked the doctors to bring him some medicine. But he refused to take them, explaining that they only harm your health.

Virtually no attempts are made to use Kryuchkov's presence to obtain any indulgences for the cell. The former State Security Committee chairman doesn't like to ask for any allowances. All his cellmates tried to persuade him to ask the administration for a television, because televisions are permitted even in Butyrka. But Kryuchkov refused to ask for one. The only thing he gets upset about is the radio. If it suddenly stops working, the ex-state security chief can even start "smashing the bug," as they say in prison—i.e., ringing for the guards to find out why the radio isn't working.

"He also managed to get them to increase our exercise time," H. continued. "He once asked the prison warden: 'Are we behaving well?' The latter answered: 'Yes, you are.' And then he said: 'I was told that exercise time can be increased for that.' In short, they gave us 20 extra minutes. After that we were allowed to exercise for an hour and 20 minutes."

According to the cellmate, Vladimir Kryuchkov is a meticulous reader of many newspapers. At first, only IZVESTIYA and TRUD were brought to the cell. Then the former army general asked that the list of publications be increased, after which they also started to bring MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS, and OGONEK.

After everyone has read the papers and no one needs them anymore, Kryuchkov sets about analyzing them and carefully highlights, clips, and collects articles about the investigation into the State Emergency Committee and about politics generally. He goes about this in the evening, after everyone is in bed and there's no one to disturb him. One cellmate once told the State Emergency Committee member:

"Lawyers are lawyers, but nobody's going to get you out of this mess except you. You'll be able to speak at your trial. So you should work every day and properly prepare yourself."

And Vladimir Kryuchkov is preparing himself, making notes in his notebook every day.

He is summoned for questioning every afternoon at about 15:00. But the former USSR State Security Committee chairman tries not to say anything about the substance of his questioning, or anything concerning the case of the State Emergency Committee generally. Soviet prison tradition forbids cellmates to show special interest in the details of why a person landed in jail. Excessive curiosity could cause others to suspect you of being an informer, and so old hands try not to pry. If someone wants to tell more about himself, that's his business. Vladimir Kryuchkov doesn't like to talk about the coup and limits himself to participation in general political discussions such as the following:

"Listen, you were so stupid: What didn't you have? You had it all! Why did you cook this whole thing up? Just think, you were the top official of the state. So why did you get mixed up in this business?"

"I was never the top official," Kryuchkov would answer, as a rule. "We wanted to do things in the best possible way, so that no blood would be spilled. We wanted democracy too, only a stricter form."

"Sure, democracy. Then why did you close the newspapers?"

"We didn't close them. We only suspended the ones that were against us, in order to set them straight."

"What about the tanks then, weren't they to spill blood?"

"No. We didn't want blood under any circumstances. It wasn't our fault that it was spilled."

But even these kinds of political discussions are extremely rare. Kryuchkov prefers to talk about poetry, opera, and the theater, which he knows well, to all appearances. He even used to collect theater posters at one time. But within four walls, especially prison walls, you can't hide from politics. And so there are conversations about Yugoslavia and about how things could be far worse for the USSR. About Gorbachev, of whom Kryuchkov speaks with great respect in the presence of his cellmates, about the need for all the former republics to sign an economic agreement as quickly as possible, and about the need to quickly create a single economic space and give free rein to commerce and private property. In such instances, the former state security chief says that he has learned a lot of things since being jailed and that all his views about life and the country have changed radically, but that he personally, unfortunately, can no longer do anything about it because he's sitting in jail.

He was once asked:

"What do you think, how long will it take for private property to be established in our country?"

"I think about 10 to 15 years," Kryuchkov answered. "Our people aren't yet ready for it."

Coup Ideologist Kurginyan on Putsch Failure

924B0074A Kiev KOZA in Russian 5 Oct 91 p 4

[Article by Sergey Kurginyan: "I Am the Ideolog of the Emergency"]

[Text] "O. Lobov, Chairman of the Sverdlovsk Party's brilliant galaxy, has just been appointed by the president to the post of manager of the "underground government," and, as the first business, for the day of 19 August signed the document that granted economic benefits to Kurginyan's "Experimental Creative Center," which was established under the sponsorship of Prokofyev and Pavlov with the mission of "analytical" support of the struggle with the democratic forces. The ETTs' [Experimental Creative Center's] activity has been widely discussed in the press and if this was not known to the first zampred [deputy chairman] of the SM [Council of Ministers], then his level of incompetence exceeds the level of his apostasy if he knew everything." (MOSKOVOSKIYE NOVOSTI)

The book, "The Putsch—a Chronicle of the Alarming Days," which was printed by the Progress Press and the Postfaktum agency, reconstructs a chronicle of the tense events by the hour, contains an analysis of the prehistory and versions of the coup's collapse, and gives a forecast of further development of the political situation in the country.

In preparing this manuscript for the press, RIA president Andrey Vinogradov remarks in the foreword, it was decided not to make any changes in that information which came off teletypes and facsimile equipment of the RIA in those days. We do not want to correct anything in the chronicle of the troubled days. The director of the Postfaktum Information Agency, Gleb Pavlovskiy, adds: the days of opposition joined us in a common effort, the result of which—freedom—was increasingly indefinite with each day. Freedom as a state is similar to information: it is open, and it is dubious and dangerous. But actually we desired this risk. The offered fragment of the chapter, "The Prehistory," acquaints us with the position of one of the ideologs of the emergency, S. Kurginyan. Clearly, we in the editorial office not only did not share this "theory," we are active opponents of it.

The ideolog of the emergency—I was it, I remained it, and I will be it. As the ideolog, I look at what occurs and I understand that I was deeply in the wrong. I am bitter for the three days lost. For the fruitless attempts to graft the intellect to those structures which are not capable of anything except flabby scheming or blunt violence. The CPSU no longer exists. Juridically, this was an outrageous act of lawlessness. But practically, and politically, it was good. At least because now there is a place for creating new political structures, structures which will not begin to stealthily replace the development of ideology, conceptology, and new organizational structures by ludicrous maneuvering on tanks. It was offensive,

disgusting. A feeling of having been spit in the face. And leaving the party also is impossible. I shall remain a member of the CPSU. Whether dismissed, dissolved, or reorganized, and, in any case—subject to pursuit. I shall remain only because it is in a bad way. But I do not believe in the political possibilities of this structure. I do not believe in this human fabric. It must be built all over again.

The putsch showed that it is impossible to rape a society that has existed for 70 years under an established "ideal plan." This society can be transformed only on the basis of an understanding of its nature and its aims.

In 1988 we spoke about the emergency at various places in the country. Then it could have averted great bloodshed. They were not heard. In 1989 the situation needed to be introduced into specific regions. And this also could have saved us from the worst. In 1990 the ChP [emergency] needed to be introduced throughout the entire country. This would have helped. This way it would have been possible to protect something of the positive that society had produced, beginning with 1985. There was still at least some kind of a chance of saving the thin intellectual layer of society at least for the future, to preserve at least some kind of a legal regime in place of total lawlessness, and the main thing, to save the state and send society along a noncatastrophic path of development. It is too late now. And the cause is not just in the GKChP [State Committee for the Emergency]. It was already too late for this. A mass of data indicates that a systemic crisis began inexplicably in April 1991. Right now only a controlled breakup of the state and the recreation of a new one are possible, while stopping the disintegration of the USSR is unthinkable today. And even harmful.

It does not matter what is being said about Gorbachev's manipulations or the notorious GKChP. After the GKChP, even this scenario of controlled disintegration is difficult to the maximum. Only on the other side of catastrophe can a new life begin. Of course, if will be possible to minimize its scale, at least to localize it. The emergency was a most complex thing. The question is not just its constitutionality. It should be observed categorically and unconditionally. And there is no excuse here for what happened. But indeed there are still more components which, unfortunately make the ChP not realizable today. It is a question about the ChP's ideology, about the type of reform produced with the help of the ChP, about organizational structures, resources, organizational designs, and major political structures that are used by responsible authority uniformly throughout the whole land, and not about trivial administrative decisions.... You do not enumerate everything.

I knew several participants of the quasiputsch. I declare that all these people (those who knew) were Gorbachev people in the full and complete sense of this word. He was not mistaken in his choice, they were boundlessly devoted to him, they were spellbound by him, they

idolized him, and at every step they tried to digest his new thoughts..., that is, to do the unfeasible.

The wisest of them unquestionably was Prokofyev. I did not believe that he could permit himself to be drawn into the group adventure. I considered and consider him the most talented and wisest of those who occupied a high place in the party. What could he, a man who was honest, motivated toward his work, sincere, and not pompous, who was an expert in political chess, win in this undertaking? Nothing! I was with him in those days, and I saw how he was suffering from what was going on, how he tried to save the organization, how he suffered from the distortion of his plans. Before this he was absorbed, yes, earnestly absorbed, in the future organization and in the conduct of the party congress. The people who were planning the plot did not behave themselves. In addition to Prokofyev, I knew Pavlov, but far more superficially. He possessed both decisiveness and competence. Not steadfastness. It was his habit to manipulate, acquiring it over many years. And there was an incredible dependence upon Gorbachev.

None of them were capable of violence or murder. This doomed them to destruction. It is difficult to say whether they understand this earlier, but what moved them then? I am convinced that there was no personal self-interest. They were adequately supplied, and they had a guaranteed comfortable place in any eventuality. I am convinced that there was a dominating feeling of despair, hopelessness, and shame from the fact that the state was collapsing before their very eyes. For a pro-stater, the fact that this is occurring right now is torture, since he should see the collapse, be responsible for it, and not have the possibility of being hindered. To say that they went out of their minds means there is nothing to say, but there is such this concept—a borderline state. And only in this way could such people go into this hopeless adventure.

We are speaking about change of the motherland, but where is she, this motherland? Does she exist, or not? And I would like to believe that the USSR President does not sleep nights, asking himself these questions after everything that has happened. I would like to believe that he is capable of recognizing not only the guilt of these people in his eyes, in their own eyes, and in the country's eyes.

The so-called coup that the GKChP undertook was absurd, and this leads to reflection.

The version about the unprofessionalism of the putsch's organizers cannot be accepted. Moreover, we are dealing not with a classical putsch, in which a division commander grabs power with daring, and with the coordinated joint actions of people who occupied such high positions that they did not have to develop some kind of new ideas. It sufficed to press a button of schemes that for years had been developed within staffs and in various

agencies of ours, as there are, then again, even in any other agencies of any other democratic countries whatever.

The machine could not help but operate on 19 August. Consequently, a command simply was not given.

This is about political actions—in the worst case about political intrigue and not about a serious grab for power. No one took power in earnest. And no one wanted to take it. And thus, what did they want and what did they get—that is the question. There is no information for a precise answer. But here are versions that can be formulated.

The first version. The action occurred with the consent of M. S. Gorbachev.

Possibly all the participants in the action or, possibly, only certain of them, agreed to it. Then the suicide of Pugo, who understood too late what was going on, becomes clearer. Right now this version is being worked over most actively by the foreign news media, Sovietologists, psychologists, and specialists from Langley and the Rand Corporation. I have cited it only in order to rebut it. What purposes could Gorbachev pursue by resorting to the risky step? Yes, he destroyed the CPSU, but indeed the CPSU existed only in the imagination of the West and our intelligent persons of narrow interests who are bothered by something. This is an illusion, we are actually speaking partly about a political troupe, partly about an obedient robot. Gorbachev needed the one and the other in order to have a political structure (the robot) and to have a scapegoat.

The same for the army and the KP [Communist Party]. The half-sickly generals and the KGB, who were engaged in upholding their corporate aims....No, these were not the enemies, but a commodity for trade in the political market. And, having deprived himself of this commodity, Gorbachev is losing the game. He loses value in the eyes of the democrats. The role of intermediary between the republics remains, but this can be performed for one or two months, no more. Hypothetically, there could be only one purpose—to clamp down on the democrats, having frightened them with the quasiputsch team and at once taking away this team. But why then was this combination thwarted?

There can be only one answer: one of the coup participants was playing a double game, having turned all the cards over to Yeltsin. This person could be only the chief of the KGB.

The second version. The quasiputsch was a demarche of a strong "rightist" structure, which pushes forward a buffering marionette group of high ranks, sacrificing them for the sake of the success of their combination. I presume that among the officers of the army, the KGB, and the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] there is a conspiratorial "Russian Party," perhaps even monarchistic. True, the question arises: and what do the rightists get in this case? For apparently there were some

utter losses for them. A victory for the democrats, is it not true?! In earnest political chess, a large number of strategic winnings for the "rightists" is evident to me personally.

First, the downfall of the CPSU. Earnest "rightists" always detested the CPSU, and from the start understood the whole ambiguity of its role. But they hated it especially fiercely in the recent period.

Second, the defeat of the USSR. Again, earnest "rightists" always considered the restoration of the Russian Empire necessary, even from the start and in any truncated version. Then, they thought, they could finish fighting the ones that slipped by.

Third, the fall of M. S. Gorbachev and the strengthening of B. N. Yeltsin. Yeltsin is organizing the "rightists" for the time being. They are looking him over....And he them.

Fourth, a reconnaissance for combat has occurred.

Fifth, the turnover of the whole playing field to the "leftists" occurred at a moment obviously unfavorable for them, when they had already succeeded in assuming responsibility but were unable to do anything.

The third version. It is a game against Gorbachev and Lukyanov's and Yanayev's renewed Nomenklatura on the part of the new Nomenklatura, which is going into power with the mask taken off: normal capitalism, without socialist curtsies or, at least, almost without them (bureaucratic capitalism). The interests of bureaucratic (the Nomenklatura) capital (which battles with both the communists and the shadowy ones) are represented by economists Volskiy and Yavlinskiy, and politicians Yanayev and Sheverdnadze.

In this case the game goes also against Gorbachev and against Yeltsin, but consecutively. The first victim being Gorbachev, the second Yeltsin. The second-echelon Nomenklatura sooner or later should clash with the radical democrats, who stand behind Yeltsin, and they are hardly confident of winning this game. In the rest of the third version, the scenario is strongly similar to the first.

In any case, by no means is a winners' banquet awaiting us. That struggle that has been going on until now between the so-called communists and the whole democratic front is being replaced by a new external, more decorous one, and, internally, by a much harsher struggle between the ordinary echelon of the Nomenklatura and the radicals. The first act is finished. And some people were forced to take off their masks. That is what the rules of the game are. But the second act is starting.

After the storming of the Bastille, the storming of the Tuileries goes on, and Gora and his guillotine inevitably arrives to replace Gironde.

Koza's Dossier

Sergey Kurginyan was born in 1950 and by education is a geophysicist and a theatrical director, a candidate of mathematical-physics sciences, president of the multiple-product corporation "Experimental Creative Center," and artistic director of the studio theater "On the Boards." He defines his intellectual interests as "mathematical-politology, and he has been a member of the CPSU since 1987.

Published at the end of 1990, the book, "Postperestroika," (written by an authors' collective under Kurginyan's directorship) has brought to its authors popularity among "pro-staters," who usually are named "rightists" in the USSR: the leaders of "Union" and Premier Pavlov have quoted the book, and during his arrest it was observed on Kryuchkov's desk. This, plus Kurginyan's personal closeness with Pavlov and still greater closeness with the leader of the Moscow communists, Yuriy Prokofyev (arrested for support of the GKChP), made him almost the ideolog of the GKChP in the eyes of many journalists. Kurginyan admits that he shares the values which guided GKChP members but disassociates himself from their senseless acts.

Former Party Officials Seek Parliamentary Posts

PM0611135791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
4 Nov 91 Union Edition p 2

[A. Stepovoy article: "Shades of Yesterday's Men Appear at Midday"]

[Text] A considerable number of deputies who became members of the country's new Supreme Soviet with the republic parliaments' blessing are generally well known for their democratic convictions. There are virtually no former guardsmen from the "Lukyanov intake" left in it. The existing system of ratifying deputations seemed to have almost entirely plugged all possible loopholes allowing the most hated figures to infiltrate the parliamentary arena. Or so you would have thought...

At midday 1 November it became obvious that assertions regarding the political demise of well-known CPSU representatives were somewhat exaggerated.

At that time on that day lists of deputies who had applied for their candidacies to be included in the Soviet of the Union's standing commissions were circulated within the USSR Supreme Soviet. The lists of commissions headed by democratically minded deputies elicited no questions. But one list—that of the International Affairs Commission, of which M. Kanoatov, a deputy from Tajikistan, was elected chairman—caused a slight shock. But see for yourselves.

A. Dzasokhov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; V. Vorotnikov, former member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo; A.-R. Vezirov, former first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee; V. Mironenko, first deputy head of a

CPSU Central Committee department; G. Kiselev, former second secretary of the Kyrgyz Communist Party Central Committee; and G. Borovik, chairman of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace...

It cannot be denied that the upper echelon of the former nomenklatura has not lost the art of choosing the prestigious and influential areas of a deputy's activity. An international arena under the flag of the Union parliament is evidently precisely what the former Communist functionaries are so lacking at present.

But nothing of the sort—a number of deputies put the question to Kanoatov point-blank: How could that have happened? It only remained for him to ask for ratification to be postponed.

No one doubts the deputies' right to aspire to work in the parliament's standing bodies. But the commissions' leaders do after all have certain rights in the formation of their teams. In a similar situation the Legislation Commission, for instance, after receiving Deputy Yu. Golik's application, announced its decision to the chamber's members—not to recommend that his candidacy be included on the voting list. So, the letter of the law was not breached and the commission's prestige did not suffer.

One question remains: Will the above comrades themselves renounce their claim to parliamentary international affairs...

TASS Observer Views Impact of Ban on CPSU, Russian CP

PM1111155391 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 9 Nov 91 p 2

[Untitled commentary by TASS observer Lyudmila Aleksandrova on Yeltsin decree banning CPSU and Russian Communist Party activity on RSFSR territory]

[Text] Why did the Russian president sign this decree if we bear in mind that the Communist Party virtually no longer exists? Was this a desire "to finish off an enemy that has been laid low" or a desire to "write off" present difficulties as "the sins of the CPSU" and create a new "enemy image" on the threshold of the hard times in store with the onset of the economic reform?

It seems that the main reason for the publication of the decree is a fear that former party structures that have survived virtually untouched at local level, in the provinces, will be the main brake on the path of reform. This, for example, is the point of view of RSFSR People's Deputy Vladimir Varov as expressed to TASS's correspondent. In his opinion, if the locally persisting "power of the party structures, albeit repainted in another color," is not eliminated, the reform could be on the skirts.

The ban on the Communist Party will also facilitate a resolution of the issue of CPSU property, the value of which, by all indications, can be reckoned in astronomical figures.

The decree signed by the Russian president notes in particular the inadmissibility of attempts "to blacken the names of millions of ordinary party members who had nothing to do with arbitrariness and violence." Thus Boris Yeltsin is directly confirming that he wants no "witch-hunt," which, incidentally, would lose the Russian authorities the support of the majority of specialists, merely because they were members of the CPSU. It is not without reason that the RSFSR president ignored protests from the most zealous democrats and included in his team the former party apparatchik Yuriy Petrov, whom he made leader of his administration, and Gennadiy Burbulis, a former teacher of scientific communism, who yesterday was appointed to the post of Russian vice premier.

The Communist Party's exit from the political arena has left something of a vacuum. What forces will occupy it? Right now the "heirs" of the ruling party have already declared themselves to be a multiplicity of political organizations, ranging from the neo-Bolshevik supporters of Nina Andreyeva to the People's Party of Free Russia headed by Russian Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy, which calls itself the party of "social partnership."

"The tree has been felled, but new, young shoots are growing from the old trunk"—this was how Gennadiy Zyuganov, former secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee, expressed himself in an interview with TASS's correspondent. A representative of the leadership of the former Russian Communist Party believes that "the democrats have made a big mistake in annihilating the left party." In his opinion, the social tension the economic reform will provoke and the protest movement where no such mass party exists will inevitably lead to the rise of fascist ideology and the "emergence of fuehrers" who will head the masses of malcontents.

The banning of the CPSU signals the close of a major chapter in the country's history. It is not just the party that is disappearing into the past but an entire system of administration that has existed for decades in the Soviet state. The main problem is whether the new authorities will be able to create a viable administrative system in place of the former structures, a system that is particularly necessary during a period of painful economic reform.

Nomenklatura's 'Reanimation Seance' Cited

*PM0511144791 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 1 Nov 91 First Edition p 2*

[Commentary by Leonid Pisanov: "Bankrupts: Reanimation Seance"]

[Text] Shuffling footsteps, the tapping of walking sticks on the concrete steps, puffing and panting, safety rails... exclamations:

"Higher still? But I thought... If only we can make it... We must!"

And here is the cherished fourth floor. People pause, supporting themselves against the walls... A heavy sigh all round.

On the top floor of Chelyabinsk's Sovetskiy Rayon Rayispolkom [rayon soviet executive committee] is a conference hall. People are standing in line at a small table in the foyer—something is being given out. I enquire: They are handing out the policy statement of a newly emerging party of communists. And intending to create this party are Roy Medvedev, Vitaliy Sevostyanov, and company. They were also handing out "homework"—forms for participation in the meeting, on which you were supposed to put your name and thereby join the new party.

Glancing around the foyer I discover two relatively young people, about thirty something. We introduced ourselves. One turns out to be a factory foreman, the other an electric welder-builder. I asked what had brought them to the meeting.

"I was and remain a communist," the foreman replied firmly and assuredly.

"Now is the right time," the electric welder supported him. "When the democrats have overthrown the bloated partocrats."

The thought occurred: The conviction is worthy of respect. But the acknowledgment that the "bloated partocrats" had been overthrown not by them, upholding their principles, but by their opponents—the unloved democrats—sounded painfully naive.

The hall was almost filled with elderly people. And only the initiators of the meeting and its chairpersons—Galina Sachko and Aleksandr Rayevskiy—stand out as being in their prime.

I look into the faces. Well, well, all the familiar faces are here! I counted fifteen or so obkom [oblast party committee] officials alone. And here are raykom [rayon party committee] secretaries, raykom department chiefs, and secretaries of enterprise party committees. In short, of the 110 who gathered at the meeting, roughly one-half were from the nomenklatura. The former nomenklatura, it is true.

However, today they were once more in their element. They it was who set the tone for the meeting. From the very first speeches there resounded, to applause, "Gorbachev is a traitor! The unlawful decree on the suspension of the CPSU's activity must be repealed!"—and not a word about the illegality of the actions of the CPSU leadership in organizing the state coup. Not a word in

condemnation of them. You would think that no documents had been published testifying to the complicity of the CPSU Central Committee and the Chelyabinsk CPSU Obkom in the events of August.

The friendliest applause in the hall greeted the calls "Repeal the decree, revive the CPSU!" True, at times the revanchist tendency was restrained by sober voices, but the "overwhelming" majority, proud of their adherence to Marxist-Leninist dogmas, overwhelmed the free-thinkers. Indeed, the whole mood of the meeting would have better suited the party of Nina Andreyeva than the Marxist platform with which Galina Sachko associates herself. To take revenge—that is what the meeting was calling for. It does not matter on what platform—as long as we reunite. It was onto this "platform" that many of those present here were prepared to jump. To vent their pent up anger against the democrats and the changes—that is why they had come.

It was not easy for the presiding Rayevskiy to keep up with those bursting for action and stretching out their hands. A man sitting in the middle of the hall stood out from the rest—a powerful man, like those I used to meet when I was working in a mine. But there they handled picks or wielded shovels. But here this man was brandishing his white palms and was drowning out everyone with his constant shouting. He would jump from his seat, make for the platform, and shout and shout... Finally he was given the floor. Forcing his way to the rostrum he unburdened his heart. Democracy really got what for! The words "it is fascism" were not the most trenchant in his vocabulary.

Yes, the State Committee for the State of Emergency had people on whom it could rely in the localities, in the heartland. This indeed is what they were counting on. And today these people are to elect delegates to an all-Russian conference of a party of communists, so that these delegates may revive the bankrupt CPSU. And the meeting cheerfully elected this speaker to its coordinating council. Now there is somewhere for his initiative to show itself.

Who is he, the fervent defender of Marxist-Leninist ideas, the irreconcilable adversary of democracy? Aleksey Vasilyevich Nikitin—the permanent aide of M. Voropayev, former first secretary of Chelyabinsk CPSU Obkom, who worked in this post virtually all his party life.

The Nikitins of this world created a blissful isle of communism in their own comfortable niches. The communism of which the toiling masses had been dreaming since 1917 was built in an individual obkom dacha overlooking Lake Smolino in Chelyabinsk. They say that Voropayev and his ilk slept easy and ate sweetly at this dacha. The aides too would get their share from the lord's table. It is this secretarial communism that Nikitin is defending today.

Well, and how did CPSU Central Committee Member Galina Sachko, active participant in the "Marxist Platform" movement, react to the phenomenon of the obkom as portrayed by Nikitin? After all, in her time she firmly slammed the obkom door behind her: As secretary of Chelyabinsk's Tsentralnyy CPSU Raykom she provoked no little wrath from the party apparatchiks by refusing to increase the party salary.

But not a bit of it. She calmly watched the nomenklatura passions rage away. She was perfectly satisfied with the fact that she had been elected for the conference in the capital. All the rest was idle talk. Like the others at the meeting, she did not call for help to get people out of the mire into which the "leading and directing" party had led them. Who has time for such people!

The new party's program, or the appeal that circulated at the meeting, contained a collection of demagogic phrases. Here are some gems. "We must support the soviet principle of organization of the administration of society—people's power at all levels. In this context we must deem unacceptable the introduction of the presidency in the republic as an authoritarian (individual) form of rule."

It is permissible to ask: If the people supported the presidential form of government at the referendum and the people elected the president—surely this is people's power? Another example. "We must develop the economy in the various forms of socialist property." Now just what is this property exactly? The same socialist property which for 74 years in our country was designated the property of the nomenklatura clan?

A vote was taken. For the Russian conference they customarily voted for those who were on the presidium.

...Sighs, the tapping of walking sticks, the shuffling of feet. It is yesterday's CPSU nomenklatura descending the stairs. It is yesterday's men on the move... What took place today was a reanimation seance.

Export of CPSU Funds Under Investigation

LD0411204391 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1900 GMT 4 Nov 91

[From the "TV Inform" program]

[Text] Russia's Procuracy has instituted criminal proceedings arising from the export from the USSR of currency from CPSU funds. The RIA reported today that over 5 billion rubles and \$14 million in cash were found and confiscated during a month of work in various banks and organizations. Investigators believe that the investigation will take considerably more time than all the cases involving the attempted coup.

Past CPSU Financing of Italian CP Revealed*924B0070A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Oct 91 p 5*

[Article by N. Miroshnik, PRAVDA correspondent: "All Truths Are Not Alike: Testimony of an Italian Communist Senator About Party Funds." Dateline, Rome. First, introductory paragraph is in bold font in original.]

[Text] **"The truth must be told, but the truth cannot be divorced from its time in history. And Cossiga (the current President of Italy. - Correspondent's note) is also right when he says that while the cold war was going on, financing from abroad was inevitable, both from the East as well as the West. Now the cold war has ended and we could find out the truth. But there is a struggle for power in the USSR. After the CPSU fell apart, a trade in documents, scholarly books, and accounting data began."**

Armando Cossutta, the Communist Party senator, began his interview with the CORRIERE DELLA SERA with the above monologue. Up until today he had preferred to keep silent. But if it was anyone, it was he who had something to speak about. One of the veterans of the Italian Communist Party (ICP), up to the mid-1970's he was considered the number two man in the party. But later, when the ICP took a sharply critical position with respect to CPSU activities, he headed a kind of "pro-Soviet" internal party opposition. Having left the leadership positions of the party, he remained a member of its Central Committee until recently, and ran for elections to the national parliament. After the ICP had transformed itself into the Democratic Party of Leftist Forces [DPLF], A. Cossutta, together with a group of prominent communists, founded a separate mass organization, the "Movement for the Revival of the Communist Party."

The interview, published in CORRIERE DELLA SERA, was not an impromptu one. As A. Cossutta admitted, as soon as the first news about the secret financing of the Italian communists by the Soviet communists began coming out of Moscow, he dictated four hours of tape recordings in which he told everything that he knew about it. He gave the tape cassettes to a notary office for safekeeping. "You never know what may happen," he now says of his actions, somewhat embarrassed, adding that when he steps out onto the street "he looks all around." A. Cossutta does not deny that Soviet communists provided material assistance to their Italian comrades.

According to the senator, the ICP also financed others. Upon the request of L. Longo, the general secretary of the party, and later, E. Berlinguer, who replaced him, the senator personally was involved in providing financial aid to their Spanish comrades during the Franco regime, to the Greek communists during the Junta, and to the Chilean communists during Pinochet's rule. A. Cossutta confirmed what G. Chervetti, one of the leaders of the DPLF, had said the other day about the Italian Communist Party having received about 2 million dollars annually, right up to 1977, after which it turned down this

assistance. At about the same time, said A. Cossutta, the party decided that commercial firms, mostly import-export firms, would no longer be directly subordinate to the ICP. These firms had been established earlier as sources for supplementary monetary revenues (deductions from profits), since according to the new Italian law on state financing of political parties, the parties henceforth had to publish their budgets. At the same time the senator admitted that after a certain period of discontinuance (tied mainly to the "rift" with the CPSU, as announced by the ICP leadership), money began to flow in again from abroad in one form or another. In this regard he remembered that in 1982, upon the request of E. Berlinguer's personal secretary, he appealed to his Soviet comrades with a request to support the financially destitute newspaper PAESE SERA, leftist but not communist, yet close to the ICP, in order to turn it into a mouthpiece for supporting the detente policy between East and West. The CPSU agreed to this idea, keeping in mind that this was a also way in which they could again get closer to the Italian communists. As A. Cossutta asserts, in order to help PAESE SERA get out of its debt pit and to support its activities for several years, the total amount spent was "significantly more than the two million dollars ascribed to me."

The senator categorically denied that he personally received any money from any source whatsoever, much less misappropriated any money. According to him, the only personal possession he has is an old mini-Fiat.

The Italian newspapers have also written about the decision of the DPLF leadership, which is insisting as it has before, that after 1976 the Italian communists did not receive any money from Moscow, and that party lawyers should sue certain local newspapers for slander.

Controversy Continues Over Officials' Illegally Privatized' Dachas*924B0068A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 25 Oct 91 p 4*

[Article by Aleksandr Nadzharov: "Secret Facilities." Article is published under the rubric: "New Privileges?" First, introductory, paragraph is in bold italic font in original.]

[Text] ***RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA has written more than once about the personal and private residences that existed for privileged state and party dignitaries under the guise of "secret facilities." It appears that they will be returned to the state.***

We are speaking about private country houses, owned by the state, and hurriedly privatized by prominent figures of the bankrupt leadership of our country.

At the end of last year and the beginning of this year, with the aid of fake cooperatives formed only for this purpose, they purchased former state dachas at low prices in the best areas around Moscow. The USSR Supreme Soviet's Commission on Privileges, which dealt

with this case, was simply amazed at the prices for which ministers, deputy chairmen, and their staffs sold each other private houses and land, for the most part ranging from four to seven thousand rubles. The maximum paid was 17,000 rubles, but this was for a dacha whose commercial value was at least two million rubles.

It turned out that all these transactions were conducted illegally, and the USSR Prosecutor's Office instituted lawsuits to evict former Deputy Chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers Belousov, Biruykova, and Voronin, Council of Ministers employee Sterligov, and Savakov, a former aide to N. Ryzhkov from the former state dachas that were privatized in this manner.

Also ruled illegal was the privatization of dachas by employees of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, including the minister himself, former Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Katushev. Specific prosecutors' charges on such matters are also awaiting the employees of other Union departments who took part in many similar transactions. Several months ago, the employees of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers alone purchased 217 dachas at low prices in the most prestigious area near Moscow. So, we are talking about hundreds of private houses, maintained by public funds, and sold almost at the price of firewood.

After a series of reports in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, IZVESTIYA, Russian television, and publication of documents revealed by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, this affair moved off dead center. In the USSR Prosecutor's Office, the Section for Oversight of Legality and Safeguarding Citizens' Rights in the Public Sphere has stated that the presentation of writs regarding eviction and illegal privatization will not be the last documents directed at stopping the breaking of the law.

The fact that such things are still going on even today can be seen from a report our editorial office received from Samara. It seems that the not unknown General A. Makashov, finding himself without a job after the failed coup, was nevertheless able to find something he likes to do. Having purchased a state owned dacha at a low price, the military commander began construction work there. And, as is not difficult to guess, the "workers" wore military uniforms.

Mismanagement of Officials' Overseas Travel Accounts Revealed

92B0068B Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 42, Oct 91 p 4

[Unsigned article: "It Is Not a Hardship To Live in the Hilton." The article is under the rubric: "Trips of the Soviet Elite Abroad." The first two paragraphs, introductory, are in bold font in the original.]

[Text] In accordance with the decree of the President of the USSR, dated April 22, 1991, "On Auditing the Financial and Economic Activities of the Staff and Economic Directorate of the Former Council of Ministers of

the USSR," a team of specialists from the USSR KNK [expansion unknown] and auditors from the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations inspected the work of the economic directorate of the USSR Administration of Affairs of the former USSR Council of Ministers with regard to providing services to government delegations and currency expenditures for official trips abroad.

The USSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Questions of Benefits and Privileges provided the editorial office of ARGUMENTY I FAKTY (AIF) with the results of this inspection.

From 1988-1990, currency expenditures for official short trips abroad by the Administration of Affairs of the former USSR Council of Ministers amounted to 710,800 inconvertible rubles. This included trips by government delegations for a total of 323,900 inconvertible dollars. The remaining 386,900 inconvertible rubles were spent on individual trips by staff employees.

From the standpoint of the Administration of Affairs, there was a lack of controls over the justification for these official trips abroad, as well as their effectiveness. A great number of trips abroad were general familiarization trips, which sometimes turned into tourist trips at government expense.

An example of the irresponsible attitude toward the expenditure of currency funds was the October 1990 trip to Paris by a delegation whose members included the former administrator of affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers M. Shkabardin and his wife; Ye. Martynov, his deputy; as well as the chief of the department for scientific and technical progress, Ye. Smirnov. The cost of this familiarization trip to the state was 23,147,600 francs.

A similar trip was taken in November 1990 to Greece by A. Volgin, chief of the personnel department, by invitation from the preparatory committee on training high ranking government employees. Just the expenses for a "mandatory" excursion to the Acropolis and the photographing cost the state 1,400 Greek drachmas.

During a trip in May 1990 to Japan for the exhibition on park management and the greening of the "Osaka Expo-90," the delegation headed by A. Biryukova was paid 330,000 Yen for per diem expenses. Since financial documents justifying these expenses were not available, it can be assumed that currency expenditures for living costs and for providing services to the delegation, including receptions, were borne by the USSR Embassy in Japan.

Facts concerning the falsification of financial documents have been revealed. Thus, in accounting for his trip to Italy in November 1989, L. Kondratyev (USSR GVK) [expansion unk], instead of presenting bills for living expenses, handed in hotel stationery on which—typed on a Soviet typewriter—were arrival dates and the amounts due to be paid. The family name of the traveler was written in by L. Kondratyev in his own hand. The

documents had no official stamps or notations by the hotels about having been paid.

The bookkeepers also accepted bills from comrades Shkabardni, Martynov, and Smirnov for their living expenses in May 1990 during their trip to New York ("Hilton Hotel") and Los Angeles ("Beverly Hilton") for the sum of \$2,987 US dollars, even though the hotel bills were made out to the New York "Mercator Corporation."

A widespread practice in the former USSR Council of Ministers consisted of official government delegations being paid full per diem when they would leave the country, even though their expenses were to be borne by foreign governments or by Soviet embassies. These payments were violations of USSR Council of Ministers decree No. 1217-506, dated December 3, 1962. Also, the decisions on these questions, including the question of personally paying per diem to themselves, were made by the delegation leaders themselves. Such violations were permitted by I. Belousov, V. Nikitin, L. Voronin, and others.

Facts came to light during the inspection regarding unjustified payments over and above the per diem. From 1980 to 1990, increased per diem payments were paid without justification to assistants and chiefs of secretariats who were deputies to the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, deputies to the chief of the economic administration, and other persons.

FROM THE EDITORIAL OFFICE Finally, the prolonged campaign begun by "AIF" and certain other publications several years ago, to expose illegal benefits and privileges of the highest level of the nomenklatura, is bearing fruit. Thus, the USSR Prosecutor General recently instituted proceedings with regard to the illegally acquired state dachas by comrades Biryukova, Voronin, Belousov, Savakov, and Sterligov.

Legality of Disposition of CPSU Property Questioned

924B0058A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 40, Oct 91 pp 1,3

[Interview with Yu. Petrov, by G. Valyuzhenich: "Money From the Party Safes"]

[Text] As a result of the Ukases concerning the suspension of the activities of the Communist Party, the question of the party's property has arisen. What is the value that is placed on it? To whom will it belong? More than enough contenders for it have made themselves known. But are there any legal foundations for beginning to divide what legally still belongs to the party? Our correspondent, G. Valyuzhenich, discusses this with Yu. Petrov, the head of the administrative office of the President of Russia.

[G. Valyuzhenich] Yuriy Vladimirovich, you will agree that it is necessary to have legal grounds for confiscating party property and transferring it to other hands.

Because the party can be liquidated only on the basis of recognizing its activities as criminal actions in accordance with a Supreme Court decision, or on the basis of its self-dissolution. Is this a case of dividing up the hide of a bear that has not yet been killed?

[Yu. Petrov] There can be no discussion as yet about any dividing up of the party's property. In conformity with the President's Ukase, we are only accepting that property onto the balance sheet. Our administrative office took onto its balance sheet what was under the jurisdiction of the UD [Administration] of the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party, but what was in the outlying areas should be on the balance sheet of the local authorities.

The property must not remain ownerless. It is important for us now to preserve and guarantee the operation of all projects. Nor should the rest homes or sanatoriums stand idle, or, say, the publishing houses, which have plans and commitments to the authors... Their technological cycle must not be broken. Who will finance all this? The party accounts, as you know, have been frozen. That is why we have assumed this responsibility.

[G. Valyuzhenich] After the accounts have been "unfrozen," will you compensate for your expenditures?

[Yu. Petrov] Of course.

[G. Valyuzhenich] You have said that the party's property is not yet being given away, but nevertheless in the outlying areas, as well as in the Center, lawsuits to gain possession of party buildings have begun. Some people have already moved into them... What if new party structures arise on the basis of the CPSU and they lay claim to them? Once again will there be conflicts and lawsuits?

[Yu. Petrov] Such a situation is not precluded. Taking this into consideration, we are providing the party buildings for temporary use, pending the resolution of the question of party property. Unfortunately, in the outlying areas the events frequently occurring too fast.

[G. Valyuzhenich] People say that there is nothing more constant than that which is temporary. A law can always "be found" for the one who is in power...

[Yu. Petrov] There must be a legal basis for everything. At the same time it is currently inadmissible for the buildings to remain empty and for the office equipment to remain idle... For example, we are planning to move to Staraya Ploshchad, and if that building transfers to the legal successor of the CPSU, it is not precluded that we will lease the building from it. In addition, no party will need the colossal amount of property that the CPSU owned.

[G. Valyuzhenich] In the event that the question of the party's self-dissolution is resolved and there is no legal successor of the party, will everything that is carried on your balance sheet remain the property of Russia?

[Yu. Petrov] What are you talking about? That property was created by the labor of the entire nation, and therefore it must be divided among the republics with a consideration of definite coefficients.

[G. Valyuzhenich] What is the value that is placed on the party's property?

[Yu. Petrov] We have not yet audited all the property that has been taken onto our balance sheet. For the time being, we are using data that has been provided to us by UD, CPSU Central Committee.

As of 1 January 1991, the value of the fixed assets of the CPSU came to 5.2 billion rubles.

The operations administration of the Communist Parties in the union republics had fixed assets with a value of 4.3 billion rubles, including: in party publishing houses, 117 billion rubles; central party institutions, 154.7 million rubles; and UD, CPSU Central Committee, 778.7 million rubles.

As part of the fixed assets, the balance-sheet value of the buildings occupied by the party committee and party institutions of managements and organizations and the party's educational institutions was 2.7 billion rubles.

[G. Valyuzhenich] Yuriy Vladimirovich, could you tell me what the party's financial resources are?

[Yu. Petrov] As of 1 January 1991, according to data provided by UD, CPSU Central Committee, the finances were distributed as follows: current accounts, banks, and cash offices of the party committees had 5.4 billion rubles, including 4.6 billion rubles in accounts and in the cash office of UD, CPSU Central Committee.

There are 2.4 billion rubles in deposits and granted credit, and 5.8 billion rubles in monetary documents, securities, and trip tickets. As of the beginning of the year, the balance sheet of the CPSU Central Committee had 257.3 million rubles that had been channeled by the party committees into the financing of economic-production activities.

Vneshekonombank had 7.3 million foreign-currency rubles in a currency account, and, in addition, approximately 7 million rubles in a special account—for membership dues.

At the present time Vneshekonombank has 12.5 million foreign-currency rubles.

[G. Valyuzhenich] But isn't party money finding a roof in joint enterprises, concerns, and various associations?

[Yu. Petrov] Once again I shall cite their own data. The funds transferred by the party to Avtobank, the USSR Trade-Unions Bank, the Youth Commercial Bank, the "Soyuz-V" [Union-V] Corporation, and others (the total number of which, in their reports, is 24 commercial organizations) constitute 2.7 billion rubles. Another

question is: when were they deposited? What interest on them has accumulated? It is necessary to ascertain all of this.

[G. Valyuzhenich] Is it possible, in the total volume of party funds, to isolate the total amount of party dues?

[Yu. Petrov] A definite amount of bookkeeping work will be required...

[G. Valyuzhenich] But what if we employ simple arithmetic? On the average, each person paid 3000-4000 rubles (from average wages) while he was in the party. Thus it would seem that...

[Yu. Petrov] The reports of UD, CPSU Central Committee state the annual totals of the membership dues. For example, for 1990 they came to 1.2458 billion rubles.

[G. Valyuzhenich] Has there been no consideration of the question—in the event of the liquidation of the party—of returning them to the rank-and-file Communists?

[Yu. Petrov] That seems to me to be absurd. A person who is in the party must possess ideological convictions. When he entered it, he knew that he would have to pay dues on the basis of its Rules... That was a voluntary choice, not one made under coercion. So I think that there are no grounds for returning them.

[G. Valyuzhenich] Nevertheless, who will decide the fate of the CPSU? Do you allow the possibility that the court will stand over the party?

[Yu. Petrov] At the present time, the investigation of the case involving the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] is under way. In the course of this investigation, information is being verified concerning the party's participation in the putsch, including information concerning various kinds of monetary operations, closed accounts, and transfers of money to foreign banks. If the audit reveals any illegal actions, it is not precluded that a criminal case will be initiated and the court will stand over the party.

[G. Valyuzhenich] But in this instance is it right for the party and the rank-and-file Communists to answer for what was committed by their leaders?

[Yu. Petrov] They cast their votes for them. Therefore the party must bear the responsibility for them.

[G. Valyuzhenich] The party's activities have been suspended. Does this mean that no one is currently working in the central apparatus?

[Yu. Petrov] One hundred responsible employees and 70 technical employees are currently working in the party's Central Committee and Russian Committee. They are basically engaged in dealing with questions of staff reduction and the issuance of documents.

CPSU Forgery Workshop Discovered

924B0082A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 30 Oct 91 pp 1-2

[Article by Sergey Parkhomenko under the rubric: "Top Secret": "Yet Another Communist Scandal: The CPSU Central Committee Had Its Own Workshop for Manufacturing Counterfeit Documents"]

[Text] "...We found shelves with blank passports of foreign states, mainly those of the United States and Western Europe, and with passports with various names filled in, but without pictures.

"Presses for embossing stamps on the passports were right there.

"There was computerized equipment for manufacturing various stamps and seals, and several hundred ready-made stamps of a multitude of countries and agencies.

"We found a most extensive collection of ink, India ink, stamp resins, and bottles of all sizes with meticulously written labels. There were catalogs and reference documentation accompanying this collection.

"There were samples of various blank official documents, as well as the grades and types of paper with which these forms are manufactured.

"We found a huge card file of 'personal particulars.' There were people of all skin colors and nationalities in the signed pictures.

"Finally (this was altogether comical), there was an entire cupboard with paste-on mustaches, beards, sideburns, and bald pates, and with make-up kits.

"In general, it was like in a low-budget spy movie."

I am quoting here the transcript of an interview given by a highly placed functionary of the Russian Government. Almost two months ago, his agency moved into the premises of the main building in the CPSU Central Committee complex (the one whose facade faces Old Square). Only three weeks later did the leader, who has now given a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent information about the forbidden corner of his new domain, visit for the first time the left wing of the floor allocated to him, with a Facilities Administration employee as his escort. Fourteen rooms with a total area of more than 200 square meters were found behind a door with a cipher lock which blocked the corridor, but was not locked. However, there was little free space there.

A workshop for manufacturing counterfeit documents, or rather an entire factory shop, was found there, with its equipment appearing to be absolutely secure and complete, in perfect repair and ready for use at any moment.

Actually, there is no question as to who the owner of all these treasures is. Everything is obvious: The fifth floor,

entrance three, has for decades been the headquarters of the CPSU Central Committee International Department.

The "CPSU Central Committee building on Old Square" was sealed on 23 August, pursuant to a ukase on suspending the operation of the party in the territory of the RSFSR which was signed by Boris Yeltsin the day before. Actually, this referred to a gigantic anthill of tall buildings, small houses, wings, and annexes of varying appearance and height, built at different times and for different purposes, but connected at present by a maze of galleries, passages, tunnels, inside courtyards, and drives into a single complex with a compound of approximately one-quarter of a square kilometer.

The Forbidden City of the CPSU Central Committee is an almost regular square of urban structures delineated by Razin Street in the southeast, Rybnyy Lane in the southwest, Kuybyshev Street in the northwest, and Old Square in the northeast. This complex differed little from the famous residence of emperors in Beijing in terms of its functions, formidable guard, and sophistication of internal procedures and etiquette. By the end of several decades, the complex became a virtually ideal abode for the central apparatus of the party which was splendidly equipped, appointed, and lived-in in keeping with all the needs and whims of the apparatus.

What was known to the world under the meaningful name "Old Square," together with all other assets of the CPSU and the RSFSR Communist Party located in the territory of the republic and abroad, became property of the state, pursuant to a new ukase of the president of Russia (No. 90) on 25 August 1991.

Russian ministries and some subdivisions of the Moscow City Administration began to receive allocation vouchers for the vacated premises within mere days, after the end of a period which was given to the employees of the Central Committee apparatus in order for them to collect personal belongings which were left behind in the course of a hasty evacuation.

Rumors about the estate of the predecessors discovered by the new tenants began to circulate virtually right away. The rumors were most fantastic: about loaded pistol clips in desk drawers, empty cartridge shells on the floor, locked safes with cipher locks which had to be cut open with a blow torch, toilet bowls and wastebaskets stuffed with half-burnt papers...

Information which NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA obtained from the aforementioned functionary of the Russian administration may not be that romantic, but it is trustworthy. As he maintains, the first thing which leaped at them were the traces of an extremely intensive but hasty effort to destroy the documents which had been made on the premises recently. The rooms in which equipment for "processing" unneeded papers was installed were literally buried under mountains of shredded papers and piles of empty covers and archive files.

For several days, the old (Central Committee) building superintendent roamed the building which was enveloped by the commotion of moving. They remembered the commandant only when he disappeared, ostensibly taking leave. They opened up his office: The desk drawers and built-in closets were stuffed with documents classified "For Official Use Only," "Secret," and "Top Secret." They tried to find the superintendent "at leisure," but this search has been futile to this day.

For many weeks, after coming to work in the morning, the new owners of the offices detected traces of an active night life which continued in their absence. The contents of tables, safes, built-in closets, bookcases, and "wall units" which invariably graced official interiors were clearly subjected to inspection at night. Finds from the day before, which still had not been picked up by the employees of Russian ministries, disappeared again. Attempts to establish the origin of night visitors and the objective of their visits were not fruitful. The office of the superintendent of the building is not known for being talkative: "Rutskoy's people" or "the prosecutor's office"—these were the only explanations they managed to get.

The "counterfeiter shop," which our informant calls it, finally met the fate of files with the "NUT" classification ("For Official Use Only") which surfaced here and there and were finally confiscated. Our informant was absent for two weeks in early October; he was away on a business trip. Upon his return, he learned from his subordinates that a team of about 20 had descended upon them without warning. They drove a truck up, removed everything that was found in the rooms of the secret block in a jiffy, repaired the cipher lock, and sealed the door. They produced a warrant which appeared (!) to be that of the RSFSR Procuracy. However, they also referred to Vice President Rutskoy, and to "the security service." It is unknown where the confiscated equipment, documents, and archives were taken.

However, the leader who discovered the unique treasury turned out to be more astute than many of his colleagues. As early as his first visit, he put several counterfeit stamps from the pile spread on the desk and the floor and a most interesting self-produced identifier for the ink collection in a thick envelope and hid them safely. He also removed a pack of pictures from a closet containing archives. All of this was done at random, without looking—"I just scooped it up off the top. I wanted to sort it out more carefully at leisure."

Apparently, these souvenirs now remain the only material evidence of the peculiar activities of the CPSU Central Committee International Department available to us. Fortunately, their current owner cannot be but considered knowledgeable about the affair, or just lucky. No matter how random and disjointed his exhibits are, they make it possible to get quite a good idea of the most important objects of attention and the extent of interests of the jacks of all trades from Old Square.

A seal of the general consulate of Brazil in a European country and the official stamp of the municipality of the city of Porto (Portugal) were found among the counterfeit stamps reproduced in the picture together with their imprints. The third sample is particularly interesting: the bilingual caption "Department for Cooperation and Development" in English and Afrikaans indicates that we are looking at a stamp of a certain official establishment of the Republic of South Africa—a state with which the Soviet Union still has no diplomatic relations and avoids any connections, or at any rate, tries not to advertise them. It is very difficult to avoid numerous connotations entailed by the "150 billion" scandal; after all, the "South African trace" was also worked actively in the course of it. The authorship of the scandal still remains undetermined, and the natural character of its emergence still remains very much in doubt.

In another picture, we show xerox copies of some pages in the catalog of ink, India ink, and stamp resins made by a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent. The appearance of the self-produced reference book—its frayed cover and fluffy edges of sheets—suggest that it got plenty of use. The notes "out" next to some numbers which apparently referred to appropriate jars indicate that the collection was not put together out of idle fascination with curiosities and that some of the samples were used particularly often. The numbers which designate these samples are also impressive: They are meticulously sorted by type and color—blue, violet, red, black, and green. The catalog classifies half a thousand liquids required to forge signatures, endorsements, visas, and stamps.

Various types of stamp resins are entered in the reference book by using the same innocuous stamp of some athletic club for the purpose of comparison with originals. However, in special cases, imprints were made by using genuine stamps which were available to the counterfeiters or by using already manufactured forgeries. Some of them are visible in our illustration: These are the stamps of border control checkpoints in Zurich, Rome (Fiumicino airport) and Paris (Orly airport). How many owners of passports of different colors roam the world at present whose "border crossing," and thus the legality of their sojourn in the territory of a foreign state, are confirmed by a stamp which they got without leaving Old Square?

Finally, there was one more find which we have only mentioned in passing so far. A very extensive picture archive was located in the secret block. Its superficial examination revealed that, for the most part, functionaries of "fraternal parties" were the object of attention of CPSU collectors. In the pictures, the leaders of the Communist organizations of Europe, America, Asia, and Africa appear "in a relaxed and friendly environment." According to our source of information, their pictures were taken in quite piquant situations. We are reproducing here a more or less modest picture: Leonid Brezhnev at leisure in the company of one of the leaders of the Island of Freedom, Raul Castro.

Let nobody be misled by the quite remote dates entered in the ink catalogue or the "historical" nature of the picture reproduced here. The employee of a Russian department who shared his discoveries with NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA had to stay on the premises of the workshop for several minutes only to ascertain that the archive and the collections were added to, and apparently used until the very end. The equipment was not idle in our time either. Let us mention that some pictures from the archives given to the editorial office portray individuals who appear in current episodes and official chronicles on TV newscasts to this day.

It turns out that Valentin Falin, the last head of the CPSU Central Committee International Department, took care to keep his facility in working condition. Boris Ponomarev, one of those who, by all signs, was its founder and who saw to it that the now discovered special production facility prospered while holding the post of head of the CPSU Central Committee International Department until 1986, currently a retiree, to this day occupies an office several steps away from the secret shop. The author of "wrks. on the history of the CPSU, internat. Comm. and workers' movement. Len. Pr. Winner 1982," as the encyclopedic dictionary introduces him, is now laboring on his memoirs. He responded to all attempts to make him vacate official premises, or at least persuade him to move to the library, with categorical protests, referring to a personal promise by Mikhail Gorbachev to provide all conditions for him to complete his work.

Unfortunately, we do not exactly hope to find even a grain of truth about the methods which were used to translate into reality the everlasting idea of "exporting revolution" in the memoirs of the veteran of the party elite. It is hard to expect sincerity from a man under whose direct management a purely criminal endeavor prospered. To organize this endeavor, the party leaders

did not dare to enlist the cooperation of even the department which was established at Lubyanka, not far away.

Of course, within the structures of the KGB, there was a niche for specialists in similar operations. However, let us acknowledge that their art is necessary for a security service: There is nothing we can do about it—no large state has ever gotten by without an intelligence service. Intelligence services have their own peculiarities.

However, the architects of the bright future for all of humanity preferred to set up and outfit their own "hot production facility" in an effort to expand their ideological influence over the world. We are all for friendship, but counterfeit passports and paste-on beards are another matter.

[Photo caption: "Samples of counterfeit stamps manufactured by the CPSU International Department. Left to right: stamps of official organizations of the Republic of South Africa, Brazil, and Portugal."]

[Photo caption: "Traditions of Bolshevism are alive. This is a picture from counterfeit identity papers in the name of the worker K.P. Ivanov. In the picture is V.I. Ulyanov-Lenin, wearing a wig (under the traveling cap). Next is V.M. Falin, head of the CPSU Central Committee International Department. False wigs, mustaches, and beards for the present-day supporters of Lenin were kept on the premises of this department."]

[Photo caption: "Copies of several pages from an identifier for the collection of ink, India ink, and stamp resins. Samples of stamps confirming the crossing of the state borders of Italy, France, and Switzerland are visible."]

[Photo caption: "A picture from the special archives of the CPSU Central Committee International Department. Leonid Brezhnev and Raul Castro."]

Ethnic Groupings Dangerous Problem in Military
91SV0079A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Sep 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Captain 3rd Rank V. Maryukha: "Ethnic Groupings as Dangerous as 'Dedovshchina': A New, Alarming Phenomenon in Military Collectives"]

[Text] Of all the letters on this topic received by the editors, this one differed in one respect. Of the two military construction units located near Moscow that were the brief duty stations of Turdybek Nurpolatov's son, the father described one of them as more or less the best subunit in the entire Armed Forces, referring to the other one as a collecting point for all kinds of vices. Nurbek Nurpolatov, as a member of the latter unit, experienced such heavy psychological pressure and outright violence that he could no longer withstand the humiliation and, as described by the father, was "forced to leave his unit and wander like a vagabond, winding up at his home."

The following day, I managed to locate the military construction detachment which N. Nurpolatov left without authorization, in city outskirts, close to a plant known throughout the nation. The letter led me to believe that I would find decrepit barracks, semi-intoxicated military builders looking for a fight with the first person they come across, and indifferent commanders who would have nothing to do with subordinates. However, no matter how closely I looked, I could not see the outrages the letter told about. By the same token, I would not go so far as to say that the unit was the best I had ever seen.

Major V. Perestoronin, the deputy commander of the military construction detachment, did not conceal the fact that the state of affairs in the detachment left something to be desired. It turned out that military builder N. Nurpolatov was certainly not the only person who had committed AWOL. In the second quarter of this year alone, the detachment listed 11 men as fugitives, one of which was given an early discharge; he should not have been inducted in the first place, because of, shall we say, the level of his mental development. Another one was a patient in the Hospital imeni Yakovenko for the same reason. Some of the fugitives are at large. Their homes are located in areas racked by interethnic conflicts. The men who either returned to their unit or were picked up by the provost service and subjected to disciplinary action have returned to duty. That included military builder Private Nurpolatov. It is true that a dispensation was made in his case by permitting him to remain in a unit located close to home.

Let us return to his previous duty station. Why did a young soldier who was transferred to a unit new to him leave this unit the following day, receive punishment for the first violation, only to turn around and commit AWOL a second time? It bears mentioning here that the latest case of humiliation of a man by a fellow serviceman occurred last year in the unit, after which the

guilty soldier was appropriately disciplined. Other barracks hooligans are kept in check by considerable pressure applied by the military procuracy and by the increasing interest in state of affairs in the unit exhibited by parents. Quite a bit has also been done by commanders—from effecting some improvement in routine garrison duty (something that "suffers" in the case of builders, for subjective and objective reasons) and in normal living conditions on the one hand, to the provision of additional feeding on the basis of subsidiary farm and greenhouse operation on the other.

"Nonetheless, we still receive reports of 'weak' rights violations from time to time," said Vladimir Vladimirovich Perestoronin. "They are 'quiet,' largely because there are no witnesses to the offenses, and also due to hesitation to lodge complaints on the part of the victims. There is little chance to spot rights violators some other way, since the victims as a rule can show no bruises or abrasions on their bodies."

Incidentally, those who dare to assault their fellow servicemen for no reason at all are known to command personnel, who take swift action against them. In addition, if one realizes that Nurpolatov himself had nothing against serving in his previous unit, in fact insisting on doing so, we must seek an explanation for his behavior somewhere else, in something other than hazing of recruits by older servicemen or lack of responsibility on the part of command personnel.

I would be less than honest if I were to say that the true cause came upon me all of a sudden or that I have never experienced anything of the sort. When I was starting my military service, I heard men use the word "fellow countryman" and its affectionate form "zema." The term "fellow countrymen" was employed by inductees in referring to men from the same rayon, region, or republic, naturally in the context of ethnic origin. The geographic principle was decisive in selection of friends; even length of service did not have any particular influence on this thinking among fellow countrymen. Protection of the weak and helping fellow countrymen were considered to be a matter of honor; the particular ethnic grouping involved did not show its "unconsecrated" side for some time.

Nonetheless, as it so often happens, righteous matters are often followed by immoral ones. Looking backward, it is difficult to pin down the beginning, the time when a community of fellow countrymen decided to take on another community, or an entire military collective, for that matter; the time of appearance of some kind of "Mafia of fellow countrymen," which has the strong prevail over everyone else in an attempt to facilitate the tour of duty of their fellow countrymen. There is this kind of "unofficial" structure in the unit abandoned by Nurpolatov, also. This kind of structure also exists in other military collectives, such as the one the unfortunate fugitive took a liking to, for example. There was a reason for this liking. With all conditions equal, the two units differed in one respect: In the second military

construction detachment, an ethnic grouping of Chechen held the upper hand, while in the first detachment Nurpolatov's fellow countrymen held sway. It goes without saying that the new location alone—even ignoring humiliation by fellow servicemen—frightened Nurpolatov out of his wits. On top of that, there is no real cause to bring charges against members of ethnic groupings. This is merely the initial manifestation of their inherent self-discipline, something that metes out punishment to those who dare to set their doubtful preferences above common interests. The grouping attempts to install its candidates in junior command assignments and endow them with unquestioned authority over other servicemen. In this connection, it sees no need for violence: The use of implied threats is sufficient. Discord arises only with change of personnel, a time when there is a struggle for influence in the unit or subunit. Thus, apparent calmness in a unit in which an ethnic grouping takes root is followed by domination of some servicemen by others.

Of course, hazing of recruits by older servicemen as a phenomenon manifested by individual hooligans still exists. It was the subject of a complaint in a letter written by the mother of Private Golubev, who is serving in Saratov Oblast. A telegram expressing alarm was sent by reserve officer Boronilov, whose son has also suffered from actions in violation of regulations in his tour in Zavitinsk, Amur Oblast. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to fail to take notice of a phenomenon as dangerous as the ethnic grouping.

There is no doubt about the pain caused us—military people—by the fact that the great, labor-intensive and, more than anything else, necessary and noble work that was being done to bring about ethnic harmony among personnel of the Army and Navy was not permitted to

stand the test of time, in that it has suffered damages from the blows inflicted by the centrifugal ethnic trends existing in the country. Of the many concepts compromised by the propaganda that was in the service of the old administrative command system, I believe that the concept of internationalism is least deserving of this. A person asks himself again and again: Is it possible to draw boundaries between multi-ethnic families or set up demarcation posts on millions of pieces of land and postage-stamp size apartments housing representatives of nations and peoples? Is it possible to organize in any place of your choosing—let alone in unified Armed Forces—companies, battalions, and regiments, along the lines of “pure blood?”

Therefore, the concept of internationalism is now infused with a new meaning, a mutual show of respect for traditions, customs, and a right to exercise genuinely equal rights. This in my view has been most fully understood by persons who have gone through Osh, Fergana, Nagornyy Karabakh, and other “hot spots.” This kind of understanding is even showing up in the Armed Forces. There is a reason why a position of priority importance is attached in the Ministry of Defense Collegium's appeal to Armed Forces personnel to problems of internal unity of military collectives, strengthening of military comradeship and soldierly friendship, formation of internationalist qualities among youth, and consolidation of age-old traditions of friendship between peoples. These problems must be resolved by the renewed agencies involved with combat training, with military, moral, and psychological education, and by all Army and Navy command and enlisted personnel working in close harmony with all nations and peoples whose representatives will be serving in the Armed Services of the renewed Union.

**Ex-KGB Official Shebarshin on Resignation,
Primakov Appointment**

924B0041A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Oct 91
Union Edition p 4

[Interview with L. Shebarshin, deputy chairman of the KGB, by V. Skosyrev; place and date not given: "Intelligence Officer in From the Cold"]

[Text] Le Carre's novel "The Spy Who Came in From the Cold" is called the 20th century's best political detective story. The novel's principal character falls victim to a most convoluted intrigue twisted in the depths of the intelligence service. Our interviewee, L. Shebarshin, who was head of a secret department, did not, of course, experience a tragedy similar to that of the British author's character, but in the circumstances of his fall from the heights of state service there is still much that is unclear. It was with this question that the interview began.

[Skosyrev] You have already spoken of the reasons for your departure from the position of chief of intelligence and said that you had been appointed first deputy without your consent. On the other hand, the newspapers write that, occupying the office of deputy chairman of the KGB, you could not have failed to have known about the coup which was being prepared. Could the real reason for your resignation be the fact that you were too closely tied to Kryuchkov?

[Shebarshin] I have already cleared up this question. I knew nothing about the coup which was being prepared. The speeches of the chairman of the KGB to his employees and Kryuchkov's conversations constantly stressed his devotion to the law and admonished us to abide strictly by the letter and spirit of the law. We believed that this was Kryuchkov's true position. I do not know why some people find it hard to believe that the intelligence service was not involved in the coup.

Why Kryuchkov initiated some of his deputies into this plan and did not initiate the chief of intelligence I can only guess. I believe that on account of some characteristics I did not inspire him with confidence. I had had, quite frequently of late, differences with our former chairman in respect of the evaluation of the situation in the Soviet Union and of the evaluation of the role and prospects of the CPSU. Kryuchkov most likely took all this into consideration. It seems to me that some of my speeches at meetings of the KGB leadership did not conform to Kryuchkov's concepts. This, possibly, explains the fact that I was not informed. You would have to ask Kryuchkov himself.

[Skosyrev] Following your resignation, a politician rather than a professional was appointed the new leader of intelligence. The intention to remove intelligence from the KGB has been announced also. Your opinion of this reform?

[Shebarshin] In principle this decision is absolutely correct. There is nothing for intelligence to do as part of the KGB. After all, the entire activity of the latter, right until recently, was of a quite clearly expressed repressive nature. I believe that repressive functions are totally extrinsic to intelligence. It should be an information organization, which monitors the situation surrounding the country.

As far as the appointment of a nonprofessional is concerned, I was perhaps the first chief of intelligence who covered the whole path from operations officer to this position. This has both its pluses and minuses. Whereas it is far easier for me to imagine the operations officer in the field, it is evidently simpler for the politician to recognize precisely what the consumer of the information needs.

[Skosyrev] But, after all, it is not the first time that a nonprofessional has become head of your service. Chebrikov was not a professional, nor Kryuchkov. And never prior to Kryuchkov, perhaps, did you have so many failures and deserters.

[Shebarshin] First of all, there have always been traitors, since the 1920's. Second, let us be realists: The number of turncoats has increased not on account of an unfit leadership but owing to the disorder and lack of prospects here at home. And consider one further circumstance: The more nebulous the situation in the country, the more efficiently foreign intelligence operates. I know on the basis of specific examples that many Western special services have been given the task of acquiring sources among Soviet people with access to secret information and with prospects of growth. So I do not see it as Kryuchkov's fault that there have come to be more traitors.

[Skosyrev] Nonetheless, your department is experiencing drastic times. How is this being reflected in the morale of the intelligence officers? KGB employee Fomenko, who worked in Munich, recently became a traitor. Was this not connected with the breakup which is now occurring?

[Shebarshin] I do not know of the circumstances of this business. But it is perfectly obvious that the changes are exerting an ambivalent influence on our employees. Inasmuch as the entire committee in the person of the chairman and some senior officials were involved in the putsch, this could not have failed to have influenced people. This has cast a shadow over intelligence also, which, unfortunately, had by the time of the putsch been unable to detach itself from the committee.

The moral factor is extremely important. Intelligence has never, after all, been a privileged institution in the sense of material benefits and has been maintained roughly at the level of all other state institutions. We had no extra remuneration in foreign currency. We received somewhat more than Foreign Ministry employees in Soviet rubles at the time of overseas assignments, it is true. But we had no other privileges. Consciousness of being a part

of such a special service as intelligence—this is what constituted our main privilege.

KGB employees are now being reproached for having carried out the orders of their leadership, which were not only mistaken but criminal. People are unsure, therefore: for what will they be reproached subsequently—for having submitted to an order or for not having done so?

[Skosyrev] You say that your employees had no special privileges. But, first, the mere opportunity of overseas travel remains an advantage.

[Shebarshin] It is an advantage enjoyed by academic institutions, the Foreign Ministry, and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and now the private, cooperative sector.

[Skosyrev] But there are other advantages also. When I worked overseas, I frequently heard from friends from the Soviet colony words like: "This one is a 'neighbor.' He drives an import and frequents restaurants." So it was that intelligence officers would blow their cover themselves....

[Shebarshin] I agree, this is a problem of ours in many locations—a phenomenon which has constantly had to be neutralized, but which has not been eliminated. Yes, we have become too conspicuous. This is not the result of a lack of understanding of the situation. Our employees are forced to be more active than the employees of other establishments. Ultimately many of them perform or should be performing double work. They have to be mobile and at the same time invisible. We have put the issue thus: If an employee stands out in a Soviet group, if his colleagues notice him, he is out of place in our service.

[Skosyrev] In some countries, the newspapers maintain, the bulk of embassy staff belongs to our intelligence services. Does it not seem to you that this is connected with the orientation toward the gathering of intelligence in gross terms, not in terms of quality?

[Shebarshin] I think not. The large number of representatives of the intelligence services overseas is a product of our feudal-departmental system. Each department tried to protect as much turf for itself as possible and expand it. The same happened with the KGB. The size of the turf was determined by the influence of its boss. And the leadership of the CPSU, that is, the state leadership, watched to see merely that there was no violation of the rules of the game and even, in my opinion, encouraged this competition and rivalry between departments.

[Skosyrev] We have spoken up to now about your regular employees. But there are foreign agents. It is known from our history that when there have been abrupt changes in the state and the leaders of state security have been replaced, people who had helped the Soviet Union from ideological considerations walked away from us. Do you not fear something of the sort happening now?

[Shebarshin] I do. This is a dreadful danger for intelligence. When our assistants overseas or people who have tied their fate to us see that the organization itself is in jeopardy, that it is in turmoil, and that a frequent change of personnel, leaders particularly, is under way, they are alarmed, naturally.

[Skosyrev] As the West is writing, even recently our intelligence, proceeding from the interests of "combating imperialism," maintained contacts with the intelligence services of dictatorial regimes, the Iraqi regime, for example. It, like other of our departments also, propped up such regimes. Does this practice continue?

[Shebarshin] Contacts with overseas special services are of a purely professional nature. Our overseas colleagues assist us in the solution of our questions, we assist them.

[Skosyrev] But does it not seem to you that contacts with the intelligence services of odious regimes, the Iraqi or Libyan, for example, which are involved in terrorism, put us in a bad light?

[Shebarshin] But Iraq, for example, has never ceased to be our partner. We did not break off relations with it and attempted to find a peaceful way out of the crisis in the Persian Gulf. I would not regard this as support for the regime. We have normal relations between states and between intelligence services. We do not interfere in one another's internal affairs. And to continue the logic of your unspoken thought, we should be implanting democracy in other states. Ousting S. Husayn, ousting al-Qadhdhafi, that is, breaking into someone else's home? Should we be doing this?

[Skosyrev] Problems of the third world are, obviously, particularly close to you. You are, after all, an Indian specialist by education and have worked in several Asian states. But quite serious accusations have been leveled at you in the newspaper MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI. It is said, inter alia, that while working in Iran you mishandled your associate Kuzichkin and that as a result, following his flight, our agents and subsequently the Tudeh (communist) Party were smashed.

[Shebarshin] This is absolute rubbish taken from the traitor Kuzichkin's book. Kuzichkin had hooked up with British intelligence long before he fled from Iran. The Tudeh Party was doomed. Kuzichkin could neither have added anything to nor subtracted anything from its fate. True, he did, indeed, have certain information about this party.

As far as this publication as a whole is concerned, it is based on a conversation with an anonymous author. Why he is afraid to speak under his own name is clear. Quite recently I had a talk with this person, after which he decided to leave the First Main Directorate. Anonymous charges on the part of a person who had in recent years been involved in the gathering of compromising

material on his fellow employees is an intolerable business, in my view. I am astonished that a respectable newspaper resorted to the services of an anonymous author.

[Skosyrev] In the third world your service countered the influence of the United States with the aid of propaganda. The business of the mass killing or suicide of American sect members in Guyana is an example. The crime was attributed to the CIA. Under the conditions of the new relations with the United States have we abandoned such practices?

[Shebarshin] Guyana, the time of the event was 78, I believe.... The atmosphere was totally different then. I do not know how the department will operate. But I would not abandon specific methods of influencing foreign public opinion in our country's interests. The main thing is that this activity not be of some perfidious nature damaging other states. But composed, imperceptible influence on this partner or the other, this is permissible, in my view.

The United States also has such a service, after all. And the former is involved in propaganda interspersed with elements of disinformation. Take Radio Liberty, for example. I am convinced that we are obliged to this radio for the seriousness of many of our conflicts.

[Skosyrev] Very well, you are sticking by your position—that which you openly expressed prior to the putsch. But at the time of the putsch the information coming from this radio helped raise the spirits of masses of people and helped Gorbachev.

[Shebarshin] I have already been asked how I view the fact that Radio Liberty correspondents were at the "White House" barricades. But this is the example I will give you: Imagine that you, a Soviet journalist, had showed up in Tienanmen Square in May 1989 and had begun to agitate against the Chinese Government. How would the Chinese have reacted to you? They would have kicked you out of the country. Why, then, do people supported by a foreign state participate in our internal disputes? Who gave them the right to do so?

[Skosyrev] Many people are now talking about the need to establish civilian control over intelligence. Whence the appointment of Ye.M. Primakov. But we are still a long way off from effective control on the part of the legislative institutions. Yet in the United States there is a group of five or six senators who may know everything about the CIA.

[Shebarshin] Almost everything.

[Skosyrev] And may thus exercise the legislature's control of intelligence. Could something similar be done with us?

[Shebarshin] Not only could but must. But this will become a reality when the structure of the legislative bodies stabilizes. The Americans have an Intelligence

Committee, which operates within a very tight framework. They can have full confidence in one another. They know that confidential information will not go beyond Congress. Could you vouch for it that this would not happen with us?

[Skosyrev] So we will have to wait a while for the control of the legislators and place all our hopes in the civilian leader of intelligence. But it is being said that his assistants are the old regular officers long conversant with the corridors of power. Will it not be the case that they will suggest their decisions to the new chief?

[Shebarshin] This is not, I believe, a great danger. The extent of it will depend on the chief of intelligence. He must know who the expert in each field is. It will not take long to learn this. No individual can know all that the intelligence service knows. The chief of intelligence should know what lies where and to whom to turn for information.

[Skosyrev] Academician Primakov has traveled overseas frequently on important assignments from the president. But what about travel on the part of the chief of intelligence? Will Yevgeniy Maksimovich not become a recluse in Yasenevo, where the service's headquarters are located?

[Shebarshin] I traveled overseas infrequently, two or three times a year—at the invitation of colleagues and for a discussion of questions of our interaction. A tourist program was usually inserted in such a trip. We, for our part, received our colleagues on the same basis. We had normal relations with our partners. We are not torn apart by ideological differences. We understand that we work for different states and may in some instances be at odds. But this does not prevent normal relations.

[Skosyrev] Speaking of trips to one's colleagues, you refer, most likely, to the former socialist countries? But have contacts with them been kept up?

[Shebarshin] They have with some. We are not in a state of war. But it is not only a question of the former socialist countries. We have established interaction with very many states. Not cooperation but interaction.

[Skosyrev] Now, when, at the age of 56, you have found yourself in retirement, you will have to part with your customary way of life. Can you conceive of yourself in the role of retiree?

[Shebarshin] With difficulty. But there are things to do. I am starting to write a book of reminiscences.

KGB Officers Voice Concerns in Letter

*PM2510133591 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 25 Oct 91 First Edition p 3*

["Letter to the Newspaper" feature comprising open letter from unnamed KGB officers followed by editorial commentary: "Who Needs the Boys With Blue Badges. KGB Officers Seek Protection From 'Reform'"]

[Text] Nowadays the ordinary state security operations officer is having both a hard and an amusing time. Outsiders have written a good deal about the reasons for this, but let us try nevertheless to investigate once again.

We are shedding tears about the glorious "Cheka" [Extraordinary Commission for struggle against counter-revolution set up in immediate postrevolutionary period] and about the monument to (and maybe the memory of) the "iron knight of the revolution." We are heroically beating our breasts and fleeing in all directions from the detachment of the party's political fighters. As we bid farewell to the symbols of the total "Chekization" of the entire country, symbols which all sensible officers have long found wearisome, we are beginning to have a crazily enjoyable time watching the exceedingly astonishing transfers and appointments in the top echelons of state security.

Good luck to the transfers and appointments. We were accustomed to them in the past, when guys with a glorious Komsomol and party past, after a meteoric study of the ABC of counterintelligence, would begin actively leading (to the extent that their ideas and experience permitted) departments, sections, services, or even entire directorates within our "offices." Not all of them were total idiots—there were also some worthwhile people, but only a handful of them.

The second echelon of "career jockeys galloping up the ladder" was made up of poppa's and momma's boys, nephews, and also well-connected grandsons. Closing ranks, this glorious crew took charge of ensuring the state security of what they called their motherland or homeland, but was in fact their fiefdom. To be honest, the former cadre policy was corrupt. It was certainly not for nothing that former CIA Deputy Director Ray Cline noted sarcastically: "The Russians pay much more attention than we do to training career officers."

Career officers. These were the biggest and most oppressed representatives in the 500,000-strong army of the pre-perestroika Union's special services. All of us—border guard officers, masters of special communications, cipher clerks, cryptanalysts, crime specialists, investigators, undercover agents, agents on the "outside," ordinary intelligence officers, the girls from the "mysterious" 12th or "listening" department, the guys from group "A" and all the other special groups—we all had to unquestioningly carry out whatever the silver-spoon caste of shady consultants and assistants came up with by way of orders.

What exactly happened back in August? A perfectly ordinary mutiny on the good ship KGB. People did not carry out orders, they did not go, they refused, they delayed implementation, they engaged in both covert and overt sabotage. And, most importantly, they were perfectly well aware of what the consequences might be. They did this consciously, aware that this was the only chance of cleansing and renewing the structures of the special services.

And what did they get in exchange? A chairman who is head over heels in love with representatives of the mass media, who is imposing and has the manners of an American senator. And how! The candidate for Russian president received quite a good schooling in image-making. But the image is required merely in order to inspire the confidence in staffers that their leader is a competent reformer with a worthy image. But today we middle-level KGB officers are unfortunately forced to state the following:

'Esteemed Vadim Viktorovich'

"The exodus of the most professional, honest, and decent staffers from the 'eparchy' of state security that has been entrusted to you is directly proportional to the frequency of your speeches, assurances, and explanations on television and in the newspapers. If this is your main task in reforming the committee, you have performed it worthily."

Incidentally, the new chairman's first action was to humiliate his own son—he dismissed him from the committee. Pop's word is law! Was this the old obkom [party oblast committee] reflex at work? Is it that a cozy job can always be found in some department or other for the son of a figure of such prominence? Are appointments based on patronage back in fashion? The action of former intelligence leader Shebarshin, who resigned merely because another rising star was appointed as his first deputy, is worthy of respect.

As we watch these games we both laugh and cry. And also we thoroughly envy the guys from the Russian committee. We envy the Moscow directorate—Russia has taken them under its wing, and their chief, so they say, though he may be an outsider, apparently has a head on his shoulders and is slowly but surely absorbing professional attitudes. We look enviously at those who are being hired by Russian counterintelligence and we ask them to put in a good word for us.

Now let's be serious.

The basic task of any special service of any state has been, is, and will continue to be to ensure by its own efforts and resources sovereignty, that is, security in implementing an autonomous and independent (sovereign) domestic and foreign policy for the good of the state and the citizens inhabiting it. Special services must do everything in their power to ensure that nobody feels offended or ashamed for the state. All the republics of the former Union have realized this. Only we in Russia are continuing to delay and to wait for someone. The actions of the USSR KGB central apparatus are very contradictory.

The Union does not exist and will no longer exist in its old form. Please be so good as to tell us: Whose security are we—the staffers of all the central KGB structures—going to ensure? There are over 50,000 of us in Moscow, but throughout Russia from the Pacific to the suburbs of St. Petersburg there are only 20,000. Who needs these boys with blue badges? Who is going to feed us? The

USSR president? He is already feeding his own **personal** bodyguard, the legendary guys from "Alfa," and staffers of the mausoleum. And now his own personal government communications and almost his own personal intelligence service. Does the USSR president now have his own personal sovereignty? Was KOMMERSANT right when it asked: "Maybe the president is intending to storm someone?"

It is deeply immoral and unsafe if the committee is going to reform itself. If Russia's citizens have decided to bid farewell forever to the era of totalitarianism, we should follow... the opinion of the commission set up to investigate the KGB's activity and disband this strong-arm state structure, name its legal successor, define the duration and procedure for the winding-up period while providing guarantees that staffers will not be thrown out onto the street without means of existence, and, probably most important of all, urgently get down to forming a Russian security structure—powerful, effective, and accountable. Otherwise we will be feeling offended for the state for a long time to come, and our children will feel ashamed of us.

And as for the image... even in Africa an image is an image.

[Signed] KGB Officers

FROM THE EDITORIAL OFFICE. The reform of state security organs is proceeding in a slow, complex, and contradictory fashion. There are both subjective and objective reasons for this. The main objective reason is scarcely going to be "removed" in the immediate future: The former Union no longer exists, and the configuration of the new one is uncertain. The USSR KGB continues to exist, but the formation of Russian structures is going impermissibly slowly—the problem is clearly "dialectical contradictions" between the two departments.

The USSR KGB is now being studied by five commissions (with various missions), including the "head" commission set up by decree of the USSR president—the State Commission To Investigate the Activity of State Security Organs. The traditions of the Lubyanka are such that lower- and middle-level staffers have only fragmentary knowledge—from newspapers or from hearsay—of the work and findings, albeit preliminary findings, of these commissions. This breeds rumors, which cause the most severe edginess and uncertainty regarding the future. Public feeling is only adding fuel to the flames: The committee should be entirely dismantled and all the personnel should be virtually put on trial. Mob rule is gathering strength in our country, so it is appropriate to recall a truism: **IT IS EQUALLY IMPORTANT TO ENSURE STATE SECURITY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY AS IT IS IN A TOTALITARIAN SOCIETY**, after a total review of functions, of course, and the exclusion of political investigation, the persecution of dissidents, and other throwbacks to dictatorship.

Unfortunately, the subjective reasons are far more numerous. Certain appointments to leading posts arouse astonishment not only among KGB staffers. Scores are being settled with staffers (this is happening particularly often at local level) who from the first day of the putsch actively resisted the orders of the SCSE [State Committee for the State of Emergency] and the conditions are being created for "voluntary retirement." The result is that state security organs are losing an unprecedented number of staffers and extremely valuable intellectual potential that it will take Russia many years to restore is being dissipated. The central apparatus is practically demoralized, and there is a huge flood of state security staffers from the sovereign republics—in essence they are refugees.

It is incomprehensible why the State Council made the decision to wind up the USSR KGB without considering the recommendations and conclusions of the State Commission To Investigate the Activity of the KGB, whose tasks, according to the decree, included "submitting proposals for reorganizing the structure of state security organs." At the time of the State Council session these proposals had not been formulated in their final form and the chairman and leading members of the commission were away.

It looks as though all this led to the decision by serving middle-level officers of the KGB central apparatus to bring this letter to the editorial office. Their viewpoint on what is happening in the committee is quite widespread. Though, of course, it shares by no means all the authors' stances, the editorial office nevertheless published the letter. The problem is indeed serious and needs to be widely discussed. We hope that this publication will be the starting point for further discussion of the problems of the reform of state security, primarily in Russia. Maybe the commissions ought also to consider the "zero" option, that is, the entire USSR KGB passes into Russian jurisdiction and only after the form of the future Union had been defined would it be decided what would be handed over to the Union security organs.

The editorial office knows the names and posts of the letterwriters, but, for obvious reasons, we are not "revealing" them for the moment.

UK Ambassador's Chauffeur Details Life of Spying for KGB

924B0069A Moscow *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*
in Russian No 42 and 43, 23, 30 Oct 90

[Interview with K. Demakhin, by Yuriy Shchekochikhin, under rubric: "A Person's World": "The English Ambassador's Driver: The Life and Adventures of Konstantin Demakhin, a Secret KGB Agent"]

[23 Oct 90 p 7]

[Text] Three cassettes that still contained Konstantin Demakhin's hours-long confession were among the documents, letters, and tape recordings that I urgently took out

of my house at dawn on 19 August. On that insane morning they had to be urgently taken away from outsiders, hidden, and preserved, because Konstantin himself, when he visited me several months before the putsch and asked to turn on the tape recorder, had begun by saying, "If anything ever happens to me, I want everyone to know the truth."

By that time Konstantin Demakhin had made a sharp break with USSR KGB by refusing to be an informer, and he had felt the effect of the entire confrontation of the system that he had served.

What you will soon begin reading is his confession, which from time to time is interrupted by my questions. It is a confession not only about the work of a secret KGB agent and no so much just that. It is about the life of a country that broke a person's life. It is about ideals that became handcuffs. It is about faith that forced a person to kill his soul.

So, then, you have before you the confession of a man who was the driver for the ambassador of Great Britain to the USSR, and who has been working in the embassy for approximately 20 years.

The Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United Kingdom, Sir Rodric Braithwaite, is the seventh ambassador in Moscow who has had Konstantin Demakhin as his driver.

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] Kostya, did you begin working at the KGB because of ideological reasons? Or were you threatened? Or bought?

[K. Demakhin] ...Well, it would probably be more correct to begin with where I come from. I was born in Moscow in a communal apartment on the first floor of the NKVD building on Preobrazhenskaya Ulitsa. It was a really large building... For my parents, as I understand the situation, it was good luck to get an apartment. Their life was on the ascendancy, since my father's service in the NKVD had become the basis for that life.

My father did not tell me about anything. He would arrive home between 0300 and 0400 hours... I remember him only sleeping. A car would bring him back home during the night. I don't know how he left during the day. He never told me about anything. I remember one night when I woke up to hear my mother and father whispering... When I woke up, they stopped talking. They were afraid of the walls, they were afraid of the neighbors, and they were afraid of themselves. And also of me. It was an atmosphere of wild fear, but it is only now that I realize that.

My parents attempted at any price to give me a good education. They were very happy when they were able to place me in Special School No. 1 in Sokolniki. It was an extremely privileged school—the first experimental school with instruction in English. The students there included Kaganovich's nephew and Malenkov's sons. Currently I am beginning to find out about everything

and everyone, but in my class there were only two students from the lowest class: me and another guy. The others were sons of generals, ministers, etc. There was a feeling of childhood isolation from them, but not complete isolation, because I was a kid with a fanatical interest in sports...

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] Kostya, when was the first time that your father told you where he worked?

[K. Demakhin] He always told me about it! As I said earlier, we lived in the NKVD building.

I saw his uniform: sometimes his uniform would be green, and then suddenly it would become a navy uniform. That is, as I understood it, he would transfer from one department to another. But as for the specific work that he did, I wasn't interested and was not sure about it.

My mother always worked as an engineer and it was only last year that I learned about her origin—her parents had been kulaks. That also had certainly had an influence, and a very strong one, on my mother's fate and the atmosphere in the family. And for that reason they hid their origin from me for a long time. I'm trying to find out my family's history, but my mother is still afraid to mention the place where she grew up, and is even afraid of going there, although I took a video film about her village. When I showed her the film for the first time, she looked at it with tears in her eyes. The second time she was hysterical. But now she is calming down...

They lost everything that they possessed. They lost any faith or memory, because even reminiscences about the past, about their hometown, were mortal for that time. That is why I grew up surrounded by lies.

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] Until what year did your father work in the NKVD?

[K. Demakhin] Until the Khrushchev thaw... I can't give the exact date when he left the NKVD, but he did not do so voluntarily. For him, his leaving the NKVD because an emotional breakdown, a tragedy. Although he lost practically nothing in his earnings...

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] Could you please tell me what you think... was your father an executioner, or wasn't he?

[K. Demakhin] I am profoundly convinced that he was supposed to carry out orders, and he was most conscientious about doing that, because people like him did not have any other way. He is my father, and I will never reject him. I will continue to remember him reverently, but what could a young captain do in the SMERSH [Death to Spies] detachments on the front line? He was always right next to the front line, but not on it...

He is a patriot who carried out orders. He is a truly Russian person in that great, tremendous perversion of a system that made people into patriots...

I matriculated at MVTU [Moscow Higher Technical School], but I studied in an extremely unusual way—I

was a fanatic about races. I was already the Moscow champion among the young men. I was a fanatic about motorcycling and races—I even arrived at the institute for the first time on crutches, after breaking a leg in competitions. But it was precisely the races that led me to what I engaged in successfully, and I graduated from the institute. I was a person who liked to take risks and I was always getting some bone broken and always getting involved in accidents.

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] Did your father want you to follow in his footsteps?

[K. Demakhin] He was a taciturn, reclusive kind of person. His reclusiveness weighed heavily upon him, but it was for him the only possible condition that dictated to him a sense of self-preservation.

There was only one occasion, when I was graduating from the institute... Yes, he most probably had foreseen quite clearly my future path, because some extremely important-looking people approached me, told me to show up somewhere, and began talking to me about my future life (obviously, the same path that he had followed was also intended for me). But, all of a sudden, he must have suspected something, or maybe they had had a conversation with him, because one morning, as I was getting ready to go to the institute, he told me in an offhand manner, as though he was hiding from himself, "Don't put on the shoulder boards... don't make the same mistake that I did... Remember this one thing, son: don't do it"... That was the only candid thing he had said in his life, the only one. I saw that it was an emotional outburst of his.

But I was a real patriot. I saw in those shoulder boards and in serving the state a person's highest patriotism and duty. I was capable of carrying out any order given by the party.

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] As I understand it, they did not desert their people after retirement, but kept an eye on their fate and on them and their children. Is that correct?

[K. Demakhin] Yes, that is absolutely correct! Judge for yourself: a student, a person who has practically come in off the street, is suddenly asked to attend the Intourist courses in order to become an interpreter-guide. I was the only student from the technical school. All the others were teachers at various higher educational schools or English teachers. That is, they were people with a knowledge of the language. But when I went there I had absolutely no knowledge of the language, because sports had done their job and had prevented me from doing any serious studying.

At the monthly courses I did something that I probably would not have done over a period of several years: I studied only English, and seriously.

And when, that summer, I began working at Intourist, I was immediately given an American group... that is, they realized that I was a reliable guy. I was assigned the job

of accompanying an ordinary American family. But the process of breaking me in also began immediately.

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] How did that happen? Where?

[K. Demakhin] The hotel administrator told me that someone wanted to talk to me. In such and such a room. I went upstairs and knocked on the door. They were waiting for me. A conversation began. It was done in a completely calm manner. Naturally it was done in a very professional, pedagogical way, very democratically. And I believed that this was actually necessary. When all was said and done, there could be all kinds of spies and anything else, and I did not think for even a moment about whether that was good or bad. For me, it was natural.

The entire atmosphere in which I grew up was also my atmosphere. I already had my father's genes. But my father had been broken, because he had not been born in this society. He had been born in another society, in another family, but he had been adapted to this one. There was no need for me to adapt: the romanticism of the KGB and the NKVD, the movies, stories, my upbringing—everything, from beginning to end, led me to the conviction that this was the pinnacle of human duty.

I was proud of that and I observed discipline, order, and secret procedures religiously. I knew that I must never give myself away, even if that could save my life...

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] Were there such instances?

[K. Demakhin] I was told that there would be a procession bearing a cross near the Yelokhovskaya Church, and I was supposed to go there and observe... I was also supposed to try to get a bit closer to foreigners... I was told, "Go there looking the way you ordinarily do," that is, looking like a sloppy motorcyclist... I went there, parked my motorcycle off to one side, and began wandering through the crowd. Night had already fallen. More and more people were gathering, and the number of militia men was increasing... Suddenly I saw young people passing by, singing songs, rather smashed... But they were not especially political people—I had already commented on things like this for my new friends... Suddenly a militia detachment headed by a stunted captain began grabbing these guys from the crowd and began beating them. I saw them grab one kid who was about 15 years of age, press him to the ground, and begin kicking him in the groin, the stomach... But he had already relaxed and was not putting up any resistance...

And the young captain, like Napoleon, kept pointing his finger at the next person to be grabbed...

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] Did they point the finger at you too?

[K. Demakhin] No... I was older... Things were easier and simpler for me... I was standing there, with a scarf wrapped around me... A face covered with dust, so that, if anyone spat on it, the spit would definitely leave a

trace. The ordinary appearance of a motorcyclist... But when I saw all this, I went up to the captain and politely, or even in a refined manner, which greatly offended him (although that was exactly what I was trying to do), told him, as I looked at him from head to toe, "Comrade captain, you are violating legality, socialist legality... by beating up people in the presence of others, thus insulting other citizens as well..." My language was carefully chosen, because I had spoken at all the political classes at the institute...

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] Did you approach him in order to test that secret power that you had already begun to sense?

[K. Demakhin] No, I wanted to find out whether or not people were beaten in the militia... That curiosity had seized me much earlier. I never violated anything. I was always disciplined... I did not drink vodka, because I engaged in sports... I was an exemplary student and I was simply expressing my indignation to him. Then, all of a sudden, I got a blow in my shoulder... I realized that they wanted me to begin a fight, and therefore I clasped my hands firmly behind my back... He pushed me again, and I could barely hold myself back. Then he kicked me with his boot. With all his might... For many years after that, my bone hurt...

The captain began shouting, "This is the ringleader!" They unhooked my hands... I did not put up any resistance—I gave myself the assignment of just suffering everything... They took me behind the Yelokhovskaya Church, where no street lights were shining, and gave me a good beating. Then they put me in a bus. They gave me a very real and very cruel beating... Two guys did the beating. I only clasped my hands on my stomach, because they were trying to hit me in the kidneys and liver (incidentally, that was also the first time that I had been hit in the kidneys and liver)...

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] Didn't you shout to them, telling them who you were, where you had come from, and the assignment you were carrying out?

[K. Demakhin] No, no... I knew that I was not supposed to mention that in any situation at all!... Later on, I fell down, pretending to be unconscious, but they kept lifting me up again and again, in order to do the job a bit more effectively... Then the bus started to leave... They took me to the militia office. It was apparently the rayon precinct... It was there that I asked for a piece of paper in order to make a statement... They gave it to me, and I wrote a very serious statement... When they were releasing me, they told me that they would be summoning me...

But the next day I was told to go to the KGB...

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] How did they find out?

[K. Demakhin] I myself telephoned them in the morning and explained why I had not arrived at the prearranged

time at the prearranged place... My meeting was arranged at a clandestine apartment...

[30 Oct 90 p 6]

[Text] [Facsimile of news clipping, with headline "British envoy's driver a KGB agent"] Caption reads: The London INDEPENDENT is one of the numerous foreign publications that printed on their front pages the report from last week's issue of LG [LITERATURNAYA GAZETA]. Today we are printing the second part of our commentator's conversation with former secret KGB employee Konstantin Demakhin.

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] What were those secret meetings like?

[K. Demakhin] There would be an ordinary apartment, where you would go. You would make a telephone call, and then someone would meet you there... The person living there would usually go into another room, and the people would talk to you. So it was there, at that apartment, that they talked to me, and I prepared a statement. A KGB employee said that I would be told to go to the militia station for interrogation. I was actually called to Petrovka. I prepared another piece of paper. I was told that I would be summoned to go to court and that that S.O.B. would get what he deserved... But that S.O.B. never did get what he deserved, and I wasn't summoned to go anywhere.

I have remembered that incident all my life. I realized that people do get beaten up by the militia, but you can never prove that. Not even with the help of the KGB.

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] Could you tell me whether, when you were attending the institute, the proposal was ever made to you to cooperate with the KGB in order to inform on your comrades?

[K. Demakhin] Yes, that also happened. It happened... As I have already said, I was an active member of the Komsomol, but for the first time, when this proposal was made to me, I felt the birth within me of some kind of doubt, some sense of awkwardness... The people from the KGB whom I met were excellent teachers, and they sensed that proposals like this could embitter me. But at that time I was a pure kind of guy and was ready to do anything for my comrades. Although I believed that the "aggravation of the class struggle" was actually serious, it was necessary to fight for the purity of ideals, to defend them...

But those were the years of the Khrushchev thaw, a time when people regained their sight. Once a girl whom I had met asked me to take her to Ploshchad Mayakovskogo. I was fascinated as I heard poetry being read there. I liked the poets' boldness. It tickled my nerves, just as I liked listening to Voice of America. A while later, some young people with arm bands identifying them as *druzhinniki* showed up and, together with the militia, chased everyone away. I was not detained. Somehow they learned who I was, where I went to school, and I had to

go to the Komsomol raykom. I told them honestly how I happened to be at Ploshchad Mayakovskogo, and with whom I went there. For a long time after that, my conscience gnawed at me: how could I have done that? Why had I given the name of the girl who asked me to take her there? For my entire life it has brought a lump to my throat when I think that I had informed on my girl friend then.

So I had come up against just plain dirt...

This is the first time in my life that I have told anyone about this incident. In principle it is a dark shadow that has been lying on my conscience...

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] You began telling me how you were used...

[K. Demakhin] I worked with bus tourists because I was a person who at least knew the traffic rules: the Intourist girls did not know much about them... The foreigners took a very warm attitude toward me, because I was a perky kind of guy and was accustomed to the two-faced, or even three-faced, life I led, subsequently telling which ones had said what.

I was ashamed about the road that we drove along. It was a patriot's real shame. I was ashamed about the half-destroyed buildings that were not suitable for human habitation, but I thought that that was natural, and I considered that the things that the tourists talked about were just ordinary propaganda. I did not think for a moment about why we were living in such squalor...

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] You were keeping an eye on the foreigners, but who was keeping an eye on you?

[K. Demakhin] I sensed their attention at all times and absolutely everywhere. But I understood that that was necessary. I believed: it's necessary. I was proud to work for the KGB.

I worked with various foreign tourists. But some of them—very elderly ones—I have remembered all my life. They were an American couple who had leased a Soviet Volga with a Finnish driver. I did not have any license, but I already was a very good driver, and I drove them all around Moscow. I showed them everything, and they took notes about everything. They were interested in everything. That won me over. I tried my best to show them the country, and we became friends. The silent Finnish driver always sat in the back. Later on, we drove across the country. We got as far as Odessa. This was the first time that I had gone by way of Uman. But it turned out that we could not drive into Uman. After the trip, Intourist workers had a quiet talk with me, and then there were more serious fellows from the KGB. But they were not my "handlers"—they were other people... And I could not tell them that the side trip into Uman had been sanctioned by my handlers. For whatever purposes they had.

Because of the Uman incident, I was no longer asked to work for Intourist. I resented that, but when I telephoned

to the KGB, I heard, "Go to such-and-such an address." That proved to be Sputnik. In front of me they spread out, like a game of solitaire, all the tours I could conduct if I would work for them... The salary was the same, the earnings were the same. Everything was in order, everything was splendid. Just give us the information... Like everything else... But I knew that I was backed up by serious KGB support, and they were recording every step I took.

At Sputnik I "happened to get" some Peace Corps graduates who had been given, as a present, a three-month tour of the Soviet Union.

They were interesting young people who were very smart. One guy knew the works of Marx and Lenin and quoted them, giving the specific volume. He kept trying to prove that Lenin was a bandit, a criminal... I hated to hear those things. But in a clear, understandable manner he laid out our history in the way that it was seen by a normal person and how we perceive it today. But then... After all, what kind of person was I? Lenin was sacred, and so was Marx. And he was talking like an enemy. Like one of those against whom I was supposed to be working.

There was a girl in that group and, I guess, I fell in love with her. She also took a nice attitude toward me. After she left, I wrote her one or two letters. She answered me. But the correspondence stopped because I believed religiously that it was a criminal act and a bad thing to write letters to foreign countries.

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] Did you maintain your ties with the KGB even after your graduation from the institute?

[K. Demakhin] I was assigned to a rather secret enterprise. I became an engineer. I got 10 rubles more than the others, and I thought that my brilliant future was guaranteed. But once I decided to make a sharp change in my fate and I went to Dzhezkazgan to work at a missile test range.

I lived in a group of engineers together with the members of the test crew in the cosmonauts' hotel...

A spirit of a restricted zone reigned at the test range. We engineers who were responsible for testing the refueling systems always had alcohol, and that gave us tremendous privileges... Drunkenness flourished to a frightening extent. You could use alcohol to barter practically anything—even a live missile.

The alcohol never got to those missiles. It was never used to wash any pipes... Those who opposed that system were simply given a good beating. One guy stood up against the ringleader. He was plied with alcohol, and I found him half-alive, beaten mercilessly in the steppe...

I got five people together and left the cosmonauts' hotel. We went to the black-bone hotel—where the installation crew members lived. It was a one-story barracks: dirty, damp, and cold. But we lived together harmoniously. We

also had alcohol, but we bartered it for meat. I myself did the cooking there and fed everyone, and the guys wanted to stop drinking.

Many people became drunkards there. During a six-month period I myself personally sent off on a plane two of the 15 engineers with delirium tremens. When a person eats soap, runs off into the steppe, he is caught in the steppe, and foam is coming out of his mouth, things are really serious...

I always carried a knife with me and was ready to kill anyone who raised a hand to me.

We were supposed to leave in order to reformatize an official trip to Moscow, and my comrade, who lived with me (he was one of the five people) went to pick up his internal passport at the hotel where he had previously lived, and he never came back from there. For a long time I waited for him near the driveway. Then I went upstairs, and a drinking party was in progress there. My friend had got drunk again. I gave him a tongue-lashing for that, and then my chief, who was completely drunk, and who was a hulk of a person, said, "Who are you? It's my birthday..." I said, "Happy birthday!..." He said, "Here, take a drink..." "I don't drink..." "What's the matter? Too squeamish?" "Well, if that's the way you think, then, okay, I'm squeamish..." We were talking in this way when, all of a sudden, I felt a lightning-quick punch on my jaw, so strong that my jaw flew out of its socket. Three guys jumped on me. They kept spinning me around. I looked at the table. What could I find there? A knife, a fork, anything at all... I had to kill him. There wasn't a knife or a fork, but there was a tremendous thick decanter, that had insulation tape wound around it so that you could not see how much alcohol was in it. So when two of them let me go, I picked up the decanter, jumped over the shoulders of the people standing near the table, and hit my chief with the decanter. I broke his skull, damaged certain arteries, and a stream of blood two meters high came spurting out. I walked backwards, holding the fragments of the decanter in front of me. But the law of the prison was well-known there. Everyone dropped his hands.

I began worrying about the person whom I had almost killed. I also wanted very much not to kill him. I walked up to the table, put my weapon on it, and said, "Now it's your turn..." Three guys came rushing toward me, shouting, "Throw him out the window!" But this was the fourth floor. They dragged me to the window... Someone opened it, but suddenly my chief shouted, "Don't touch him!..."

Later on, in exchange for two bottles of alcohol, a military physician was brought in, and he put in some stitches... My victim and I sat down at the same table, and all the others hid. He and I began drinking that alcohol. For him it was just an ordinary thing to do, for me it was not. But I drank it like water... I don't remember how I was taken back afterwards to that

installation-crew barracks. I remember just one thing: how I kept wiping the vomit off me...

A few days later I got a telephone call from Moscow: "Where are you, anyway? We bought a motorcycle, the only one for the whole team, and for some reason you disappeared!" I was told that I was supposed to prepare for the Soviet Union's championship. Never before in my life had I had a new motorcycle. I set off for Moscow...

I found a job at the Scientific-Research Institute for Information for the Motor-Vehicle Industry. It was an office that existed only on paper. They did not pay well, but no one worked either.

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] Kostya, why don't we start talking about your last place of service?

[K. Demakhin] I worked at the office for seven years, and my secret operations came to an end. For me that was very good: I began traveling all around the country with my all-star team. I made an attempt at the world championship. I got good results in motorcycle races on the ice. And I saw other countries for the first time.

But I was blind. Even after I had seen foreign countries, I still did not understand anything.

All that I thought about was sports... I sacrificed myself and said goodbye to myself before making my laps. Once, at a championship race, I was told, "Don't let him get ahead of you!" And the person they were talking about was Antonin Shvad, the former world champion. And I said, "No, he won't be the first to arrive."

I would not win the starting position from him, but every turn that I took was a threat to his life. And he understood that. He held back for four or five laps, and then he stopped. And that was the first time—as well as the last time—in the history of motorcycle races. He stopped so that the judges would stop the race, because I was out to murder him. I came in first, and he did not cross the finishing line at all.

I returned to the Soviet Union on horseback. A few months later, I smashed myself up. And everyone deserted me. No one came to see me in the hospital. I didn't have anything to buy food with. My wife was expecting our second child. I was deserted by everyone...

I constantly made telephone calls from the hospitals (I was in four of them) to my KGB "handlers," who once again found me in Moscow. I would deceive them by concealing my future disability. I would explain to them that I could no longer work at the NII [Scientific-Research Institute]. I made several telephone calls, and finally I was asked, "Do you want to work with foreigners?" I agreed. I was told, "You have to go to such-and-such an address." It proved to be the Administration for Diplomatic-Corps Affairs (UPDK).

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] Did they already know there that you had been sent there on a recommendation from the KGB?

[K. Demakhin] Naturally. And I was accepted as one of their own, although I was always, for them [the KGB], one of "their own." They never let me out of their sight...

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] Did you sense that?

[K. Demakhin] When I went to a capitalist country for the first time to a competition (prior to that, I had visited only Bulgaria), I was called to the Central Committee. An extremely respectable-looking gentleman, in a very courteous tone of voice, had a serious conversation with me, and asked the question, "But you got letters from America, didn't you?..." But that had been many, many years previously, when I had written to that girl... But he said, "Yes, but you wrote to her, and she wrote to you..." That is, they never forget anything there. For me that was a confirmation of the fact that they remembered me. Their memory was sitting in me, and I could not get rid of it, or even planned to. All that was self-explanatory...

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] Was the proposal made to you at the UPDK that you work at the British embassy?

[K. Demakhin] Yes, and to begin working immediately as the ambassador's driver. I accepted it as an honor, as a great trust. Especially since at that time I was only a Class III driver...

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] Naturally, you were well received. But you were not the only person of that kind at UPDK. I know their ways rather well and I know that the entire UPDK was penetrated by the KGB...

[K. Demakhin] It's not only a matter of the KGB. I never brought presents to the UPDK, but I knew that others were bringing things there...

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] Did your close ties with the KGB protect you from extortion?

[K. Demakhin] Of course. Only once, several years ago, when, all of a sudden, people in the UPDK began to make frequent trips abroad, a big new chief appeared. He was a deputy for working conditions... He was the person upon whom the last signature for departure depended. He began asking me, "I have bad tires. Do you think you could get me some?" At the embassy it was possible to ask for something. They would find it, and you would get it for work. Putting it succinctly, I got him a set of tires for his Volga. The next trip came around, and once again I failed to get my documents. I went to see him, and he closed his office door. "Well, Kostya," he said, "what are you going to drink?" He opened up his safe, and he had whiskey, gin, vodka, cognac... And... he told me what size blue jeans he needed...

I returned to the embassy and stated that I would not go to any foreign countries. I told the Soviet administrator that I did not want to have anything to do with someone at the UPDK.

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] What happened then?

[K. Demakhin] In literally two or three weeks that big official was fired. They figured him out, even though I did not mention his name. But after two weeks he was caught making the same proposal to someone else and he was given the sack. Incidentally, that same general suggested to me that I repair automobiles in exchange for a lot of money, because he had two garages and he was apparently setting up his own production entity, foreseeing perestroika by many years...

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] But, the way I understand it, Kostya, you were sent to work with the British ambassador not for the purpose of locating bribetakers in the UPDK. Am I correct?

[K. Demakhin] The British received me in a remarkable way, not knowing that I was a double agent in the literal sense of the term. I respect a person. For me he seems like a good, nice, wonderful person, but then, all of a sudden, I meet another person in the evening.

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] From the KGB?

[K. Demakhin] Yes, from the KGB...

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] Were these frequent contacts?

[K. Demakhin] Telephone calls several times a week. Especially if some serious action was being carried out.

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] What kind of action?

[K. Demakhin] Well, I would be paying special attention to someone. I would be told that that embassy worker was of interest to them. That's all...

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] Who specifically was the KGB interested in?

[K. Demakhin] Maybe a womanizer, or a money-grubber, or a greedy individual. That is, all his negative features were of extreme interest for their purposes. In order to find out something about the person, I would organize small games, up to and including games involving currency... Although I personally never had any attraction for currency operations, and, in general, I was always assigned to which attracted me. I would repair cars, would accept a small payment, and then enter into a friendship with foreigners. They would come to visit me. There would be conversations and drinking parties at my place... Sometimes they would start talking about various things... Those were the things that interested me. Or, rather, not me, but **them!** I felt that the foreign representations had their own services that were trying to harm our state. Those services, probably, have to exist. They exist in all countries. But what I saw convinced me more and more that the scope of the KGB and of similar Western intelligence services are incomparable.

I know many KGB workers. They also include those whom I remember normally. But it was specifically from

one of these normal individuals that I heard for the first time that, if it was necessary, he would not stop when faced by an unjust act.

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] Did you always carry out what you had been ordered to do?

[K. Demakhin] At first, yes. But later on I began more and more frequently to think about the role that had been assigned to me. Once I was working on a certain "object" at the embassy. He was in the special [osobaya] service. Those people usually have little to do with the Russians and take a very serious attitude toward their secrecy. Therefore they are inaccessible to anyone. But for me that person proved to be accessible.

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] Did he first become accessible, and then an "object"? Or vice versa?

[K. Demakhin] He had an expensive car, and it needed body work. During the days when it was being repaired, I became friendly with him. He began visiting me, and everything was proceeding normally, but they, naturally, found out about this. Operations worker Volodya, an extremely stupid, hard-headed person without a shred of creativity (although they, in general, were all creative), began encouraging that Britisher to become a traitor. It was then, for the first time, that I realized that the motherland is not only communism, Lenin, and the Soviet Union. England, or America, could also be a motherland. I told Volodya to leave the guy alone, and that he believed me. Volodya looked at me as though he was looking at an idiot. Then a catastrophe occurred. We were driving home. My young son was playing around in the car, and when I made a wide turn, he suddenly fell out of the car as it was moving. This Britisher protected my son with his own car, preventing the stream of traffic from running over the child. That's what happened...

So I repeated to my "handler" that he should leave the guy alone!

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] What later happened to that person?

[K. Demakhin] He turned out to be a real patriot for his country and when he realized what he was being encouraged to do, he left the Union with astonishing speed. That happened after a meeting in my home after a rather bad discussion that I had one-on-one with Volodya.

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] You were upset?

[K. Demakhin] My eyes began to open.

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] Am I correct in thinking that, in the UPDK system, an eye is kept not only on foreigners, but also on one another?

[K. Demakhin] When I had just come to the UPDK, it was proposed to me that I report was the atmosphere among our people at the embassy was: who was who? what were they involved in? what did they talk about? I got off with making general statements. Later on, I stated

openly that that didn't suit me. They backed off from me. However, I am completely convinced, I am assured, that if not everyone, the absolute majority of the Russians working in embassies inform on one another.

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] You were in the system, but you considered yourself to be purer than the system?

[K. Demakhin] I reported certain things and always had, in exchange, benefits and indulgences. I was forgiven for absolutely everything, if I ever did anything wrong. If I had an automobile accident, it was glossed over. If I was late, people would close their eyes to it. But I did work very selflessly, because I was convinced that these people were our enemies.

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] When did you begin to harbor doubts as to whether everything that you were doing was correct?

[K. Demakhin] Do you remember the time when approximately a hundred Soviet diplomats were deported from London?

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] Yes...

[K. Demakhin] A counterwave of deportations of Britishers from Moscow began, but simultaneously surprising and unpleasant things began happening to their private cars: the tires were slashed on absolutely every one of them... I could guess who was doing that... Then the electronic equipment in the ambassadors Rolls-Royce began to fail... I particularly hated that. Later on, I began to think more and more often, "If these people are enemies, why do that take such a heartfelt, painful attitude toward what is happening in our country?..." And I began to go to meetings with my handlers less and less frequently...

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] But what did they do?

[K. Demakhin] The militiamen standing at the front gate are also in the same club... Once one of the militiamen told me at a big drinking party, "Kostya, why don't you stop what you're doing? I saw your file at the 5th Administration. You could already be shot. So much has been written about you there, it's awful..." And so I realized that he himself had been working for them for a long time...

[Yu. Shchekochikhin] Did they attempt to exert an effect on you, or to turn you?

[K. Demakhin] I did not conceal my views or my doubts. I told them about all my views and about how they had begun to change with regard to the army, the party, and Marxism. They would have very patient talks with me, each one lasting two or three hours. Then they realized that I was no longer the same person I had been...

[End of interview]

An Agent—So What?

Our correspondent, S. Kiselev, asked the Embassy of Great Britain and the Main Commercial-Production Administration for Providing Services to the Diplomatic Corps, attached to USSR MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] (Glav-UPDK), to comment on this article.

N. Jones, head of the embassy's press service:

"There is nothing special to comment on here. When it is a matter of the security of the state, or the protection of its interests, we do not see anything unusual in this situation. As for Mister Demakhin himself, he will undoubtedly continue to work at our embassy. In the same job, I think."

L. Kerestedszhlyants, chief of Glav-UPDK:

"It is necessary first of all to clarify something: Demakhin is not an employee of Glav-UPDK. He works in our daughter enterprise, which is called Inpredkadry. His self-exposure definitely does not mean that all the remaining workers in this independent company (approximately 8000 persons) are KGB agents. In any case, I am acquainted with several of them and I know that they are not agents employed by intelligence agencies. The item published in LG has caused people to worry that now the foreign diplomatic corps will begin to suspect all the Soviet citizens working in embassies, consulates, representations, etc., of having ties with the KGB."

I'm Writing a book: "Raby GB" [Slaves of State Security]

Item, by Yu. Shch. [Yu. Shchekochikhin], under rubric: "Monologue After the Confession"

The book will be about people like Konsrtantin Demakhin, the final part of whose bitter and penetrating confession was printed in this issue of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA.

For a long time I could not understand what forced people who had become secret KGB workers to come—or to write—to the editorial office after our appeal in this newspaper last autumn. For them to announce themselves meant taking a colossal risk. And not even because someone might stop a truck on an empty street or suspiciously drunken hooligans might give you some punches on the head in some driveway. No, worse than that! Announcing oneself means telling acquaintances, loved ones, and close friends, "Things were like this, folks!... Actually, I am a different person. I am not the same person that you knew and loved." And, compared with this, what is even a blow on the head with a blackjack?

So they came. And they wrote.

I will immediately reject all the reproaches that were heaped upon me by MVD and KGB workers in their letters: "Have you lost your mind? Not a single intelligence service in the world can operate without secret workers!" I did not receive a single letter, or receive a

single confession from a person who, after becoming a secret worker, engaged in the fight against the Mafia or who exposed terrorists.

Everyone was completely aware of what I was talking about and of the specific stone weighing down upon my soul that I wrote about when I directed my appeal to the secret workers.

It is not the same thing with everyone else, with all other countries. In the civilized world there has never been, and there is not now, anything such as we had. The reason why they wrote, and the reason why they came, was the fact that it had become unbearable to remain a slave of the system.

The sweet fairy tale about the happy communist tomorrow actually gave rise to slavery. And slavery is a bad thing. It consumes a person from within, forcing his heart to beat strenuously in the search for freedom.

And no one, in any way, can take that feeling away from a person...

That is why we give room in our newspaper to these people. This is important. It is important to live free.

In last week's issue of LG my friends and associates—other journalists in this newspaper—told me how LITERATURNAYA GAZETA intends to come out of the crisis. Apparently we actually are making our way out of it. I certainly have nothing to add to what has already been said. I only hope that we shall remain a free newspaper for a free person, so that we can live together in freedom.

Racketeers Exploit Rumors of Russian Monetary Reform

PM0711164391 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 2153 GMT 6 Nov 91

[From the "Television News Service" newscast: Report by A. Vagin, Ye. Shmatnikov, identified by caption; figures in brackets denote broadcast time in GMT in hours, minutes, and seconds]

[Text] [215954] [Vagin] The Russian president's statements on the need to liberalize prices have completely undermined the last bit of faith people still had in the hapless ruble. Fearing not only steep price hikes, but also a disadvantageous rate of exchange for existing banknotes, people have rushed to the stores to buy up everything that can still be bought.

This chaos has spawned a new type of racket. In remote areas, especially in Central Asia, rumors that the Russians are beginning to print limited quantities of rubles and that all other banknotes will be withdrawn have been put into circulation. Enterprising speculators are buying rubles at a rate of 50 kopeks per ruble from gullible shepherds and peasants in exchange for bank certificates and bonds. After such operations money is imported into Russia in suitcases rather than purses to buy whatever

there is. The total value of these deals, according to unofficial information, is already running into hundreds of millions of rubles. And if, one fine day, all the securities are presented for payment, not even the West will be able save our economy.

Stiffer Sentences Urged To Combat Rise in Crime

924B0044A RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian
16 Oct 91 pp 1-2

[Article by Valentin Demin, first deputy director of the All-Union Institute for the Study of Problems of Strengthening Law and Order: "We Have Surpassed the United States in the Number of Murders as Well as in the Number of Presidents: We Need Only Measure Up to Them in Terms of Authority"]

[Text] There is a wise Vietnamese saying: "Two may sleep in the same bed, but their dreams will be different." So it is with respect to the law. It is utterly different to "radicals" and "conservatives"; to representatives of the Union and republic state structures; to those who strive to live better by their own labors and those who reap profits by dishonest deals.

Musing over the fact that our people lack respect for the law, A. Herzen noted: "The crying injustice of half the laws have taught them to hate the other half; so they submit as to some blind force."

Over the years of Soviet power, the decline in prestige of the law became simply catastrophic, I think for this very reason. There was, however, a distinctive aura about it, as if to say: If those in authority can break the law, then why can't we?

The bureaucratized CPSU, running the country as a monopoly without any supervision, not only did not consider itself bound by law. It openly set itself above the law. The indiscipline and corruption of party officials locally became increasingly illegal and widespread. Judicial and law enforcement bodies were reduced to the role of obedient executors of political directives.

But is it really tolerable that such a person as Yevgenyevich Nikonov, the former procurator of Krasnogorsk, for example, who selflessly engaged in battle with the local mafia and successfully prosecuted its ringleaders for taking bribes and other misdeeds, should be held responsible for the evils of the entire system? When the workers at the largest plant in Krasnogorsk nominated Nikonov as a candidate for USSR people's deputy, everything was done to prevent his election and to drive him out of the procuracy as well as out of Krasnogorsk. Coming to the defense of Nikonov during these difficult days for him was SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA, the predecessor publication of what was to become RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA.

Instructive, too, is the position taken by the collective of the public prosecutor's office of Ryazansk Oblast on 19 August. It not only promptly dissociated itself from its

superiors, who had taken the side of the putschists, but announced its readiness to come to the defense of legally constituted authority with weapons in hand.

The overthrow of the unjust system that existed offers us a historic opportunity to affirm—not in terms of demagoguery but in fact—lawfulness as one of the foundations of the new state system and emergent society. To achieve this, however, it is necessary to profit fully from the bitter lessons of our past. Any power, even one that serves the noblest of aims it would appear, inevitably will grow into a state of totalitarianism if it dares to rise above the law—if it does not feel itself bound by it—and if society does not work out effective ways of controlling this power.

It is therefore particularly important that any changes and reforms carried out by the new regime from the outset have a firm legal basis and be strictly in accordance with the law, so that arbitrary acts in violation of rights may be promptly and rigidly suppressed.

Widespread condemnation of the activities of the leadership in Russia in this respect during the putsch cannot be called justified. The Russian government bodies, for example, were forced to take upon themselves the functions of the Union ministry departments in their territory since the USSR Supreme Soviet was inoperative and the Union government backed the coup.

A tendency to revert to this habit of not respecting the law, however, is manifesting itself even now.

Why are certain of the ukases issued by the president of the RSFSR so lacking in substance from the legal standpoint and therefore stirring justified criticism?

Why as a result of the actions of six members of the Presidium of the All-Union Council of Veterans of War and Labor, who had supported the putschists, was it necessary to disband the Moscow and rayon councils of this organization, close their bank accounts, and seal off the premises? More than two million veterans in Moscow were thus deprived of the opportunity to requisition food supplies through their councils, to get material assistance from charitable organizations, or to obtain legal counsel.

A campaign that has been widely unleashed to expose persons who did not take a stand against the State Committee of the Emergency [GKChP] during the 19-21 August period is stirring profound public apprehension. Among them, of course, are many who were simply confused, disoriented, or poorly informed with regard to the law, persons in the habit of carrying out everything coming from such highly placed personages as the president of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the acting President of the USSR and chairman of the Council of Ministers, and their department heads. Indeed, how can we speak of compliance on a mass scale with fiats of the Emergency State Committee when the putshists failed to hold out for even three days?

Many people were sincerely convinced of the need to declare a state of emergency in the country; they demanded it from Gorbachev, and they detected weakness of power in his "indecisiveness." Can all of this really be ignored? Can the conniving role of the CPSU Central Committee, as well as its other organs perhaps if their complicity is established, really be the determining factor in the persecution of communists who have supported democratic changes by their actions wholeheartedly, and who have participated and continue to participate actively in this process?

The point is not simply that democracy stands to lose thousands and thousands of people who might have remained to uphold it. In a country where until recently without respect for the law such a campaign may assume extremely dangerous and destructive forms. As one so-called revolutionary, A. Platonov, put it in a similar situation: "This means that all the bad people must be killed or there will be very few good ones left."

It is true that the underlying causes of the putsch, its driving force and mechanism, must be explored in depth and exposed, and that everything must be done to apply the lessons that have been learned from what happened. After the establishment of personal blame by competent bodies, however, those alone who committed unlawful acts must answer for their misdeeds in accordance with the law. That is the way it must be in a lawful state. It is for us to ponder this fact long and hard.

The crime situation is particularly alarming. Last year there were almost 120,000 cases of criminal hooliganism, of which more than 30,000 were dropped. The remainder went to court. What was the disposition of these cases? Roughly two-thirds of the hooligans who were guilty of acting with "malice aforethought" and 90 percent of those who committed acts of hooliganism without aggravating circumstances remained free.

Of course, these findings must not be oversimplified. To call for the incarceration of all hooligans would be unjust and irresponsible. But facts are facts. Whereas previously a hooligan knew in advance that he would be jailed, and that only the very lucky ones could manage to get off with a slight scare, now he is convinced of his impunity.

We need not be surprised by the fact that street crime has tripled since 1986, that in many places criminal gangs literally terrorize people, and that we now surpass the United States in the number of murders committed. Nor can liberal admonitions alter such a situation. People judge authority by how reliably the property, the health, and the lives of citizens are protected. A democratic revolution requires stable order. It is time to get rid of a host of illusions about "humanizing" punishment, the humanity of which lies largely in protecting citizens from people who commit crimes and in forcing criminals to feel the unyielding force of the law.

Shift in Emphasis From Public to Private Law Urged

924B0061A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Oct 91
Union Edition p 2

[Article by S. Alekseyev, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences: "Not Just Law—Private Law!"]

[Text] The subdivision of law into "private" and "public" is something that has been known since ancient times. And in terms of its content this subdivision seems perfectly clear and obvious. Private law encompasses private, individual interests and the affairs of individuals, while public law encompasses the sphere of state affairs and the interests of the state as a whole.

What is significant, however, is that it is precisely private law that became the chief factor in and vehicle of the legal process, far outstripping in this respect the institutions of public law, including those of criminal law, criminal procedural law and administrative law. And that happened chiefly because the principal part of private law, called "civil law," encompasses and translates into legal language the principal achievements of civilization—"freedom of the individual," private property and the market—and therefore acts as a "market law" that encompasses relations entailing the freedom of the autonomous individual, and diverse commodity-market relations in all of their subtleties and variations, all of which relations have been legally worked through and elevated into a harmonious system.

It is significant that Russia, too, reached the eve of the October Revolution having a highly developed culture of civil law, a developing civil court, prepared materials of a developed civil legislation, and—what is especially essential—major, world-class scholars in civil law. A good many of them, fortunately, continued to work in the universities and legal institutions in the period after October.

Bolshevism is by its nature a phenomenon incompatible with law. Although wide use was made of legal documents—decrees and resolutions of the Council of People's Commissars, and even a Constitution (1918)—they for the most part, in V. I. Lenin's words, served the purposes of propaganda, the establishment of the absolute imperatives of the "proletarian regime," the omnipotence of the party political apparatus, the priority of "revolutionary legal consciousness," and the legalization of the "Red terror."

Granted, in the changeover to the NEP the question of civil legislation arose. And that in itself is instructive: the NEP, which was intended to revive commodity-market relations required, for this reason, appropriate, fitting legislation. Civil legislation—the RSFSR Civil Code adopted in 1922—became such legislation.

Well, the very existence and functioning of civil legislation, even in a totalitarian society, is a positive fact.

Especially since its development and partial application—albeit very limited application after the NEP was rolled back at the end of the 1920s—made it possible to disclose the potential of major scholars specializing in civil law and having prerevolutionary service, and to introduce a progressive stream into Soviet jurisprudence. But the problem is that civil law under Soviet conditions did not become private law, the foundation of the whole legal system.

A fateful role was played here, unfortunately, by the precepts of V. I. Lenin. After a draft Civil Code based on materials prepared back in prerevolutionary times had been drawn up at his initiative (and this step was significant), V. I. Lenin noted angrily in letters addressed to Politburo members and to the People's Commissariat of Justice, that the code had been "absolutely messed up" and that it was necessary to provide for the state's "intervention" in "private-law relations" and in "civil affairs." And here is his statement, which was subsequently accorded general and incontrovertible significance: "We recognize nothing 'private'; for us everything in the area of the economy is of the nature of public law, and not private."

It is understandable that such an ideological postulate accorded with both existing realities and with the de facto assumption of state control over the entire life of society, the domination of dictatorial state capitalism, and the omnipotence of the party nomenklatura, masked by socialist phraseology. But the reason that "public-law" principles—or more precisely, statist principles—so lastingly permeated all of Soviet law and made it the true handmaiden of the whole totalitarian system, was that the ideological precepts and the regime of total state control merged into one.

I shall be so bold as to assert that it is precisely here that we find the root problem of our democratic development and emergence of real freedom and a market, and modern civil society.

The theoretical side of the question is this: until civil legislation, laws on property and entrepreneurship, and all other analogous laws are recognized and established in public and legal existence as private law, we will not have real private (personified) property, entrepreneurship, private initiative, and the peasants' right to land.

The problem, of course, is not one of terms or of simple classification. The essence of the issue is that private law expresses a particular legal system and particular juridical procedures based wholly on the freedom and lofty status of the human being. It was under the influence of the totalitarian regime and the total domination of public-law principles that the notion that everything "legal" derived wholly from the state and state law, and that "permission" and "consent" were needed everywhere became rooted in our country and entered our flesh and blood.

In private law, in contrast to public, everything is just the opposite: the human being himself, on the basis of his

inalienable natural rights and his will, and in his own interest, develops his legal relationships, and all of this, perfected and formulated by himself, with the consent and agreement of others, becomes legally binding and is recognized and defended by the state as its, the state's, own law. Moreover, the sole arbiter and final judge in all collisions and conflicts is the court. And all of us, who by habit associate law primarily with constitutional questions, criminal prosecution, problems of government, and so forth, evidently still have to break down our established public-law stereotypes in order to fix in our understanding the fact that law is only law when private law occupies a lofty and worthy place in it.

In connection with the need to restore private law in our country that is undergoing a process of renewal, a number of practical questions arise.

The chief and perhaps most burning question of present-day reality is associated with the conclusion of a treaty on economic commonwealth by the sovereign states of a reformed Union.

A key purpose of the treaty is to create a common economic space. It is a purpose that is clear and obvious to everyone. But hardly anyone recognizes that such a common economic space is impossible in principle from the outset if there is no unified legal field, that is, not just, once again, a "legal space" (what a fashionable word!), but a unified, favorable and dependable legal environment that is equal for everyone.

How can such a unified and favorable environment be attained when all republics have proclaimed the "supremacy" of their own republic legislation, and it is isolated legislation, especially on economic matters.

And so the published text of the treaty mentions the "supremacy" of the republics' legislation, although it is noted that the parties to the treaty "have agreed to bring the norms of their economic (!) legislation closer together," and cases in which the treaty and legislation of the USSR take priority are mentioned.

I must state categorically that the treaty's provisions, if they remain in the form in which they are now worded, will not create any unified, favorable and dependable economic environment that is equal for all; and from that standpoint the hopes for a common economic space, to put it mildly, are not very encouraging.

The solution here is entirely different; and it especially is not in the context of "economic legislation," which is what in former times was opposed to civil law as a form of public law. The solution here lies in the strict differentiation of public and private law.

Public law is indeed the domain of the republics as sovereign states. But private law, which is directly based on natural and inalienable human rights, is law that in principle and by its very nature is uniform and, moreover, worldwide law.

And how can all this be achieved. By imposing unified civil legislation from above? Absolutely not!

Every sovereign state must have its own and invariably its own civil code—the symbol of its adherence to the ideals of civil society. Yet there is a world field of civil law that encompasses the more than 2,000-year history of private law; incidentally, the Basic Principles of Civil Legislation adopted in 1991 have in many respects already embodied this experience.

And further, in my view, the scholars specializing in civil law must have their say. As they have always done in all ages. After all, even Roman private law was created, by and large, by the leading specialists in jurisprudence. And at the present time in the United States recommendations on the standardization and harmonization of private law in the states are the results of advisory studies by major prestigious jurists, both scholars and practitioners, and the universities.

I think that in our country, too—thankfully, the traditions and works of the remarkable Russian school of civil law are still alive—it would be warranted to pool the efforts of all specialists in civil law—those from both the Russian Federation and all the other states (including, without fail, the Baltic states), and foreign specialists, as well, especially jurists from the EEC and the United States. So that they, through their advice, recommendations, wishes and even reminders of the indisputable requirements of science and of the eternal axioms, might contribute to the harmonization of the civil law of sovereign states and to the establishment in it of uniform values of private law.

U.S. Legal System: Model for Protecting Rights of Accused

PM0411144491 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Oct 91
p 4

[PRAVDA political observer Tomas Kolesnichenko "Opinion" column: "The Cost of Slips of the Tongue"]

[Excerpts] "All ambition must be checked by other ambition." This is not a philosophical maxim or a quote from a skirmish between politicians or parliamentarians. It is a principle enshrined in the U.S. Constitution. Thanks to a system of "checks and balances," it guarantees strict separation of powers, whereby no one power may totally override another. [passage omitted]

... It happened on 8 August 1969 in the Bel Air district of Los Angeles, where the most famous Hollywood stars live. One of them, Sharon Tate, was expecting a baby. But a terrible tragedy happened. Tate and several of her guests were brutally murdered. The criminals were caught virtually at the scene of the crime. Charles Manson ("Jesus-Satan") and his accomplices (from his "family") not only confessed to the murder but justified their action with various political and philosophical "arguments." As usual, all this was greatly exaggerated in the daily press. However, the real sensation came when

President Nixon—then in his heyday—referred to Manson in one of his speeches. Waging war on rising crime, Nixon gave him as an example of man's decline. I do not remember what the president said, but that is not important. What is important is that he uttered the three words: "That murderer Manson...."

You should have seen what happened the next day! There was not a single newspaper that did not carry these words as a banner headline on the front page. They forgot about Manson and the unfortunate Sharon Tate. Nixon was their concern. How had he dared to refer to a suspect as a murderer? Who gave him that right? Why was the president interfering in legal affairs? And so on and so forth. They unearthed famous "slips of the tongue" by presidents and great statesmen stretching back virtually 100 years. Watergate may have brought Nixon down, but the first alarm bell sounded at this stage in his career. [passage omitted]

Unlike Nixon, our prominent figures are not threatened with the prospect of outrage in the press or demands for their resignation if they not only refer to the accused as a criminal but award him punishment—even the death penalty—before the court has passed verdict. It has nothing to do with any special prejudice in these remarks (as a matter of fact, they may even be right). No, it is because of the frightening ignorance of the law which has been cultivated in our society for decades.

IZVESTIYA recently reported on a conflict between the RSFSR general prosecutor and the chairman of the Russian Supreme Court. I was not struck by the conflict itself but by the legal reasoning behind the general prosecutor's arguments. Discussing "delicate issues" that have arisen in the dispute, the prosecutor said that "we must work with the courts to resolve them by talking and consulting with scientists and legislators—not in the way that V. Lebedev proposes. *After all, ours is a common cause*" (the italics are mine—T.K.).

The heart of our legal problems lies in that last sentence. It completely rules out the principle of an adversarial legal system, under which the prosecutor accuses, the attorney defends, and the court decides. I am sure that a similar phrase must be somewhere in the U.S. annals of famous "slips of the tongue."

Now we are preparing legal reform, it is simply essential to strengthen the rights of the individual, the presumption of innocence, and the entire legal procedure. Returning to the "civilized world," of which there has been much talk recently, primarily means abiding by civilized norms of legal procedure. Take the United States, for example: Even if someone is caught at the scene of a crime, the police are obliged first of all to explain to the person under arrest that he has the right to remain silent. He also has the right to immediately contact his attorney, who may attend all—I stress, all—interrogations. If these regulations are not observed, the

court will immediately dismiss the case. In the course of the investigation, the attorney is present during all action involving the accused.

Orders for arrests, searches, confiscations, and so forth are issued by the judge—not by the prosecutor. On the basis of the presumption of innocence, the accused (this is very hard for us to understand) arrives in court presumed innocent and, for that reason, is not placed in a cage or behind a barrier with an armed guard on either side but is simply seated at a table next to his attorney, and so on and so forth. A list of the accused's rights can fill several pages alone. But the most important point is that the verdict itself ("guilty" or "not guilty") is not passed by the judge but by the jury: in a special room away from the judge, so that they should not come under pressure from him.

I have not even mentioned the conditions in which convicts are kept or told you how offenders in U.S. high-security jails are transferred to cells with black and white television instead of color, as a punishment. I have

not mentioned their rations, which include condiments for the meat, salad, and a piece of chocolate cake with their tea (similar meals are served to the prison administration). All this is beyond our understanding and ultimately reflects the real prosperity of "their" society (in contrast to ours). However, a jail is a jail wherever you are: It is not meant to be heaven on earth. "Their" legal system has its fair share of shortcomings and blatant violations. That is something with which our readers are well familiar. I am not calling for our criminals to be fed on chocolate but, on the other hand, we must not starve our prisoners and we must never trample on their dignity as human beings in any way.

Or perhaps it was not a slip of the tongue by V. Stepankov? It is certainly true that the courts, the prosecutor's office, and all of us have a "common cause." That cause is to finally build a rule-of-law state, in which all ambition (including prosecutors' ambition) is held in check by other ambition and where the principle of an adversarial legal system and protection for human dignity triumphs.

**'Top Secret' Interviews NEZAVISIMAYA
GAZETA Editor**

*LD1011081491 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1955 GMT 9 Nov 91*

[Interview with Vitaliy Tretyakov, editor in chief of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, by "Top Secret" program presenter Artem Borovik at the Russian television studios; date not given; from the "Top Secret" program—recorded]

[Text] [Borovik] Our guest today is Vitaliy Tretyakov, editor in chief of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA. Good evening, Vitaliy. [video shows Borovik, Tretyakov seated at a table in the studio] end

[Tretyakov] Good evening.

[Borovik] I invited you not just because in the last program [vypusk] of "Top Secret" there was a long interview with you, but also because your NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA carries a "Top Secret" column. Is it difficult to obtain secrets?

[Tretyakov] No, not today. They are lying around everywhere. You can pick them up with your bare hands. On the whole, it is simply a matter of professionalism.

[Borovik] But are they expensive?

[Tretyakov] Well, as far as our newspaper is concerned, it has not paid for a single secret yet.

[Borovik] Vitaliy, today, on the whole, freedom of speech, which the democrats spoke about so much, has dawned. Are you happy or are you lacking something?

[Tretyakov] We are neither happy nor sad. It is normal for us when all normal journalists work in a normal atmosphere. In my opinion, those who, for some reason or another, before the putsch did not dare or who were forbidden to avail themselves of that opportunity, should be happy. We have always worked like this for as long as the newspaper has been in existence.

[Borovik] Do you feel that there are too many secrets in the new political establishment of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin? It is simply impossible to break through to him, even to his press secretary Voshchannov.

[Tretyakov] There is a feeling that it is simply one of the parameters of the work of a journalist in the Russian atmosphere today. It is easier, much easier, to get through to the Union leadership. We will not speak about how real the power is that it possesses today, but it is easier to work with the Union leadership, much quicker and much more convenient, even with the absence of all types of top brass and other such accessories of solid political power. As far as Yeltsin's entourage is concerned, there is a kind of wall there.

[Borovik] Is it much more difficult to obtain an interview from Boris Nikolayevich today than from Mikhail Sergeevich?

[Tretyakov] Our newspaper has published interviews by all leaders of all republics that were and are part of the Union. Yeltsin remains the only one who has not given us an interview.

[Borovik] Does it seem to you that journalists have been given some imitation of real secrets but that the true secrets lie deep down and it is not that easy to dig for them?

[Tretyakov] There is a feeling when there are many diverse sources of interesting information at once which somehow do not fit into the same picture, and that it is not possible to see the whys and wherefores, or who governed the country and with what, until the whole deck has been dealt. There is such a feeling. In the near future we intend to conduct several interviews that will perhaps help us to get to the bottom of how real all these secrets are, how much they are actually secrets, and whether another supersecret mechanism exists. Maybe it does not exist at all. Maybe it is all just in our imagination regarding plots by all sorts of enemies, bolsheviks, non-bolsheviks, and who had a direct influence on all that. We are now in a period of chaotic gathering of that information. The time will come—just like that fragment of the day in Foros. We practically do not know anything really, but maybe we will find out in time. So it is difficult to say anything about our situation today.

[Borovik] Vitaliy, thank you. We wish you new successes and new secrets.

[Tretyakov] Thank you.

**PRAVDA Now Available in Moscow on Eve of
Publication**

*PM1111235191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
12 Nov 91 p 1*

[PRAVDA Editorial Office report: "You Can Read PRAVDA a Day Early"]

[Text] We are addressing ourselves to Moscow's kiosk operators, newspaper traders, foreign representatives, and anyone who would like to get the next issue of PRAVDA the previous evening.

As of today you can come to the editorial office at 24, Pravda Street and, in the lobby between 1945 and 2100, buy at twice the normal price tomorrow's copy of our newspaper either for yourself or for distribution.

Don't miss this chance to read the previous day what others will only find out the next morning!

Subscription Price for Trud May Double

924B0080A Moscow TRUD in Russian 29 Oct 91 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Our Forecast"] [Text] Starting 1 February the subscription price for TRUD may double, but this will not affect those who enter an annual subscription now.

The prices of paper and printing services are rising wildly. If this process is not stopped, the editors will have no recourse but to raise the subscription cost. Then starting in February, an annual subscription will cost in the neighborhood of 60 rubles, a quarterly subscription—15 rubles, and a monthly subscription—five rubles (the single-issue cost is 20 kopecks). At newsstands the newspaper will be sold at 30 kopecks an issue starting in January 1992.

Dear readers! Right now you can subscribe to our newspaper at what, in effect, is the discount price announced in the catalogue: 28 rubles, 92 kopecks a year. TRUD's index number is 50130.

Russian Papers Extend Subscription Deadlines

924B0080B Moscow TRUD in Russian 2 Nov 91 p 4

[Unattributed article: "Subscription: November Has Arrived"]

[Text] "At the post office no one could explain to me for which papers the subscription period that officially ended 31 October had been extended" (Moscow, a phone call to the newspaper's offices).

The newspaper TRUD's publishing house has the following information.

A telegram from V. Bulgak, the RSFSR minister of communications, information and space, that was received by the Central Retail Subscription Agency reports that the subscription period has been extended until 15 November for the following four publications only (at their request): the weeklies ROSSIYA, ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI and KRESTYANSKAYA ROSSIYA, and the daily ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA. But the Ukrainian Ministry of Communications and the Rostov Oblast Communications Administration have appealed to our publishing house with a request to extend the subscription period. The publishing house has no objections.

By way of supplementing the telegram from the Ministry of Communications, the Moscow City Soyuzpechat [All-Union Publishing] Agency and the Moscow Post Office reached agreement to extend the subscription period by one day for all publications listed in the catalogue—it was possible to subscribe to them on 1 November, as well.

Report From TASS Moscow Underground Communications Center

924B0080C Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 2 Nov 91 p 1

[Article by TASS Correspondent N. Zheleznov, special to KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA: "STAS Is Authorized to State"]

Our special correspondent Stanislav Bartnikas received this brief report from the secret TASS bunker.

"Now a great deal is being clarified. TASS, for example, has three centers. One is at the Nikita Gates, the second is under the train terminal, and the third is in a village near Moscow. If the desire had been there, no State Committee for the State of Emergency could have interfered with the transmission of information" (Vitaliy Ignatenko, TASS general director, in "Discussion With the President Over a Cup of Tea," IZVESTIYA 20 September 1991).

The depth is 50 meters. Before us stands the desk of the head of one of the world's five largest news agencies: a lamp, five telephones, a carafe of water, and an unopened 1991 desk calendar. But TASS's present general director has never worked at this desk, and let us hope he never will: both the general director's office and the other services of this reserve bunker of the agency can "come to life" only at a command indicating a "special situation," when some sort of threat is created to TASS's activities.

Journalists are here for the first time in the 32 years of the secret bunker's existence. The Ministry of Communications, which "oversees" this facility, asked "that its location not be linked to a specific place in Moscow." Therefore, let us put it this way: beneath the capital city, in 1959 TASS's top executive Nikolay Palgunov cut a red ribbon before descending a deep shaft. The 53-meter well for the elevator and various utility lines, like the 100-meter horizontal tunnel for the editorial office and communications room, are built according to all the rules of defense installations. Thank god, not once has it been necessary to batten down the many-ton door that is lined with lead in case of a nuclear alert.

There are no more than 20 office employees and workers here who keep the facility in a state of readiness. Every day they descend the elevator for underground work. They maintain the life-support systems. Air conditioners, a heating system, an independent artesian well, an independent quartz mechanism for keeping the precise time, lighting, a receiving and broadcasting room, telegraph, radio and photo apparatus. Alongside modern photo transmitters and teletype machines lies a room for receiving and transmitting information using Morse code—in case of dire emergency. Two industrial refrigeration units, geared to store foodstuffs for a lengthy period, are always ready to be turned on. A constant temperature is usually maintained in the facility.

The last time that the air conditioners and refrigeration units worked at full speed was some 15 years ago, when a general rehearsal was conducted of TASS's operation under civil defense plans, with more than 200 agency employees participating.

"But our main task," says the facility's director Aleksey Ananchenko, "is to monitor all the communications arteries located underground. 336 telegraph and 180 telephone communications channels linking TASS with

all the world agencies and with its own sources and consumers of information pass through our nexus."

Incidentally, this photo report and text have not been transmitted from Tver Boulevard. At our request the bunker's engineer on duty hooked up one of the teletype machines, and a tape bearing the notation "Transmit to KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA" flew off to Pravda Street.

Independent Baltic Paper Struggles To Survive

924B0081A Moscow *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*
in Russian No 44, 6 Nov 91 p 7

[Article by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA staff correspondent Tatyana Fast: "How We Were Independent: From One Newspaper's Experience"]

[Text] Riga—The end of party power over the press has created illusions: of the freedom of the press among the public, and of the press' independence among journalists. Riding the wave of glasnost, the papers—both newly established and those which had ceased to be some organizations' organs—one after another were proclaiming themselves independent. Few journalists in these years have been able to resist the temptation to take an opportunity to publish their own independent newspaper. We, several Riga journalists, were not able to resist the temptation, either. Disagreements between the people in the Baltic republics were on the rise, and so was the conflict between the central and local press. Against this background, the absence of an all-Baltic regional newspaper seemed an omission. Thus, our NEZAVISIMAYA BALTIYSKAYA GAZETA was born. A sponsor was available, too—the Baltia Association of Independent Entrepreneurs—who was willing to support the newspaper financially. The association incorporated several cooperative firms and banks, counted business volume in millions, and had hard currency accounts.

The desire of the new class to support the newspaper and, in case of success, have a nice calling card in the West and in the East seemed understandable. The emerging business needed information and communication channels. Therefore, we were not surprised by the proposal: "Make a good newspaper. Money is no object." An agreement of noninterference in editorial creative life sealed our aim at independence.

Still, what is it—an independent newspaper? Not state-owned? Not party-affiliated? We felt proud that none of us belonged to any party or was part of any warring fronts. But can one make a newspaper on this? Then what is it made of? Of looking at the same event from different points of view? Of praising something at some point, and then criticizing it at another? Or perhaps, one should do without any opinions and build a newspaper on facts alone—let the reader figure out what is what? Recipes were offered and rejected, while the publication started.

Our very first issue was not to the liking of the functionaries in the new government—we had written about their predilection for ostentatious receptions. The second issue brought us a threat of a lawsuit from the CPL [Communist Party of Latvia] Central Committee. After we criticized Rubiks, former first secretary of the CPL Central Committee, the newspaper of the republic communists SOVETSKAYA LATVIA warned: "Beware the independents!" The reader was sending puzzled letters: Who are you with? Define your stand! The issue of independent press was also an issue for the reader who was used to the fact that a newspaper defends either the right or the left. Our reader has a long-standing conception that a newspaper must support some clearly defined positions.

We did not agree with this. We published letters from readers, explained, and quoted our opponents in the belief that this was also a sign of independence. Groping blindly in the situation of acute political confrontation of parties and movements, we were attempting to create the concept of an independent newspaper. We were rejoicing every time we were mentioned on Svoboda and BBC and in democratic Moscow newspapers.

Of course, we were not alone even on the Baltic press market. ATMODA, born under the NFL [National Front of Latvia] wing, was criticizing the NFL leaders. Lithuanian ATGIMINAS slipped out from under the Sajudis guardianship. Lithuanian RESPUBLIKA was bravely battling old and new authorities. The times were demanding publications of a new type, serving the truth rather than group interests. In this sense, we were trying to be independent.

Can one, though, remain independent towards good and evil? Towards official corruption? Towards OMON [Special Missions Militia Detachments] excesses? Towards the CPSU and KGB provocations?

We were writing about tanks crushing the democratic movement in Vilnius and Riga. About Baltic communist parties that were fooling the workers and were using automatic rifles to fight their own people. Evicted out of the House of the Press by OMON, we put together a homemade January issue almost manually and were giving it away free at the barricades. It was then that we were suddenly jerked back by the sponsors: "Do not get into politics!" A little later, we heard something even more harsh: "Change your position!"

We replied: You are independent entrepreneurs; we are an independent publication. The agreement between us provided for each of us to maintain our sovereignty. When we brought this up, we got a sobering reminder: Those who pay are the ones who can afford to have an opinion. A little later, an article written by our partners appeared in the local press under the tale-telling title: "A Sponsor's Wish Is the Law." We were pointedly being shown our place.

We were being summoned to conferences and... taught how to write. Just like it had been done in the old times

at party meetings. Even the terminology turned out to be similar: "You are not holding the line," "You are helping their hand..." We suddenly remembered the party censors, who usually did their job quietly, one can even say, in a delicate manner. If they removed materials from the issue, they tried, as a rule, to find a good reason: The censors cared about their reputation. The new masters were acting openly and unceremoniously. Their reputation was protected by money—in millions. Actually, not just money. When we, having gotten tired of squabbling, declared that we want to break the relationship and claimed our legal rights to the newspaper, the editorial offices were visited by... four Schwarzeneggers. Flexing their biceps and other muscles, the Schwarzeneggers explained that it was in our interests not to start a fight for the newspaper. The text ran more or less this way: "Remember! The newspaper has been and will be ours. We can prove it to you by any means at our disposal."

On 1 June 1991, we published the last issue of NEZAVISIMAYA BALTIYSKAYA GAZETA. The collective unanimously decided to break the contract relationship with the association.

The calamity made us sit down and do our own calculations. Are we really unable to survive without millionaires, we thought. Others somehow manage... If worse comes to worst, we will tighten our belts in the beginning. The results of the calculations left us horrified... The price of independence came to this (the data used is for Latvia). Paper costs 7,000 to 14,000 rubles [R] a ton at the commodity exchange (to produce a weekly, for instance, one needs 22 tons a month). The printing house charges 17 to 25 percent of the print run's list price. The Ministry of Communications—2.5 kopeks per copy for transportation. The Main Administration for the Distribution of Printed Materials of the USSR Ministry of Communications—20 to 25 percent of the list price of the retail part of the print run. The cost of computers: if we want our own, it costs R300,000-400,000; if we lease—R3,000-4,000 for typesetting and layout of one issue. If you want the issue to be on schedule and reach the newsstands on a certain day, add another couple of thousand in cash (for each issue) for bribes. The result: To publish the newspaper in at least 100,000 copies, we need half a million as a minimum. To make the ends meet, we would have to either hike up the price per copy, or to have a million-copy print runs. In the current—quite saturated—newspaper market either option is unrealistic. One can, of course, hope for advertising revenue, but this is also a double-edged sword: Advertisers prefer to pay higher rates but place their ads in newspapers with larger circulation. No matter how we look, it seems that independence is the province of the rich.

But how do colleagues from other publications exist? It turned out that since ATGIMINAS had separated from the Sajudis, it became impossible for it to maintain the staff and to pay authors' fees. There are now only three staff members. SOGLASIYE (also formerly a Sajudis newspaper) went bankrupt and closed. We heard of one

Moscow weekly that apparently survived thanks only to the editor's former profession in construction business. Another one apparently runs a successful business selling KamAZ trucks. The Riga political newspaper BALTIYSKOYE VREMYA stays afloat by publishing a pornographic supplement YESHCHE; SM-SEGODNYA (previously SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH) publishes several commercial supplements, each "contributing" something to the kitty. So, if you want to publish a newspaper, it looks like you either have to sell something, or sell yourself.

Meanwhile, there were prospective buyers for our newspaper, too. Among those who showed interest were—strange as it may seem—the CPL Central Committee (telephone call): "We hear you have some money problems. How much do you need?"; the military (they offered to share their office space); some people engaged in pump manufacturing and in reselling imported shoes. We got offers—through intermediaries—from cooperatives in the Crimea, one bank in the Transcaucasus, and then simultaneously several firms in Moscow. Some were interested in an opportunity to establish themselves in the Baltic market; others—to invest rubles where tomorrow there may be hard currency; still others—to make politics through someone else's efforts. Almost all promised millions. Alas, nobody was interested in the newspaper as such, let alone an independent one. There was a specific price tag attached to the millions—the right to the newspaper. We did not find common language with any of them.

Nevertheless, we survived... After three months of stoppage, desperation, and broken illusions, we took a small loan in the bank and started with commercial supplements. For several months, nobody was paid a salary—all income went to buy paper for the future newspaper. At the same time, we were looking for new authors.

30 September was the birthday of BALTIYSKAYA GAZETA. In having to obtain a new license, we lost the word "independent," but we did retain this independence in substance. True, this independence does not have much of a material support. In our calculations, the remaining resources will last us until the new year.

Actually, many newspapers have found themselves in a shaky situation today. It appears that only those backed up by state structures (soviets, ministries, mayoralities) or financed by big private capital will be able to survive. It is not surprising that in this situation the press is being bought up by mafiosi groups. Some do it to launder the party money or income from shadow economy dealings; others want to gain power by manipulating the public opinion. Some will say: This is what a market economy is; this situation is new for the Soviet press but not for the world press. There is a difference, however. In democratic countries, the state takes upon itself the care

of independent press. Any society interested in its development must have an interest in opposition. Independent press is the opposition; its presence is an indicator of the society's health. If this press disappears, so will the health.

I do not know whether it was this or some other reason that moved the prime minister of the Latvian Republic Ivar Godmanis to extend a helping hand to the press. Almost all republic newspapers are now included in state orders for paper. The government was able to reach an agreement on deliveries of paper from Russia. So far, until the new year. What will happen after that—nobody knows.

...A few days ago we saw the NEZAVISIMAYA BALTIYSKAYA GAZETA—no longer ours—on Riga newsstands. The new editorial staff does not delve into politics. They write about UFO's, rational nutrition, and sex. The cover shows a temporary address and the editor's name. Alas, this temporary newspaper has more chances to survive than we do. It will be supported even if the reader loses interest in the tabloid mishmash.

DEN Newspaper Remains Under Army Cover

924B0081B Moscow *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*
in Russian No 44, 6 Nov 91 p 7

[Report by Sergey Kiselev: "Varennikov Is in Jail, but His Cause Lives On: Newspaper DEN Is Still on the Barracks Status..."]

[Text] It is now possible to state with full responsibility that there is no great filth on the territory of a military unit located on Krutitskiy Podvorye, next to the Moscow garrison guardhouse. I do not think this was the single reason why the former commander in chief of the ground forces, Army General V. Varennikov, moved the editorial offices of the DEN newspaper in here a few months before the August putsch, having first evicted military construction personnel from this object (which, by the way, had been repaired at the expense of the Ministry of Defense). It remains an established fact: After the unsuccessful attempt at a state coup, no priest came to the DEN's secret base to sprinkle it with holy water; nor were there any church choirs singing canticles. This made it different from the office of DEN editor in chief A. Prokhanov—here they were exorcizing filth in accordance with all canons of orthodoxy.

Anyway, being housed in a nonsprinkled facility on the territory of a military unit does not upset representatives of this highly patriotic publication that now represents a "spiritual opposition." So they have no intention of vacating it.

"We have not received any written orders to house the editorial offices of DEN newspaper in our facility," says Colonel B. Ermilov. "We received a verbal order from Varennikov, and it was our duty to carry it out. We do not even have an elementary lease contract—DEN is still kept here at the expense of the Ministry of Defense.

As the military told me, DEN editor in chief A. Prokhanov sent a letter to the new commander in chief of the ground forces, Colonel General V. Semenov, in which he advocates the need to leave the editorial offices on the territory of the military unit. So it is quite possible that we will still hear church canticles around the building where one normally hears only military marches—after all, it is not possible that there is not even a small bit of filth left here after the putsch...

P.S. As we went to print, *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA* received information that the military department permitted DEN newspaper to continue to keep its quarters on the territory of the military unit, provided the editors sign a lease and pay regularly for leased space. Thus, we can confidently state: commanders in chief come and go, but the highly patriotic DEN remains under army cover.

TV News Service's Grushin Interviewed

PM0711175391 Moscow *MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI*
in Russian No 42, 20 Oct 91 (signed to press 15 Oct 91)
p 11

[Interview with Boris Grushin, leader of Television News Service, by Yelena Chekalova—date, place of interview not stated; first paragraph is *MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI* introduction: "Facts Do Not Require Translation"]

[Text] Many people predicted that Television News Service would beat "Vremya." Hardly anyone predicted that they would do so by such a large margin. During the contest between Central Television's two news programs 45 percent of viewers voted for Television News Service, and 20 percent for "Vremya." These are the results of the poll carried out by the VP [expansion unknown] service in the European part of Russia (Television News Service's victory was also recorded by two other sociological groups). Its leader, Boris Grushin, answers questions put to him by *MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI*.

[Chekalova] Did the poll's results surprise you?

[Grushin] Yes, very much! I was sure that if Television News Service won, this would be by the smallest of margins.

[Chekalova] But I really thought that "Vremya" would win. It was always instilled in me at Central Television that the television viewer's main trait is his attachment to tradition.

[Grushin] Well incidentally, the "ordinary" television viewers displayed a greater inclination to change than the leaders of public opinion. Whereas the press's leaders, the journalists—including television journalists—and cultural figures turned out to be the most reserved. One more interesting detail: The supporters of Television News Service attach noticeably more significance to the novelty and objectivity of information than to the fullness of its presentation or its general political orientation.

[Chekalova] But after all we have continually been persuaded that factual journalism is alien to our viewers, and that it was necessary to "translate" the facts for them into the language of opinions and viewpoints. So what has happened, were we mistaken or have the viewers changed?

[Grushin] Both. All the VP's research presently bears witness to the following: However critically we react to the inflated judgments of the changes which are going on, they are nevertheless evidently greater than we suppose them to be. All the time such a quantity of newly arising factors is becoming involved... My advice is: Do not get carried away with predictions, it is better to keep assessing what is going on. In the meantime, after a purely formal summing-up of the contest's results, I did not get the feeling that Central Television's new leadership is going to study its audience very seriously. But, you see, our poll showed that although Television News Service won, not one of Central Television's existing news programs satisfies the viewers; moreover, different viewers like different programs. We have argued about the specific nature of television for so long but have not grasped the most important thing: Television converses in pictures. There is no visual information in our television news. Central Television's new leadership has quite clearly changed the screen's political orientation. But you cannot seriously think that if people appear on screen who say "correct" things then our television will improve greatly. Alas, our television does not hold the public in suspense with respect to what is going on. The text is only augmented by general pictures which hardly reveal the scene of the action. There are almost no reports which record the events themselves, but without these there is not a single genuine news program.

[Chekalova] What does the following figure in the current poll signal: Almost one quarter of the viewers watched the programs participating in the contest but refused to judge them?

[Grushin] This figure is more valuable than anything. It signals that people have finally begun to realize their own lack of qualifications to judge, and to understand that as yet they still live in a society opposed to news.

[Chekalova] ?...

[Grushin] Television and radio continue to engage in "translating" facts into the language of ideological formulas, even in the most unexpected cases. A recent example: A symphony concert is broadcast on radio from the conservatory (Shostakovich's Fifth Symphony), when Anna Chekhova suddenly announces in her well-modulated voice that the concert is dedicated to the "liberation of Russia." What does this mean?! Surely it is clear that this is as absurd as talking about the "velvet" revolution accompanied by a picture of Rostropovich's face.

No, whatever you say, this is all a real shame. And it is not only the popular consciousness which is being littered in this way but the consciousness of the people who

are in power, making the decisions. Therefore, we remain permanently not just at a pre-perestroika but, without exaggeration, at an antediluvian level of government. Now, as before, the same old formulas of the authorities continue to operate: "Things will make progress because we have decided they will," "Things will make progress because good sense demands this," etc. No, in this way you will not build a civil society and extricate the country from the crisis.

[Chekalova] But what do you propose?

[Grushin] With regard to the theme of our conversation, to first and foremost approach fact with respect, and to understand that political news is far from being the whole news. Information which is strictly about society is almost absent from our television news. And this at a moment when new people operating in new situations are emerging in society. Liberate news at last from the straitjacket of politics, do not reduce it to politics.

[Chekalova] Central Television's task is a very complex one. After all, its position in the circumstances of the Union's breakup is an altogether delicate one.

[Grushin] It makes no sense if Central Television continues to construct its picture of the news from the viewpoint of the center. Today practically all reports from the republics seem to be saying: Everybody is suffering from the Union's breakup. Why does nobody ever show me the positive changes in the republics which have occurred precisely thanks to their leaving the center? Enough of this scaring people with the image of a society at the brink of destruction—show how it is passing from one state to another.

[Chekalova] That means that analysis and commentary are nevertheless necessary?

[Grushin] Who is disputing this? Having lived for so many years in the midst of chimeras, we did not even learn to react to facts in a fitting manner. For example, it seems to us that if the emerging market is accompanied by an increase in crime, then the market is unnecessary. But it would be necessary to explain that in our criminal society this is normal. And it is an illusion that the news programs' newscasters are capable of providing analytical information. From them we receive and will continue to receive either a catalog of events or jaunty but, forgive me, stupid resumes. For example, just recently Sergey Darenko summed up laconically in VESTI: "All Gorbachev has to do is to put on the appropriate scull cap and set off for Central Asia." All this is pure shameless showing off. In Western news services the institution of analysts has existed for a long time, and there is no need to reinvent the wheel. But we continue to exist on the verge of unprofessionalism. The moderator of an analytical news program is in actual fact not a person who passes judgment but one who "teases things out" of the analyst. And this can be a gripping form of presentation. For example, on CNN there is a program called "Cross Fire" in which experts are sat between two moderators who "fire" pointed questions at them.

Everything is open to the moderators—from peremptoriness to sarcasm, and the experts must show the highest degree of skill to avoid being cornered.

[Chekalova] Boris Andreyevich, do you believe that the new leadership of Central Television will create a new television service?

[Grushin] I would like to believe this will happen, very much so. But in order to build even a new news system, immense efforts and many years are required. And it is necessary to understand the most important thing: You cannot just destroy things. I get the impression that it seems to the new leadership that if we remove some people from key positions and appoint others, everything will be all right. But it is possible that these very positions are unnecessary in the new structure, and "the others" may want to do something of their own. You see it is a question of how to create the conditions in which creative people would receive the greatest possible chance to realize their ideas.

Astra Agency Director Interviewed

*LD0411230491 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1530 GMT 2 Nov 91*

[Interview with Astra agency general manager Armen Oganessian by Eugene Krylov, on occasion of agency's founding anniversary—live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [Krylov] Hello, I'm your host, Eugene Krylov. Welcome to another edition of our monthly review of the Transcription Service, informing our listeners and managers of local radio stations about the latest releases of Radio Moscow. This time I'd like to start by reminding you that the World Services of Radio Moscow in English and Russian, as well as the Transcription Service, are parts of the Astra agency, which is marking its first birthday these days. [passage omitted] The founder and general manager of Astra, Armen Oganessian, is our guest today. Hello Armen.

[Oganessian] Hello.

[Krylov] So Astra is one year old and so could you please elaborate somewhat on the results of this past year—perhaps you could speak even of some achievements—and say a few words about the prospects?

[Oganessian] Well in general we are quite satisfied with the results of the year. If a year ago I had been told that WASHINGTON POST would mention one of our films as a very interesting and great breakthrough, I think I would be surprised, I would not believe it a year ago. I think that Astra, it started as an idea basing on radio to build a TV company—with English language—and I think that was a reflection of changes that took place a year ago in BBC Bush House and in foreign broadcasts and in Deutsche Welle in Germany. They tried to base a TV section, a TV department based on their foreign radio broadcasts and this development brought, I think, facilitated, our efforts just to start a kind of this company and we call it Astra, which is associated TV-radio agency.

And we started producing films; we started producing TV programs using our satellite Moscow global system and now we have as our partners, and who receive our signal in the United States, the company CONUS, which is, I think the fifth, if I'm not mistaken, the fifth among the biggest companies in the United States. Together with them we covered via satellite the latest Bush-Gorbachev summit and then we just, together with a team of their journalists here, we covered changes in media after the August events. And we want to proceed, and we are nearly to conclude an agreement on this basis, with CONUS on long term—I mean long-term agreement. And we are working hard in producing of documentaries. [passage omitted]

But it's not the only thing that we are working at. Via our Moscow global system we are providing our clients and the audience in the world in general with the coverage of events which are taking place, very dynamic events, in the Soviet Union. So we are working in both genres, in TV viewers and in producing documentaries. [passage omitted] So as you see we are concentrated in documentaries rather in history and culture than on, so to say, on hard politics. And I think this transformation reflects the transformation in general in the media here, I mean in media which used to be very political. [passage omitted]

[Krylov] We have heard about the efforts of Astra to expand in the sphere of television, but we must not overlook our radio services. It would be interesting to hear the opinion of the general director about the future of radio. Are there any changes in subjects or forms of broadcasts?

[Oganessian] I think there was and there is still a kind of, so to say, standard attitude to short-wave broadcasting, that it is diminishing its role in the world, that it's just moving to its sunset and so forth. So short-wave broadcasting is dying and this process will take about a decade. Well, I don't think this is true. I don't think this is the true reflection because I think at any time you will find a bulk of strange people who want to know what neighbors are doing, what they are thinking about the world. And so far radio remains a means of communication which cannot be replaced overnight. And I think that, yes, television based on satellite and bringing you live pictures from other countries certainly is (? as staunch as it used to be competitor) to radio, but nevertheless radio has its advantages and I think shortwave broadcasting will develop. And again, though we put much emphasis on culture and education [words indistinct]

[Krylov] And here is the last question to the general director of Astra, Armen Oganessian. Numerous independent agencies and radio stations in the Soviet Union spring into existence and into the whirl of the information market. Does Astra feel strong enough to compete with them?

[Oganessian] Yes, certainly. I feel certain about this because we have a very good and qualified staff. We are in the market now for many, many years. We know all dimensions of this work—technical matters and not minor issues of dealing with the PTT system in the Soviet Union, which is very complex. And we have a very qualified technical staff

which—I don't know which company can enjoy this, can enjoy such a qualified technical staff as we do. So I think that, yes, there is fierce competition but we have our own placing in this market and frankly speaking I don't see a chance, a serious chance, for any of our competitors just to replace us in the market.

But I think that in general Astra is open for cooperation and some joint venturing in the future. I can't exclude this and I think that this is a possible development. For example we can, we have a middle wave [as heard] in Moscow, very powerful and strong frequency and it covers Moscow and Moscow Region and we want to transform it into, not 100 percent commercial, but into a kind of international radio station with the programing coming from other radio stations in the world, a kind of a monitoring program. Businessmen, foreigners, tourists—they want to know what is actually going on in this country and they do tune to Radio Moscow World Service in Moscow for this frequency. And we want to make it more life [as heard], a little bit more commercialized, with more commercials in this program, in this 24-hour service, and I think we have very interesting proposals coming both from Soviet companies here and foreign entities. And I think we are to make our choice and very soon we can face big and drastic changes in our broadcasting for Moscow and Moscow Region.

I think business programs about business in the Soviet Union and in general in this world is also a new dimension in our work. Probably you know our program "New Market", which is becoming very popular among businessmen all over the world. After all, some of our partners did find Astra because we have this program. They just listen to this program and they do call us asking for some business support, for some consultations. And now we are working with a company which, (?a respectful) company, which receives economic information from Astra, from the radio wing mainly, because they have this habit of analyzing what is on in the economy in the Soviet Union. And we are open for any other clients on this matter.

[Krylov] Well, from the sound of it our prospects do look bright and I think that radio station managers who have not yet started cooperating with Astra should hurry up. Don't be late! Thank you, General Director Armen Oganessian.

Radio Rossii Signs Cooperation Agreement With BBC

LD0611112691 Moscow SEM DNEY in Russian No 43, 21 - 27 Oct 91 (signed to press 15 Oct 91) p 2 LD

[Unattributed report: "BBC in Russia"]

[Text] On 9 October 1991 in Moscow the country's first ever cooperation agreement between a Western broadcasting organization and the Russian State Television and Radio Company was signed. According to this agreement, from the beginning of 1992 Radio Rossii will broadcast at the end of each week two half-hour programs prepared in London by employees of the BBC Russian Service. These programs will be transmitted to

Moscow via communications satellites and relayed simultaneously by Radio Rossii.

In addition, starting from when the treaty was signed, once a week Radio Rossii will include in its broadcasting schedule recordings of Russian Service features received from London.

The treaty was signed by Oleg Poptsov, chairman of the State Television and Radio Company, and John Tusa, director general of the BBC World Service.

"Everything is just beginning," Oleg Poptsov said at the signing ceremony, "and I am very pleased that Radio Rossii is embarking on its first international contacts. This is significant inasmuch as the radio took its first steps with the creation of Russian statehood and of the Russian Information Agency."

In reply, John Tusa noted that the treaty which was signed shows how far we have moved since 1987, when BBC Russian Service broadcasts were jammed in the USSR. He added that BBC broadcasts on Radio Rossii frequencies will be a very important supplement to remaining shortwave broadcasts.

Aleksandr Nekhoroshev, director of the Radio Rossii information service, told our correspondent that the BBC features will include programs such as "The Servants"—about an institute for servants in England, "The Quakers"—about the history of English trade, and "West End"—on the cultural life of contemporary London. The impression is that the English radio broadcasts will be much less politicized than the Radio Rossii broadcasts.

New Radio Station for Businessmen To Start Up

LD0111185791 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0800 GMT 1 Nov 91

[Text] The first private radio station in Russia, Resonance [Rezonans], is planned to go on the air on 4 November. As reported to a Russian Information Agency correspondent by Resonance chief editor Yelena Danilina, the radio station has been given premises at the Olympic TV and radio complex at Ostankino. The possibility has arisen to have relay transmitters in St. Petersburg and in Ufa. Talks are underway with Magnitogorsk. In this way Resonance will be heard over a territory stretching from Britain to Siberia.

The radio station for businessmen will advertise in Russian, English, German, Polish, Slovak, French, and Czech. In Moscow broadcasts will be made on the 25 meter band, in St. Petersburg on the 439 meter band, and in Ufa on the 215 meter band, from 0700 to 0900 and from 2200 to 2400. Apart from that, from 1500 to 1600 it is planned to have one hour of broadcasts especially for Moscow.

A radio school for people starting out in business; for businessmen; stock exchange summaries; trade proposals; music to suit all tastes and no kind of politics—that's the agenda for our Resonance, Yelena Danilina said.

Vorontsov Warns Against Decentralizing Environmental Protection

92WN0083A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
29 Oct 91 p 3

[Interview with Nikolay Nikolayevich Vorontsov, acting USSR Minister of Nature Use and Preservation of the Surrounding Environment, people's deputy of Russia, by scientific reviewer L. Kruglov: "Will We Divide the Biosphere?"]

[Text] Interrelations among the eight former Union republics after signing the Treaty on Economic Community are shifting to a new qualitative level. However, if the economic ties which were lost are finally arranged, then matters of solving common ecological problems will be far more complex. The conclusion of the interrepublic agreement on ecological safety has been delayed for an indefinite period of time. It is absurd and even dangerous to divide the biosphere. Natural processes do not recognize administrative and political borders, and only through unified efforts it is possible to overcome negative phenomena in the use of nature and preservation of the surrounding environment. How can we reach a general agreement? N.N. Vorontsov, acting USSR Minister of Nature Use and Preservation of the Surrounding environment, people's deputy of Russia, answers our correspondent's questions.

[Kruglov] Nikolay Nikolayevich, many ecological problems affect the fate of the country's entire population. Tell us about those that can only be solved together.

[Vorontsov] Really, too many such problems have accumulated. One of them is control over the condition of the surrounding environment in a unified geographic territory. It should be strict and should be conducted regardless of the borders between countries. For example, today data on cross-border pollution of the air basin in the Kola Peninsula, in Karelia, in the Baltic states, and in Belorussia are being processed in Ventspils. This gives us an opportunity to evaluate the condition of the air basin of an entire region. However, now the government of Latvia is raising the question of making payment for the receipt of this information, which is important for everyone, only in convertible hard currency. However, are not the Northwest, the Baltic area, and the woodlands a united ecological space? It is impossible to declare the "independence" of the atmosphere. The clouds carry acid rain without regard for borders.

And what about rivers? Only the basins of the Volga, Don, Kuban, Pechora, and North Dvina rivers are located in the European territory of the RSFSR; the Dnepr crosses Russia, Belorussia, and the Ukraine. The basin of the Kura, essentially, encompasses the entire trans-Caucasus, Turkey, and Iran. The West Dvina, having risen in the Valdai Hills, flows through Belorussia and becomes the main river of Latvia, the Daugava. All the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan use the Amu Darya and Syr Darya for their water needs. The Irtysh rises in China, flows through Kazakhstan, and

falls into the Ob within the territory of Russia. Any declaration of ownership of a section of a river, just like a release of polluted sewage into a common stream, may be cause for serious international conflicts. Alas, I can already cite some examples. For instance, one of the mountain rivers which flows through the territory of Armenia and Azerbaijan became the object of a genuine ecological war. So, for the time being it is impossible to manage without unified control over water resources.

[Kruglov] Certain general criteria are needed here...

[Vorontsov] Unquestionably! Standards have been developed by the country's best specialists, rather rapidly and at the cost of great efforts, for all types of use of nature. The maximum permitted norms (PDK) for the content of one of another toxic substance in the water, air, or soil have been scientifically determined. Inspection over the observance of state ecological standards has been arranged, and sanctions against violators have been defined. It would be imprudent to destroy this newborn structure: After all, the condition of the surrounding environment in a number of regions in the country is on the verge of catastrophe. Of course, it is possible to introduce national standards. These may be either stricter or milder, and can have legal force for a given territory. However, what will such lack of coordination lead to?

It is suggested that we use the standards adopted, for instance, in West Europe and the United States. However, then in many cases we will also have to shut down thousands of obsolete industries, which means dooming millions of people to unemployment. And this is at a time when inflation has spread across the country and the old economic structures have been destroyed! Such a policy will lead to nothing other than chaos. Our task is a gradual transition to world standards for the use of nature. In fact, not all of these are appropriate for us. For instance, the harmful chemical production of chloroprene at the "Nairit" Enterprise in Armenia is ecologically cleaner than the development of the same product in the U.S. by a factor of 100. Really, should we "catch up" to America here as well?

Or another example: The Tadzhik Aluminum Plant, one of the largest in the country, operates in the Gussarskaya Valley. Emissions from this enterprise have in fact ruined the gardens of neighboring Uzbekistan. Who determines the damage? Obviously, independent ecological arbitration, which it would be impossible to suspect of sympathies for one to the detriment of the other. To eliminate such a "third court," called on to protect the surrounding environment in a united ecological territory, would only be a gift to any destroyer of nature!

[Kruglov] In connection with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from countries of East Europe, claims are being made against us in connection with the pollution of the surrounding environment in places where our military

units were located. Can any one of the republics assume the responsibility of investigating such a ticklish situation?

[Vorontsov] The material suits being made against us are significant, but sometimes they are too high. Until the ecological losses are assessed, Czechoslovakia is delaying the supply of houses for servicemen. However, in order to make a real material estimate of the ecological damage, we must send competent specialists. Otherwise, we will have to pay a rather larger sum than that which pays the modest salary of the experts, from a treasury that is empty even without this. The solution of the problem is being delayed, and our servicemen are roaming foreign streets. Soviet experts worked in Hungary for several months before the withdrawal of our troops. Many suits were objectively reviewed, and the state budget saved hundreds of millions of rubles! Next is the withdrawal of the Soviet contingent of troops from the former GDR. So, will we pay as much as they demand? Or will we calculate the true ecological damage?

[Kruglov] Apparently, in the deputy corps, where there are not very many ecologists, the word "ministry" acts like a red cape before a bull. Well, they are all officials and bureaucrats!...

[Vorontsov] In the Ministry for Nature Use there are no pure administrators on the staff. Scientists and specialists in the fields of ecology, biology, geology, and geography work there. They have voluntarily left scientific work in the name of saving their native natural land. For comparison, a similar department of the United States has not 382 specialists, as we have, but more than 10,000 people, and all, as they say, attached to business. It is impossible to economize on the preservation of nature: This will end up costing us more.

[Kruglov] The Soviet Union is an equal member of many international organizations, including the UN Program on the surrounding environment. What will be the fate of our international ecological obligations?

[Vorontsov] To be precise, the USSR is obliged to fulfill ten conventions, 17 agreements, two protocols, one memorandum and one declaration. They all proceed from international nature-preservation treaties, such as, for instance, the convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora (SITES). There are many species of animals inhabiting our country and many species of plants which need protection. At the same time, there are resourceful people who, under the name of various cooperatives and joint enterprises, passing by customs with all manner of truths and untruths, are trying to export this national wealth outside the borders of the country. One can imagine what kind of thievery will begin, if the republics, which have not yet signed the conventions, do not manage to organize control over the export of rare species through their as yet unorganized customs services.

Many of our preserves have international value, such as the shore of the Caspian, where millions of waterfowl spend the winter. They fly here from the Russian North and Scandinavia, where they nest in the summer. There are also state preserves of Union significance: the Astrakhan Preserve in the RSFSR, the Kyzyl-Agachskiy in Azerbaijan, and the Krasnovodskiy with a branch in Gasan-Kuli in Turkmenia. The preservation of these natural complexes falls under the Ramsarskiy Convention, also signed by the USSR.

Our country's most important international obligation is to observe the Convention on Protection of the Baltic Sea and the Declaration of Cooperation of the Danube States on the water management of the Danube and protecting this river from pollution. It will take a great deal of time and resources to reconclude the treaties on a republic level. Meanwhile, the ecological situation may worsen sharply.

[Kruglov] Nikolay Nikolayevich, quite recently, this September, the Congress of USSR People's Deputies resolved to draft and conclude an Interrepublic Agreement on Ecological Safety. The draft of this agreement was discussed by representatives of the nature-preservation agencies of the sovereign republics. What is its fate?

[Vorontsov] The participants in the Moscow conference confirmed that the unity of the ecological space does not depend on sociopolitical processes. The underestimation of ecological problems during the crisis period which the country is undergoing may lead to serious consequences. The draft agreement on ecological safety which we proposed provides for four membership statuses: federal, confederate, association, and observer. Each party has the right to choose the form of participation. The main thing is to achieve a tangible improvement of the surrounding environment on one-sixth of the earth's dry land.

Environment Termed 'State Security Problem'

92WN0068A Moscow *TORGOVAYA GAZETA*
in Russian 22 Oct 91 p 4

[A.V. Yablokov, deputy chairman of USSR Supreme Soviet Ecology Committee, interviewed by L. Glazkova: "Ecology Today Is a State Security Problem, in the View of A.V. Yablokov, RSFSR State Adviser and USSR People's Deputy"]

[Text] USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member A.V. Yablokov is deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Ecology Committee. He is now also responsible for ecological and health problems in the RSFSR State Council.

[Glazkova] Aleksei Vladimirovich, how serious is the problem of ecology in our country?

[Yablokov] The situation is not bad but desperate. Sixteen percent of the territory of the former USSR,

where something on the order of 45 million to 50 million people live, lies within ecological hazard or disaster zones. Most of these areas are major industrial regions, such as the southern Urals, Kemerovo Oblast, and so forth.

We are breathing increasingly dirty air. We are drinking increasingly dirty water. We are eating increasingly dirty and unsafe foods. As a result, the incidence of disease is growing, the frequency of congenital defects is increasing, and life expectancy is declining. So ecology today is a state security problem.

[Glazkova] I don't think you'll find anyone who is not concerned by the problem of food product quality. What can you say about it?

[Yablokov] Agricultural monitoring of food products is supplemented in our country by monitoring on the part of a network of sanitation and epidemiological stations. They are to be found in every rayon, but not all of them have sufficiently good equipment and the capability to conduct highly skilled analyses. Nevertheless, the several thousand centers that exist study each year nearly two percent to three percent of all basic food products. The results are not only alarming, they make you shudder. Up to 40 percent of the output of children's milk kitchens contains pesticide levels hazardous to health. DDT is to be found in 70 percent of all dietetic butter. Half of all vegetables are dangerous because of contamination with pesticides and mineral fertilizers, mostly nitrogen fertilizer. Incidentally, that's also why they keep so poorly. On the whole, nearly 30 percent of all food products are contaminated. The tragedy and absurdity of the situation consists in that we are unthinkingly copying Western farming. We don't need pesticides or mineral fertilizer, because they begin to act and to produce higher yields only in areas that already have high yields (say, 40 centners of grain per hectare) and that require superhigh yields (60 to 70 centners). Our own medium level of 16 to 17 centners allows us to get by just with good farming methods and natural soil fertility.

[Glazkova] In a certain sense, no doubt, it's not quite appropriate to speak about a lack of ecologically pure food products at a time when food products are in short supply generally. Is the threat of famine real, as some assert, or is this a destabilizing myth, as others assure us?

[Yablokov] It is expected that this year's harvest will amount to 70 percent of our average harvests. When you consider the fact that three-fourths of all vegetables in previous years rotted before reaching the stores, that at least 40 percent of all food products spoil in storage, then in principle we have sufficient grain, potatoes, and vegetables to feed the population. In my view, a political mechanism for impeding reforms has now come into play. Rural areas have more food, while major industrial centers are under a kind of blockade. We have carried out a revolution at the top and removed the people who were impeding rapid progress toward a market economy, especially those who shone during the putsch; but the

average level of administration has stayed the same. We estimated that by the end of the year, hundreds of thousands of private farmers would appear, farmers who could solve the food problem, but they number only somewhere in the area of 30,000 to 35,000. The process has been stalled: They are not being given land, their farms are being set afire, supplies are being blocked. What is the solution? The hope is that the former party structures and the military-industrial complex would move quickly toward the market. Now people are looking for party money, but if it exists and is thrown at the market economy, thank God.

The question is not just one of shifting toward the principles of a market economy, but also of completely revamping its entire structure. This will take years, which history has not allotted us. We'll have to get through a couple of hard years. And we'll need help from all over the world—not in food, but investments.

[Glazkova] What are the developmental trends for the ecological situation in the near future?

[Yablokov] Unfortunately, they are going to get worse. Ecological refugees have already appeared. We are witnessing the appearance of previously unknown diseases. People have already written about children growing bald in Chernovtsy, and the same has been observed in the Baltics, Magnitogorsk, Moscow, and Yakutia. The culprit is probably thallium. In areas surrounding petroleum-refineries and distilleries, children have developed tics and trembling hands, an ailment that disappears three months after they are moved to another area. In Karelia I saw children suffering from fluorosis—destruction of the teeth as a result of fluoride from the waste products of an aluminum plant that are getting into drinking water. This is terrible! In all eight cities with plants producing protein-vitamin concentrates, the public was found to have allergies. Incidentally, the recent incident of mushroom poisoning in Krasnodar Kray could be linked with either local chemical contamination of the soil or the appearance of some sort of new combinations of toxic substances.

We intend to use all possible economic levers to alleviate the urgency of the situation. For example, fees for natural resource use are to be introduced. The money will go to local government bodies for specially designated ecological accounts. I hope that within two to three years the situation will begin to stabilize.

[Glazkova] What strategic ways of improving environmental protection do you see?

[Yablokov] The incorporation of market levers, which are widely used in the developed countries. The principle is this: The polluter pays. Plus a well-thought-out taxation policy.

[Glazkova] Does this mean we're doomed to an endless pursuit of prosecutions?

[Yablokov] I wouldn't say that. The entire world can't consume as much energy as they West consumes. We need to look for a different, more economical model of using natural resources. An aspiration on the part of every person to have his own car or airplane is absurd from the standpoint of the social ideal. We have abandoned good-for-nothing barracks socialism, but in actual fact the world is nonetheless moving in a socialist direction, toward the socialization of nature. Already, the United States, France, and Italy have the notion that every person has a right to shorelines. Sweden has the notion that every person has a right to the forests. In Britain, a person cannot move a fence on his land without permission, because this could change the landscape, which is a national asset.

[Glazkova] And so we will move in this direction in the long term. But what is being done to restore the environment today?

[Yablokov] Two years ago, the USSR Supreme Soviet that everyone is cursing today adopted a resolution, the most sonorous in our history, on urgent measures to improve the ecological situation in the country. Nearly 50 environmental-protection procuracies have been created. The introduction of the notion of the ecological crime in legislation is on the agenda. Unfortunately, this work at the union level has now ceased in light of the transfer of these matters to the republics.

[Glazkova] An incidental question. Since we talk a great deal about the need for a single economic and other kinds of spaces, then no doubt God himself commands that we also create a single ecological space.

[Yablokov] That's absolutely correct. No individual republic is can deal with ecological disasters on its own. This has been demonstrated by Chernobyl and the Caspian, Aral, and Black seas. Now Russia has unveiled an initiative to quickly conclude an interrepublic ecological agreement. Common norms and common or similar laws are indispensable. Since we are now entering the European home, we must also address the question of convergence of the environmental-protection legislation of all the countries participating in the Helsinki agreement. We can survive only if we work together.

Declining Birth Rates, Childhood Illness Linked to Environment

Deaths Exceed Births in Ukraine

92WN0085A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
17 Oct 91 p 2

[Article by Viktoriya Yasnopolskaya: "In Ukraine More Are Dying Than Are Being Born"]

[Text] Recently in the Ukraine Museum of the History of Medicine in Kiev a meeting was held between journalists and the representatives of the republic's research centers

of genetics and clinical immunology and institutes of the Ukraine's Academy of Sciences, along with deputies to the republic parliament.

The facts and figures that were presented at the meeting were simply shocking. The demographic situation in Ukraine is such that if it is not addressed as seriously as possible literally today, tomorrow irreparable damage will occur.

Judge for yourselves. The increment in the birth rate in the republic (according to 1991 data) is zero. Many more of us are dying than are being born. This is frightening for the additional reason that those who actually manage to be born have too few changes for normal health. Innate and acquired pathologies and severe hereditary diseases are the consequences of unhealthy parental genes.

Already, ineluctable statistics indicate that in some regions only 20-30 percent of school-age children can be considered healthy. On the whole, the disease rate for Ukraine's population has increased by a factor of 2.2 for all classes of disease.

The reasons for this disastrous situation are known. They include, first and foremost, our common misfortune and pain—Chernobyl. They include the global pollution of the biosphere, the consequences of Ukraine's overpopulation with industrial enterprises and motor vehicles. They include the sick earth, into which 175,000 tons of chemical herbicides and pesticides go annually.

The scientific conference on "The Health and Revival of Ukraine's People" that is currently being held in Kiev represents the first attempt to work out comprehensive solutions of environmental problems and the demographic problems that are inseparably bound up with them.

Ufa Births Continue Steady Decline

92WN0085B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 29 Oct 92 p 2

[Article by Staff Correspondent M. Merzabekov: "To Have Children, or Wait?"]

[Text] Ufa—About 10 years ago in Ufa the millionth inhabitant was born. I recall that the local press gave fitting attention to that fact, which is understandable. To see the republic's capital among the cities with population's of a million was considered prestigious.

However, the euphoria over this matter rapidly disappeared among Ufa's inhabitants. People started to realize that the life of a big city is associated with numerous negative factors for the health. Crowded conditions in stores and on transport. Air pollution from vehicle exhaust, and excessive noise. The true state of the environment ceased to be a deep secret. And at this point the perestroika upheavals began with the attendant

material shortages and psychological instability, and it came to be downright uncomfortable to live in a big city.

The demographic situation responded immediately to the deviation in the social backdrop. First of all, the birth rate started to drop. Whereas its curve reached a "peak" in 1987, when 18,700 births were recorded, starting the following year it headed downward at an increasingly steep rate. 1988 saw 17,800 births in the city, 1989—16,400, and 1990—14,700. In 1991, judging from figures for the first nine months, the city will have about 13,500 births.

We asked specialists to comment on these figures.

P. Yangurazova, deputy head of the city public health department for children and maternity:

"Yes, it's an unhealthy symptom. We conducted a survey among young mothers who do not want to have more than one child and have terminated their pregnancies. Among the reasons they cited, poor social and living conditions occupied first place. Problems with housing, kindergartens and nutrition, the high cost of living, and general shortages. Second place went to the poor condition of the environment. Everyone knows the story of the pollution of Ufa's water with phenol."

T. Stupnikova, the city's chief pediatrician:

"Today we see the following picture: whether they be pregnant women or nursing mothers, virtually all of them are anemic. And look at the children: you will not see rosy cheeks on many of them. By and large, the children are unhealthy. It is rare for them to be classified in the first health group. Children's resistance has declined drastically, and their immunity has been weakened. After the phenol pollution last spring, we conducted a general medical examination and identified 1,500 young patients with various acute conditions—irritations of the gastrointestinal tract, skin diseases, liver ailments, allergies, and various manifestations. But what is typical is that a commission of the RSFSR Ministry of Health, on the basis of several thousand laboratory analyses of blood and urine, reached the conclusion that a substantial number of deviations had occurred even before the phenol discharge. Consequently, the general ambience is unhealthy in and of itself. What we consider the norm turned out to be a "defective" norm. And it is not just 1,500 children with acute conditions, but literally everyone, whose health needs to be improved."

"Unfortunately, there is no scientifically substantiated system for improving the health of the city's young citizens. Everything that is done by the health care agencies is done intuitively. We are spending millions, for example, on providing vitamin supplements for children's diets. And at the same time their intoxication by certain unidentified substances is continuing.

"Children's nutrition has turned into a difficult problem. Yet many mothers have no opportunity to buy sufficient

vegetables and fruits. One cannot speak about the normal consumption of meat and fish, either. Irrational nutrition is what leads to anemia among nursing mothers."

What the public health specialists have told us is common knowledge. Let us hope that society will some day get through the present crisis, and that children may become healthy and rosy-cheeked. In the meantime, it seems that the nature of motherhood itself is choosing the most rational solution in the given situation: rather than subject one's flesh and blood to the risk of poisoning, malnutrition, disease and stress, it is better to hold up the "purchase" of a child until better times.

Only, won't we have to wait too long?

Novgorod Sets Up Ecology Center

OW0811073791 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1415 GMT 7 Nov 91

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On Wednesday the city of Novgorod registered the country's first ecological education center. Among its founders are: Moscow State University, the Moscow Institute of Chemical Technology and a number of other enterprises and public organizations in Moscow and Novgorod, as well as Professor Silcox of Philadelphia, a historian and U.S. administration environmental adviser.

The U.S. founder supplied equipment for chemical laboratories. In addition, the U.S. professor wants to organize student exchanges.

'Map of Radioactive Catastrophes' Nears Completion

92WN0102A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 23 Oct 91 pp 1, 6

[Interview with People's Deputy Aleksandr Penyagin, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet subcommittee on nuclear ecology, by Aleksandr Putko; place and date not given: "In the USSR There Is No Concept for Dealing With Dangerous Nuclear Waste"]

[Text] Deputy Aleksandr Penyagin Is Compiling a Map of Radioactive Catastrophes in the Country

Have you ever seen a map of the country that showed the radiation situation? For example, zones in which it is quite impossible to live because the background radiation is higher than 40 curies per square kilometer, all shown in red? Or the broader green spots (from 15 curies to 40 curies), areas not quite as dangerous but from which it is better to depart? The territory colored yellow is another matter: According to existing law in Russia, the Ukraine, and Belorussia it is permitted to live there. But with the agreement of people who are willing to risk their health for the sake of the money offered to them as compensation.

This same map shows the sites of the major accidents, indicating the dates and scales of the disasters, along with burial sites for spent nuclear reactors, radioactive waste, and instruments and drugs containing isotopes. Here, too, it is possible to see the regions where uranium is extracted and processed, the mooring places for nuclear submarines, and the sites where nuclear weapons testing has taken place. I saw it with my own eyes in the USSR Supreme Soviet Ecology Committee.

It was compiled by People's Deputy Aleksandr Nikolayevich Penyagin, chairman of the subcommittee on nuclear ecology. Of course, in this work, which has been going on for two years, he has been helped by other people's deputies, scientists, the military, and people at many enterprises and sites. Data from pictures taken in space have been used.

The work is not yet complete. It will be refined, there will be new data, but it must be assumed that the overall picture will change only for the worse. And even without this, the picture is appalling. A.N. Penyagin himself believes that if we do not properly assess the situation and start to take steps, we can expect a global catastrophe in the not too distant future.

[Penyagin] In July 1989 our committee was assigned the task of conducting an in-depth study of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident. It was then that we compiled the first maps of the regions contaminated with cesium-137 [as published], strontium-90 and plutonium. The time during which these radionuclides affect living organisms varies. For example, strontium and cesium are dangerous for 150 to 200 years after an accident, while for plutonium the half-life is 24,000 years! Thus, the 30-kilometer zone around Chernobyl is for all practical purposes wasteland for mankind forever.

The first conclusion, that we reached immediately, is that it is essential to investigate the overall situation in the country. Because we had accidents involving the ejection of radiation even before Chernobyl. In particular, in Chelyabinsk Oblast at the Mayak Production Association, where weapons-grade plutonium has been produced since 1948 (this is what we call plutonium that is more pure and more suitable for the manufacture of nuclear weapons). According to our data, there have been three accidents there, as the result of which about half a million people received large doses of radiation. The situation there now is particularly acute: An enormous quantity of radioactive waste has been accumulated, including radioactive water. Entire lakes—about half a million cubic meters of radioactive water. We took measurements there in the region of the settlement of Muslyumovo. The figure for the air is 693 microroentgens, while on the banks of the Tcha River it is up to 1,500. And this when the maximum permissible standards are 12-15 microroentgens!

And what about losses of nuclear reactors from space? And the dumping of radioactive waste into rivers? And

the numerous "tailings" from those places where we began extracting uranium starting in forties?

[Putko] What are these "tailings"?

[Penyagin] This is what specialists call ore with a low uranium content. This portion of the ore extracted does not have much use for processing. It is left on the surface. It is then washed down by rain and carried into rivers, and enters various products. You see the green triangles on the map? These are sites where ore has been recovered, for example, in Chita Oblast, in Kirghizia, in the Urals, in Uzbekistan, and in the Ukraine. "Tailings" have been left everywhere. The radiation situation has been neglected, and no re-cultivation has been carried out on territories after the uranium has been extracted. People are falling ill but know little of the causes of their suffering.

[Putko] I see black rectangles on the map.

[Penyagin] These are radioactive waste burial sites. They are located all across the territory—in the Far East, the Baykal region, Central Asia... And here, we have a burial site near Moscow, close to the suburb of Sergiyeva.

An enormous quantity of radioactive waste is being formed in the military-industrial complex. During the period 1949 through 1956 waste from Chelyabinsk-65 was poured into the Ob River. Whereas initially the mass of radioactive waste moved as far as the Kara Sea, now it is contaminating the upper reaches of the Ob basin. An underground lens of radioactive water has been formed. A total of 124,000 people have been affected in this region along the Tcha River.

[Putko] Do we have any laws, any concept for resolving this problem?

[Penyagin] There is no law and no concept. And the problem, as you can readily understand, is growing with catastrophic speed. Because the existing reactors are wearing out but are still being operated, the useful life of some nuclear power stations is coming to an end, and uranium is still being extracted and processed, including here near Moscow. The situation with respect to radioactive waste is alarming and obviously very expensive. There is already nowhere to put the waste from many enterprises.

Our naval fleet is in crisis. Incidentally, I served aboard a nuclear submarine and so I am especially aware of the situation here. Dozens of decommissioned submarines have been laid up. It is not known what to do next. For they contain nuclear engines. After a nuclear submarine has served its allotted 25 years, the nuclear innards of the reactor should be removed. This is understood. But what to do with it next—bury it or store it?

What will we do next with the dangerous waste—bury it more deeply or organize storage somewhere? Meanwhile, we are doing both. And, of course, without the necessary precautions, haphazardly, uncontrolled. We cannot guess how buried waste will behave, where underground

water will take it, and how that will affect the soil and the plant and animal worlds and ultimately the health of our children and grandchildren. We are still trying to reduce the number of nuclear submarines. But what will be done with the reactors and the spent nuclear fuel?

And the main factor is that the unwound flywheel of the military-industrial complex has not been stopped. We have agreed to reduce the number of warheads but we are unable to think about a planned halting of the gigantic machine that continues to create deadly weapons. The madness goes on. This is why, when agreeing to reduce the arsenals of nuclear weapons we must at the same time raise the question of the cost of dismantling the enterprises that produce them. Specifically, they are themselves dangerous from the standpoint of radiation.

We do not even have a state mechanism to control their activity. At one time the USSR State Committee for Safety in the Atomic Power Industry tried to extend its control powers to the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Atomic Power Engineering and Industry to that part that it was customary to refer to as the "defense people." It was not permitted.

[Putko] So there is no hope, no ray of light?

[Penyagin] If there were no hope I would not be compiling this map. I am sure that we will pass a law on the utilization of nuclear energy, and nuclear and radiation safety. There have also been other advances. In 1989 the USSR Supreme Soviet passed a resolution stating that everything relating to ecological information should be declassified. Regardless of whether the production involved is nuclear, chemical, or anything else. Of course, this is only a beginning. The enterprises of the military-industrial complex are still surrounded by very high fences, but I hope that during the course of the reform of the military they will be brought within a legal framework.

There is no doubt that the difficulties in resolving all our problems are being exacerbated by the political situation in the country. For now they must be resolved by the independent republics. Will they agree to coordinate their actions? In any event, much is already being done in Russia. The Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry has made an inventory of most objects and has taken under advisement a draft sector program on radioactive waste. But I am convinced that only together, through the efforts of all the sovereign republics, will we be able to achieve success. For if you look at our map you will see that we all now find ourselves in the same crisis situation.

[Putko] Do you intend to publish the map?

[Penyagin] As soon as the work on it has been completed I will try to do that. Moreover, I would very much like similar maps to be compiled in all countries that possess nuclear weapons and nuclear technology, so that it will be possible to weigh these maps together and see where

we are today. The nuclear danger knows no borders. Our submarine, the Komsomolets, lies in an area where fishermen from various countries cast their nets, and a number of our regions have suffered from radiation emanating from the Chinese nuclear test site in Xingjiang. Radioactive dumping in the world's oceans and destroyed reactors falling back to Earth from space are equally dangerous to everyone.

Chernobyl Further Scrutinized in Wake of Recent Fire

Reporter Tours Area

92WN0096A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Oct 91
p 3

[Article by M. Odinets, PRAVDA correspondent: "What Is There, In Chernobyl?"]

[Text] Once again, as in the Spring of '86, in Kiev and far beyond its boundaries, the public is concerned by troublesome rumors associated with Chernobyl. And despite the fact that, appearing on the television screens and speaking over the radio and in the newspapers, the members of the governmental commission convened after the recent accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, specialists in atomic energetics, are trying to assuage the people with explanations about what is being done at the nuclear power plant after the fire at the second power generating unit, the Chernobyl syndrome constantly makes itself known.

I visited the station, spoke with its management, met at the site of the last accident with those who eliminated it, and was present at the regular meeting of the governmental commission. This is how these notes came about.

A small accident. The road to the sadly infamous nuclear power plant reflects the state of affairs at the plant itself. I remember when thousands of buses passed over it carrying evacuees from Pripyat, how the concrete trucks carrying liquid concrete mass rolled over it one after another from Vyshgorod, how flocks of trucks carrying reinforcements, steel structures, pipes, and various assemblies moved over it, as well as armored transport vehicles and tanks without weapons...

A big accident—big trouble!

But today the road to Chernobyl is almost deserted. Sometimes a truck will pass going the other way, a bus will race by, overtake the passenger car, and again it is quiet. On the sides of the road, especially beyond the control checkpoint at Dityatki, instead of the menacing signs warning: "Danger—do not drive onto the shoulder!", "Driving into the forest is dangerous!", there have long been signs with "bricks" and the word "shoulder". In the former temporary military towns located along the roads, the roofs have already been dismantled and the frames removed.

"A small accident," I heard in Chernobyl. Beyond the second control checkpoint at Lelev, where at one time helicopter pilots who poured bags of sand into the mouth of the reactor in the fourth unit were based, there were no people on the road.

And then—the painfully familiar picture: To the right of the road, raised upward to the sky, like arms, are the remains of 10 tower cranes over the halted construction of the fifth and sixth units of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. And darkening in the rainy haze of autumn is the silhouette of the station with its vertical "garland"—the smokestack and the gloomy sarcophagus on its left margin. In the distance we can see an unaccustomed scattering of burning electrical lamps atop the production unit in one of the sections of the roof. Judging by all, this is where the fire was. The gap formed as a result of the accident comprised almost 2,500 square meters.

The slogan, "Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant imeni Lenin Works for Communism!", which towered above the administration building, has long ago been removed. But the bust of Lenin, to the honor of the station's collective, stands at the very entrance. Beyond the doors are announcements, including about where people who have come to participate in operations for elimination of the fire at the fourth turbogenerator should report, about the evening concert in Slavutich which will feature the Belorussian ensemble "Syabry", about health resort trips, and other information.

A colored line with the sign "governmental commission" leads to the second floor. It is located in the place where, if memory serves me, the nuclear power plant's party committee used to be. In the waiting room I see a familiar face—Katya the secretary. In the summer of '86, Yekaterina Vasilyevna was the first to accompany us, PRAVDA journalists, to the renovated office of station Director E. Pozdyshev. Today he is the deputy minister of atomic power and industry. Recently Pozdyshev was here in connection with the accident. In the office, however, the governmental commission is today represented by N. Shteynberg. He was at that time the plant's chief engineer. Today he is the chairman of the Ukraine Gosatomnadzor [State Committee for Safety in the Atomic Power Industry].

I recall that at that time the governmental commission was headed up by the country's Council of Ministers deputy chairmen Shcherbina, Silayev, and Voronin... Today there is a different level. Well, it is understandable—a small accident. However, the resonance produced by it was great. In the evening on that day, already an hour after the start of the fire, foreign journalists were calling the homes of the republic government leaders. And at 7:00 a.m. the general director of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, M. Umanets, was forced to hold a press conference for our own and foreign correspondents who had flocked from everywhere during the night and at dawn. In Kiev the telephone calls went back and forth all night—passing on from one family to the next the

worrisome news from Chernobyl, and advising each other to close the air vents and windows, and not let the children go outside during the day...

But leaving memories aside, it was already time to go to the site of the fire, to turbine generator No. 4. However, the nuclear power plant has its own routine, its own order. It turns out that it was lunch time, and I went to the dining room together with the others. While I was standing in line among the workers and specialists, I heard much talk about the future of the station, and this means also its people. They were sad. The collective is not in a very happy mood today. The fate of the nuclear power plant which has been doomed since Spring of '86 was hanging by a thread as it was, and the fire broke the almost invisible thread of hope. What to do after the closure of the nuclear power plant, where to work, what would happen with Slavutich? These questions accompanied us everywhere we went. I felt especially sad in the turbine room of the second power generating unit, when instead of the ceiling I saw above me a piece of grey autumn sky.

GLOW OVER PRIPYAT. People who remember that April night in '86 in Pripjat say that the glow was significantly less then. I am a witness—the area of dousing the fire today turned out to be significantly greater, and the work of the firemen lasted longer. Today there are still traces of water in the halls of the machine room, and fire hoses hang on the hand railings. There are many traces of soot on the wall separating the reactor zone from the turbine room. Covering beams which crashed during the fire are still hanging down. They are mixed with pieces of metallic structures, remainders of the roof, tangled wires, and broken glass. All this is covered with ash, soot and dust.

The sight is not a happy one. We feel drops of rain coming in from the top through the opening. Two motorized cranes operate skillfully in the pile of scrap. They were brought up to the level of the turbine room, and although the area is narrow, they help to clear the clutter, loading warped steel, bent pipes and fused bitumen into the trucks which drive up here along the transport corridor. They take all this to the burial site. Below, on the first floor of the machine room, on the start-up pump platform, we see groups of people with closed "leaves" of faces. They are collecting into sacks the rubbish which fell from above.

People wave to us from the roof. They have brought a bitumen cooker up there and are now clearing the surface of the roof.

"The main thing," explains station worker O. Goloskokov, "is to create a front of operations, to enclose the top of the building before winter. Then the work in the room will go more energetically."

We are approaching the epicenter of the accident. Next to us are bent railings, interwoven pipelines, and deformed beams. Station Engineer S. Shekstelo explains: The people performing the work on liquidating the

consequences of the accident are from the production association "Spetsatom". It is headed by Hero of Socialist Labor Yu. Samoylenko, about whom PRAVDA has often written. Here too are specialists from "Ukrenergostroy", "Yuzhnoteploenergmontazh", SMU-3, and NPO [scientific-production association] "Pripyat". All the operations are coordinated by the head of the "Ukrytiye" facility, V. Grishchenko, and by the deputy chief engineer of the nuclear power plant, N. Karrask. They control the fulfillment of an integrated schedule at various marks and the delivery of equipment. Part of it will be brought here from the Rovno and South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plants. It is expected to take a month to liquidate the consequences of the accident.

At the top, above us, a 125-ton bridge crane is moving along the crane tracks which had not been destroyed. However, it has not yet gotten to the place of the collapse due to damaged cables. A 200-ton "Libkerr" crane has been brought to the site of the accident from Podolsk. It will speed up the work significantly. Finally, a powerful multistory crane will have to be brought in from the "Ukrytiye" rayon. For this it will be necessary to stop the third power generating unit, and since the second is currently out of operation and the first is under repair, the entire station will temporarily stop producing electrical power. This will be for the first time since '86 and before the station will be shut down in accordance with the decision of the UkSSR Supreme Soviet.

"Now it is already clear," said S. Parashin, the nuclear power plant's general director, in his conversation with me, "the plant will have to be closed for good."

In a short time, the metallic casings of the turbine generators in the second unit have turned brown from the water sprayed by the firemen and from the rains. The specialists working on them who removed moisture from the machines said: "Now the main task is to save the complex equipment from being ruined."

In my trip through the station, I never once encountered any dosimetrists. The measurements are performed systematically at all sectors of work on liquidating the consequences of the fire. As Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Environmental Protection I. Lyakh told me when I met him at the nuclear power plant, the measurements of the gamma-background are also taken at 14 points along the perimeter of the nuclear power plant.

"The radiation situation," he assures us, "is unchanged."

AT THE GOVERNMENTAL COMMISSION. It meets annually in the "glass house"—that is what they call the small room next to the office of the nuclear power plant's general director, M. Umants. It effectively reviews and resolves problems associated with the liquidation of the fire. At the meeting, at which I had occasion to be present, fire safety regulations and the expert investigation of radiation safety were discussed and approved.

As the events of 11 October showed, the experience of the catastrophe of 1986 here, at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, has taught us little. Although, we must say, the station personnel acted irreproachably. The fourth turbogenerator in the second unit was shut down in a timely manner, and after it the entire reactor. The oil system of turbogenerator No. 4 was emptied. But how? The reserve containers for emergency dumping turned out to be already filled with used oil. In the haste, the liquid which should have been taken out of the station long ago was poured directly onto the floor!

The firemen in the "small" as well as in that "big" emergency exhibited bravery and courage bordering on heroism. The teams gathered here from several oblasts, and in a few hours they localized and extinguished the fire. But why did they work this time too without means of protection, without basic respirators or appropriate instruments? The firemen present at the meeting told me later that when they were returning to their stations, the dosimeters at the control checkpoint at the village of Dityatki determined that their shoes had increased levels of radionuclide contamination, and they had to walk to the buses at night over the cold asphalt, wet with the autumn rain, in their bare feet...

I had occasion to hear from MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] workers that some managers of the NPO "Pripyat" created obstacles for them at the time of the accident under the excuse "not to raise a panic", and would not let them into the machine room to look around and determine the cause of the fire. "Do not raise a ruckus!"—was this not the position of certain plant managers in the Spring of 1986 which cost the lives of many workers at the nuclear power plant, as well as serious illness to the residents of Pripyat?

Again and again I heard the same question from the firemen, which I also had occasion to hear in '86—why? Why was the roof at the nuclear power plant made of highly flammable material? After all, this time the fire might have engulfed the entire nuclear power plant, and the consequences of the catastrophe then could have been unpredictable.

It is fully understandable why the UkSSR Supreme Soviet again and again insists on closing the station. Now a resolution has been adopted about the final closure of the nuclear power plant in 1993.

I would like to conclude this material on an optimistic note. After the conclusion of the governmental commission meeting, I turned to N. Shteynberg, chairman of the Ukrainian Gospromatomnadzor [State Committee for Safety in the Atomic Power Industry].

"There is little to be happy about," he said. "The people who are insisting on the closure of the station are chopping off the very limb they are sitting on. There is not enough organic fuel not only in the Ukraine, but also beyond its boundaries. Thank God the people at the nuclear power plant continue to work."

Official on Progress of Investigation*92WN0096B Moscow TRUD in Russian 1 Nov 91 p 2*

[Article by A. T. Mazalov, chief of the USSR Gospromatomnadzor [State Committee for Safety in the Atomic Power Industry] Main Administration: "Why the Blaze Started in Chernobyl"]

[Text] **TRUD has already written about the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant which occurred on the evening of 11 October in the second power generating unit. A governmental commission on investigating this accident has not yet completed its work, but the reasons and the course of development of the accident have been determined. A. T. Mazalov, a member of this commission and chief of the USSR Gospromatomnadzor Main Administration tells about it.**

Some things were clear to the specialists from the very beginning. For example, the fact that the switching of a high voltage switch located hundreds of meters from the machine room in an open space of network distribution devices led to the accident. The question consisted of why the switch was engaged. Perhaps someone accidentally or carelessly turned it on? The conclusion of the experts synonymously answered this question. The switch was engaged spontaneously—due to a short in the electrical wiring. And this, in turn, turned out to be the result of damaged insulation in a multiple cable connecting the generator with the open distribution devices. So that already now we may remove suspicion of involvement in this accident from the station's operative personnel. Or more precisely, involvement in its occurrence.

The switch was engaged when the turbogenerator was coming to a stop. Its rotations were reduced to almost zero. And then current began flowing into it, which caused a well-known phenomenon in electrical equipment: The generator turned into an electric motor. Switched into the network, it began to rotate wildly. Its design certainly did not provide for such a transformation. And soon everything began to tumble down: Under the huge electrothermodynamic loads, the generator's insulated bearings broke down. And then nothing held back the hydrogen and the turbine oil, which under pressure began flowing into the machine room. A combustible mixture was formed, which immediately ignited.

Two strong funnels were formed. Like gas burners, they quickly heated the metallic structures holding up the roof of the machine room and made them pliable to the point of losing their load-bearing capacity. Well, and after that the roof collapsed—over an area of approximately 2,000 square meters.

I would like to note that the on-duty personnel kept their wits about them. In a most complex and rapidly changing situation, the primary actions of the people were the correct ones: They quickly drained the oil out of the turbogenerator into an underground emergency tank,

let out the remnants of hydrogen from the generators into the atmosphere, and opened the sprinklers on the beams and the roof of the machine room. It is very important that they shut down the nuclear reactor and cooled it down to a safe state. We should acknowledge their courage and bravery in putting out the fire.

However, things did not go without the infamous "spoon of pitch." They forgot to turn off the second turbogenerator of the same power generating unit, and as a result they "beat it to death" too (without a fire, thank God!). Errors in managing the process of shutting down the unit also led to a dangerous reduction of the water level in one of the cooling system's elements.

As for the firemen, their actions were skilled and highly professional at all levels. This made it possible to localize and then extinguish the fire rather quickly.

Nevertheless, an increase in the background radiation at the station itself was noted. Not as a result of a new leak of radioactive materials, but because the roof which collapsed and some other places still retained small fragments which had been contaminated with radiation from 1986. Now, with the new damage, they became apparent. This does not represent any serious threat to the ecological situation at the station and around it.

In conclusion I will emphasize that the new Chernobyl accident is not a strictly nuclear one. However, it occurred at a nuclear facility and, as we already know very well, it must be treated a thousand times more carefully than an ordinary nonnuclear one.

Labor Official Pledges Support for Chernobyl-Affected Areas*92WN0097A Moscow TRUD in Russian 1 Nov 91 p 1*

[Article by V. P. Shcherbakov, chairman of the USSR GCTU: "Not To Leave the People in Trouble"]

[Text] **In the course of his trip to Bryansk Oblast, USSR GCTU [General Confederation of Trade Unions] Chairman V. P. Shcherbakov visited the populated areas which suffered the most from the Chernobyl catastrophe. In Zlynkovskiy rayon he met with workers and kolkhoz farmers, as well as with the rayon and oblast trade union active membership. The next day, at the request of our TRUD correspondent, V. P. Shcherbakov commented on the situation which has arisen in this region:**

[Shcherbakov] Unfortunately, there is every reason to conclude that the measures which have been and are being taken by the organs of state power and administration for health protection and socioeconomic and legal protection of the people who suffered through no fault of their own are inadequate, are being realized at an extremely slow rate, and as yet are not yielding tangible results.

Almost six years after the Chernobyl tragedy, thousands of victims, including children, continue to live in

extremal conditions, in zones with a high level of radioactive contamination. The plans which had been outlined for their relocation and construction of housing for them are not being fulfilled. The population of the oblast and the rayon experiences considerable difficulties in obtaining basic necessity goods, and primarily food products.

The shortage of medical workers, doctors and particularly specialists, and the lack of provision of medical institutions with the necessary equipment and instrumentation, make it impossible to provide for the examination and treatment of patients at the proper level. Up until the present time, sanatorium-resort treatment and health treatment of children and parents with small children has still not been organized in full volume. Despite the repeated demands of the trade unions, the question of allocating the necessary number of health centers by the former Fourth Main Administration, by other departments, and by the CPSU Central Committee system has still not been resolved.

Due to the absence of a local mechanism and order for practical realization and financing of the RSFSR law: "On Social Protection of Citizens Subjected to the Effect of Radiation as a Result of the Catastrophe at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant", people who are in need cannot get many benefits or compensations, even those provided for them by law.

This situation, as far as I know, is characteristic not only for the region of Bryansk Oblast, but also for a number of other territories which have suffered from the Chernobyl catastrophe. Evidently, the organs of power of the country and the republic must react more effectively to the appeals of workers and the demands of the trade unions associated with the vital provision of people in this zone.

From my side, I consider it necessary to announce that the trade unions will act more persistently. They will strengthen public control over the course of realization of the governmental decisions, work on giving whatever aid they can to the labor collectives and to the workers in eliminating the consequences of the tragedy and in protecting and strengthening the health of the victims. Compromises are inappropriate here.

Kyshtym Holds Lessons for Other Nuclear Accident Sites

92WN0086A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 29 Oct 91 p 4

[Article by Special Correspondents K. Belyaninov, O. Volkov, V. Nedogonov, V. Umnov: "Chernobyl, 30 Years Later"]

[Text] We urge that this article be read by current and future officials of Bryansk, Zhitomir, Kiev, Gomel, Mogilev, Kaluga, Tula, Orel, Smolensk, Rovno, Chernigov, Brest, Minsk, and Grodno oblasts.

Chelyabinsk Oblast—The river divides the village of M. into two parts. And although they built a paved bypass road long ago, residents still walk straight across the rickety boards stretching from one bank to the other. Kicking pebbles, a young boy goes down to the river—it's the shortest route from school to home. Geese cackle on the stream, a calf browses on the grass. In terms of content of cesium-137, the river silt is classified as a solid radioactive waste.

Thirty years ago, all the neighbors were moved away from the radioactive T. River, both upstream and downstream. M. remained, for some reason. Maybe there simply wasn't enough money at the time for everyone. Today it's all the harder to come up with the money.

At one time, in order to protect people from the river, a barbed wire fence was erected along the bank and a soldier carrying an assault rifle was posted there. He was later replaced by a policeman, and the policeman was later replaced by an old man with a Berdan rifle from the extradepartmental security service. All that was long ago. Today the reinforced concrete posts left from the barbed wire fence protect the garden plots along the river—keeping livestock from getting into them.

A dosimeter, if placed in the footprint left by the schoolboy, would register 1,500 microroentgens per hour—100 to 200 times greater than the natural background radiation here.

Maybe some people would like to leave. But there's no point in it. Because in the resettled villages, the stores are just as empty, people have the same complaints about their health, and they curse the Zone the same way. Some have even been resettled several times to protect them from the radiation, and now they could be knocked off by a common cold—because the small prefabricated houses in which the resettled residents live have fallen into disrepair in 30 years' time, they can't retain any heat, and the holes in the floor and walls are big enough to stick your arm through.

The sturdy old homes in which they lived before resettlement have been buried in the ground.

This is a preserve now. A state preserve. And the road leading to it, which is used only by scientists and journalists, is guarded by a policeman.

People are no doubt reluctant to come here not just because of the policeman and the signs saying "Caution. Radiation!" The birch trees in the preserve are of such a strange shape—with branches growing from the very bottom of the trunk—that one is gripped with a silent terror: "Forget giant fruit flies, these are real mutants!" The people call these misshapen trees "witches' brooms." And it is for some reason hard to believe the specialists who say that it's all the fault of the elk, which are in the midst of a population explosion and are said to be eating the bark off the birches. About 100 meters away from the shell of the atomic power station and the abandoned vehicles and excavators, about 10 of those

elk are roaming about. Their horns, of course, "glow." One official has hung a set of elk horns in his office and likes to talk about how the level of radiation level decreases in proportion to the square of the distance—It is virtually impossible for a casual visitor to enter the Zone itself—the city of Ch. Two rows of barbed wire and a plowed-up security strip straddle the border, as it were. The "border troops" from the internal troops are distinguished by their white overalls and hats. They let people in only with the permission of the Big Boss—and only if they are wearing protective clothing. Even the President, after he strode confidently past the "Radiation" sign, was swung around, stripped naked, and issued pants, a shirt, and overalls (his security detail, it's said, roamed about the sanitation checkpoint naked as the day they were born, but with pistols strapped under their arms).

Did you think we are outside Strugatskiikh? No, this is no science fiction story about what the Chernobyl zone will be like early in the next century. This is Chelyabinsk Oblast, the city of Chelyabinsk-65, the village of Muslyumovo, the Techa River, and October 1991.

The Chernobyl We Were Unable To See

When on November 4, 1976, Zhores Medvedev published in the journal *NEW SCIENTIST* a brief description of the 1957 Urals catastrophe—the world's first—British, American, and French experts declared that no such thing was technically possible.

Our country, naturally, remained silent altogether. It never said a word about the fact that in 1960, as we celebrated the Mayday holidays, it was over this very zone that the American U-2 spyplane was shot down and its pilot, Powers, taken prisoner. We guarded the facility for producing strategic plutonium very carefully.

Someone spilled the beans only in 1989. And the person who did so, strangely enough, was the Minister of Medium Machine Building, L. Ryabev, who at the time was a candidate for the post of Deputy Chairman of the national Council of Ministers.

On the eve of his assertion—Lev Dmitriyevich knew perfectly well that Deputies from the Urals would not fail to look into the rumors of the accident—the Central Nuclear Information Research Institute finally published an official admission: Yes, there was an explosion at the radioactive waste storage facility in 1957. Radionuclides contaminated the surrounding land and air for a distance of many kilometers. And with them, the Techa River.

And the Deputies, after reading it, confirmed Ryabev's account. They didn't know at the time this that wasn't even half the truth—not even a fourth (or even an eighth) of it.

In 1949-1951, the Mayak [Lighthouse] enterprise dumped the wastes formed by plutonium production directly into the Techa; in 1951, traces of them were found in the Arctic Ocean.

In 1951, it was decided to pour the wastes into closed Karachay Lake, on the grounds of the installation (120 million curies, as against 50 million for Chernobyl as a whole).

On September 29, 1957, an explosion at the storage site holding radioactive wastes contaminated 23,000 square km.

In 1967, wind dispersal of radioactive aerosols from the Karachay's banks, which had been eroded as a result of a drought, contaminated 2,700 square km.

The Kyshtym accident remained a secret until the summer of 1989, and the name itself of the totally innocent city was withdrawn from use altogether.

In actual fact, the nuclear fallout pattern bypassed it altogether. Kyshtym is a small hilly town with narrow streets; the old palace of the Demidov industrialists sits on a hill.

At one time, Upper Kyshtym factories smelted copper and pig iron (it is said that many London homes still have Kyshtym roofs to this day). Some Englishmen had tried for so long to obtain a concession that by the start of the 20th century, they were granted it from on high.

But the Soviet government needed wide open spaces. And the little town perched among the Vishnevyye Mountains was hardly suited to become a springboard for great construction projects. The little factories fell into disrepair. Nearby, however, construction of a secret installation was in full swing.

In 1949, this city—it's had many names, Chelyabinsk-40, Ozersk, and now Chelyabinsk-65—produced plutonium for the first Soviet atomic bomb. And it continued to produce plutonium up until 1990.

Legend has it that Kurchatov carried the first few grams away from the reactor in his bare hands. Perhaps that marked the start of our radioactive disasters—first through ignorance, and then through foolhardiness.

The well-trodden trail from Kyshtym into the forest was paved and closed off with a checkpoint. But bold spirits used secluded trails to get through the barbed wire, and they returned laden with oranges, lemons, and chocolate.

Today, mind you, the situation is the opposite! The artels of the once-secret physicists have spread throughout the Kyshtym area—the problem of almost all our "secret" cities. It is said that they make excellent furniture by order, solder radio components, and build cottages.

The Kyshtym secrets were kept for 40 years, right up until 1990. And when Chernobyl happened, the Chelyabinsk experience in dealing with the effects of the radiation accident—which, mind you, were also secret—went virtually unused.

How Could Kyshtym Help Chernobyl?

"Overall, it has yet to help at all," said M. Kosenko, head of the clinical ward of FIB-4—the Chelyabinsk branch of the Biophysics Institute. The branch was specially established in 1962 to help the residents of the stricken areas.

Mira Mikhaylovna flew to the Ukraine on the morning of May 7, 1986. And what did she see? The diagnosis of "radiation sickness" was being given to people who didn't have it, while alarming symptoms, on the contrary, were being overlooked. She said so, and got the reply: "And how do you know?" But she couldn't answer because she had signed a statement pledging never to reveal anything. All the research findings are still in the safes of the Eighth Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Health.

In 1987, Kosenko worked in Belorussia. And it seemed to her that many decisions there were being taken on the basis not of facts but of emotions. It was decided to devote attention to everyone immediately; as a result, people continued to live in the most contaminated areas—up to 140 curies of cesium—for many months and even years. What they should have been done was to immediately divide the area up in terms of contamination density. And to start providing assistance in the dirtiest areas. Had this been done, the millions and millions of rubles allocated "for Chernobyl" might not have been wasted.

We have also learned that the Chelyabinsk experience could have been used in Chernobyl in at least the following areas:

- **decontamination:** The workers should not have simply used excavators to load the soil into trucks; first they should have covered it with a layer of "clean" soil and used tractors to shovel it into trenches, thereby preventing radioactive dust from being thrown into the air;
- **extinguishing the fire:** They shouldn't have dropped sandbags from helicopters, thereby throwing more dust up over the surrounding area; rather, they should have waited for the fire to burn itself out;
- **protecting people:** They shouldn't have needlessly put soldiers on the roof of reactor No. 4, and at the very least they shouldn't have sent patients from FIB-4 to help in the cleanup; after all, those people already had a heightened dose, and any additional exposure would have unforeseeable consequences;
- **resettled populations:** People should have been allowed to choose for themselves whether to leave or not; for some old women, the psychological strain was much more dangerous than the radiation threat.

And how was the situation handled in the 1950s?

First, as the directives required, all the men were gathered in the village center and an announcement was read: An accident had occurred at the chemical plant, and so on and so forth, and all your livestock must be destroyed. Immediately after that two men carrying machine-guns

started off through the village. Short machine-gun bursts, bellowing cattle as they were being slaughtered, squawking poultry.

The women were the first to protest. A delegation of them set off for the main official in charge of dealing with the accident. They asked for permission to slaughter their steers and cows themselves. The official sighed and...consented.

It had seemed as though the physicists had foreseen everything: destroy the animals, appraise the value of the housing and all their goods and chattels, then build new houses in a "clean" area, and finally move the stricken villages one by one.

But when the subject of resettlement came up, the men dug in their heels. The detailed plans failed to take into account the pot-bellied samovars, the mothers' worn padded coats, the crosses on fathers' graves in the cemetery. It became necessary to concoct something about mysterious sicknesses and terrible suffering in order to persuade the women to grab the children up in their arms and flee the village.

Halfway on their journey, the people came upon the "clothes-changing points." Piles of underclothing, brightly colored suits purchased by the [napartachivshevo—??] nuclear plant. But here too a fiasco ensued. The same padded jacket had to be changed 10 times.

Eighteen thousand resettled residents began a new life. It would be naive to think that every family received a normal home. And even more naive to think that everyone who should have been resettled was. Many were left to spend the winter in temporary millboard shelters, or even forgotten for a few decades. But even those who were lucky enough to receive a normal house with a shed were not fated to start living a normal, "preaccident" life. They were mowed down by disease and died out one by one, because in their new areas, who was there to help if something should happen?

We are going to list only the experience we still have time to borrow, now that the secrets have been lifted.

- It is essential to find ways to make early diagnoses of tumors using means other than x-rays, which entail additional radiation.
- Residents of contaminated areas cannot be allowed to donate blood.
- Even according to the "35-roentgen equivalent concept" that is the subject of so much controversy, a person can receive up to .5 rem per year **equally throughout his lifetime**; but if he receives 10 rems one year and 15 the next, and then the rest is added—excuse us, but this is juggling with the figures.
- It is essential to set up a hemotological service based on existing data: An expected increase in the incidence of leukemias in "Kyshtym" was recorded between the fifth and 20th years following irradiation; the maximum incidence was recorded at the interval of 15 to 19 years (without a doubt, these data must be adjusted with the Chernobyl situation).

We've read a great deal of "nuclear" literature and it all says the same thing: There are no medical data on the effect of small radiation doses over a prolonged period of time. But in fact, there are such data! Not a lot, and the research must continue, but there are some data! It has been simply impossible to obtain them experimentally anywhere else in the world except "Kyshtym."

There is also experience in the agricultural use of "slightly contaminated" areas.

The Experimental Scientific Research Center has now been operating in the preserve established on the site of the eastern Urals radioactive fallout pattern for 30 years.

The Research Center's Recommendations:

- Potatoes can be grown in areas where the contamination level does not exceed 10 curies per square km, provided several cm of soil are removed first.
- The "dirt" accumulates only in the potato skin. Therefore, the potatoes, like other vegetables from contaminated fields, must be cleaned very thoroughly.
- Fish taken from a contaminated river (lake, pond) can only be fried. Under no circumstances can it be boiled, because the radionuclides accumulate primarily in the bones.
- The same applies to animal meats.

The secrecy has been lifted from virtually all these findings. When the Japanese heard that we have research on the effect of small radiation doses, they promptly made their way to Chelyabinsk any way they could. Mira Mikhaylovna Kosenko has flown to Japan twice and there delivered the first report on the FIB's projects.

But in our country, despite the fact that the medical findings have been sent to the national commission on radiation protection and to almost every scientific journal, they have yet to be published.

How Could Chernobyl Help Kyshtym?

People here are very offended. Offended because a decision was taken to provide benefits to the victims of Chernobyl, while nobody has thought about the victims of Kyshtym. Despite the fact that they have lived side by side with disaster—and a no less serious one—for several decades now.

To tolerate evil is to excuse it. Could this be the solution to the riddle of what happened to the Chernobyl funds received by tolerant bureaucrats?

Meanwhile, people continue to deluge visitors with the question: Why hasn't life gotten any better for us? In any case, this is what happened last year in Chelyabinsk Oblast, which, by decision of the Russian Council of Ministers, received an appropriation of 90 million rubles.

Hence the lesson of the funds allocated for Chernobyl could be very useful to this area.

Two years ago, officials of Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk, and Kurgan oblasts began making calculations for the first time: how much of what should be invested where. This resulted in a long list of construction materials and medical and industrial equipment. Taken together, all this was meant to convince Russian and union authorities that 90 million rubles was just a drop in the bucket.

The chances for success increased considerably following the visit to Chelyabinsk Oblast by B. Yeltsin during his election campaign. Later, as President, he ordered the Council of Ministers to study the question of declaring the rayons afflicted by the Kyshtym accident a national ecological disaster area. A decision to this effect is expected any day now.

But here's where the danger lies, in our view. It is clear that for the next several decades, the local authorities will be hostages to nuclear production. Because the Mayak enterprise alone requires enormous funds—to vitrify wastes, to drain "glowing" swamps and lakes, to damn the strongtium-contaminated rivers, and to bury their cesium-contaminated banks. And it is essential to do this, because the contamination is spreading—through ground waters and through dams that are losing their sorption properties. And there's no one else to do this except the specialists from Mayak.

But regardless how many millions can be wrested from the Russian government, it will not be enough to solve the problem of radioactive wastes. This is why it is important that the medical and social problems of the people victimized by the atomic race be included in the program as a separate line item.

Chernobyl was unable to learn from Kyshtym's mistakes. But can Kyshtym benefit from even a small part of what Chernobyl has learned at the cost of so much suffering?

In What Ways Will Kyshtym and Chernobyl Not Be Able to Help Each Other?

The problem, no doubt, is not even in the fact that it has so far been impossible to compel our state to shift even a few funds from one budgetary "pocket" to another. Even if when we talk about the bulging pocket (the military one) and the half-empty pocket (the medical one). Nor is it in the fact that about 90 percent of the Chernobyl emissions consist of cesium derivatives.

It's all simpler and more dreadful at the same time. By sheer coincidence, Chernobyl became a national tragedy. It's just that the time was such, and the new policy mandated that the accident be discussed, albeit in hushed tones. The whole world learned about Chernobyl, and no one can count the number of commissions that have passed through the checkpoint of the "zone" over the past six years. Nobody knew about Kyshtym for 30 years.

True, a lot of commissions went to Kyshtym too. They drew up their conclusions and compiled their thick reports. It's just that later, those reports were marked with the purple stamp "top secret."

Two years ago, Mayak specialists did some calculations. It turns out that total rehabilitation of the contaminated areas—and only those adjacent to the enterprise itself—will take 67 billion rubles (67,000,000,000) rubles. And when we take inflation into account and the fact that no one will give you more than 10 kopeks for a Soviet ruble, the fact that the oblast construction industry, its desire notwithstanding, couldn't put even half a billion rubles to use annually, and, finally, the fact that the area of the Eastern Urals nuclear fallout pattern is several tens of times bigger than the zone, it becomes clear that nobody could provide such a sum today.

And yet the problems, mind you, might never have happened had an attempt not been made from the very outset to portray nuclear-generated electricity as the very cheapest—an excellent argument in favor of the nuclear power industry. This is why the waste problem was never included in its cost. Yet if we are to believe the American journal *WORLDWATCH*, which in May of this year published calculations made by Pentagon experts, the manufacture of one pound (880 grams) of weapons-grade plutonium produces more than 300 liters of highly radioactive wastes containing hazardous chemical substances, more than 60,000 liters of wastes with low- and medium-level content of hazardous substances, and 2.5 million liters of contaminated cooling water.

Had someone begun back then to earmark a percentage of nuclear profits for dealing with the problem of radioactive wastes, maybe the question of processing and burying them wouldn't be so acute today.

For the first time in its more than 40-year history, Mayak finds that no one needs it. Of course, the trains still come carrying spent fuel from our own water-cooled reactors and from eight "friendly" countries, and also from nuclear submarines. But the country no longer needs the plutonium that motivated the entire existence of Mayak.

And Chelyabinsk-65 itself is gradually getting used to its new way of life, becoming a normal city of 85,000 people with a full set of provincial problems: Young people are moving away, there's not enough transport, and about the only thing you can buy without ration cards is a loaf of bread. None of this would be so terrible were it not for—Mayak's storage facilities hold 100 "jars" containing highly radioactive wastes, each with a volume of 300 cubic m. Every one of them, say officials of the oblast State Security Committee, could rupture; The cooling system has deficiencies; power outages at the Mayak enterprise are not infrequent; and an autonomous power generator—a diesel engine—was installed only two years ago. During this time, there have been almost 10 instances in which "jars" became overheated. This is exactly how Kyshtym began in 1957.

Karachay Lake (efforts to "close" it have been under way for a quarter of a century now—it's being filled in with dirt and will eventually be covered over with concrete), is still in a state of heightened combat readiness. Thank God there haven't been any windstorms—no rarity in Chelyabinsk Oblast. In the past decade, two of them passed by the lake by sheer luck, leaving several-kilometer-long swatches through the surrounding forests.

Mayak is truly in a predicament. Money to restore the area can be obtained only by concluding commercial contracts for processing nuclear fuel from abroad. Three years ago, the Ministry of Atomic Power was going to try to reach agreements with Britain, France, and Germany under which we would process all components, including wastes, and return them to the customers, but the deal fell through. Today Mayak believes quite seriously that such a contract with Germany will allow it to earn 1 billion marks in the first year alone. And it thinks that by building a nuclear station it could solve nearly all the problems of contaminated lakes and rivers within 10 years.

That's probably all very true. But a freeze was put on construction of a station, and it will probably never start: A new design is needed and more money. And the importation into the country of radioactive wastes—and from Germany no less—is something that no Supreme Soviet would ever authorize, let alone the Chelyabinsk Soviet. Suffice it to recall that of 100 old burial sites left over from the 1950s, 25 have yet to be found.

On a larger scale, Chelyabinsk-65 is just one point on the oblast ecological map—albeit the dirtiest. Of the 10 closed cities that produce nuclear weapons in the country, three are within the oblast. And a list of metallurgical plants that operate at the ecological limit would have more than a few entries—in Karabash, Ufaley, Magnitogorsk, Satka, Zlatoust, and Chelyabinsk itself.

Meanwhile, you could count the ecological success stories in the oblast on your fingers: At the insistence of the oblast State Security Committee, filters have been installed on a couple of plants in Magnitogorsk and Chelyabinsk, and five old reactors at the Mayak plant have been shut down, although the Ministry of Medium Machine Building tired to get permission to continue operating them.

Will There Be a Garden-City Here?

The preserve on the site of the Eastern Urals radioactive fallout pattern is relatively clean. Thirty years ago, soil contamination was measured in the thousands of curies, but today the figures on the cardboard signs along the road are of an order smaller—400, 800... The radionuclides have gone into the soil to a depth of dozens of cm.

However, for the time being it's still better that people not come around here. A large bird—a rare species of eagle on the endangered list—soars above the untended

fields and the horribly misshapen birch trees. The preserve is said to be one of the country's finest.

For about the next 30 years—that's how long it will take for the radioactive elements to break down in the soil and water—no one is going to disturb the preserve. And God forbid that it becomes the only oasis on an Earth dotted with smoke-belching chimneys.

Every person should leave behind at least something good.

State Action Needed To Erase Nuclear Testing's Legacy

92WN0078A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA

PRAVDA in Russian 28 Aug 91 p 3

[Article by I. Chasnikov, corresponding member of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences: "Tears of the Test Site: An Eyewitness Account"]

[Text] Semipalatinsk-Alma-Ata—In early August I visited rayons situated in the vicinity of the test site at the invitation of the Semipalatinsk Oblast organization of Znaniye society. In these rayons I lectured and held conversations on the topic "Radiation and Life" and on the issue of ecological education of the populace. Presentations were organized in Semipalatinsk and Ayaguzskiy, Beskargayskiy, Zharminskiy, and Charskiy Rayons. In July I spoke in the city of Balkhash. The people everywhere talked to me about closing down the nuclear test site as soon as possible and categorically objected to going through with two scheduled so-called control nuclear explosions with a yield of no more than 20 kilotons, and one explosion of no more than 1 kiloton. The local populace was also outraged by the compensation for these explosions proposed in the draft ukase of the RSFSR president prepared by the military-industrial complex, and stated that people's health cannot be bought or sold. At the same time, they tearfully talked about their woes and the fact that there has still been no settlement with them for 40 years of nuclear explosions, of which there have been about 500, out of which almost one half were on the ground or in the air. The people asked that their views on the test site be published in KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA.

I was surprised by the fact that virtually no preventive efforts have been undertaken among the local populace for many years. The populace has no information on radiation levels or the purity of farm produce turned out. To this day, the cattle graze not only around the test site but also inside it. There have been cases in which the local populace used in their households remnants of machinery and products that had been tested during the explosion of nuclear bombs. I came across people who in their childhood visited the sites where ground explosions occurred.

It was reported at the science and practitioner conference on "The Health of the Populace and the Ecological Situation in the City of Semipalatinsk and Semipalatinsk

Oblast of the Kazakh SSR" (July 1989) that the people who lived in localities close to the test site were exposed to doses of radiation impact of tens and even hundreds of rems per year during the period of nuclear weapons tests on the ground and in the air. At the same time, the "Norms of Radiation Safety" envisage maximum permissible doses of total external and internal radiation of no more than 0.5 rem per person per year. This is why it is no surprise that between 1959 and 1987 the rate of deaths in conjunction with leukemia in the oblast increased by a factor of three, and the frequency of the birth of children who are subsequently mentally retarded increased severalfold. The number of congenital deformities and suicides increased substantially. Between 1960 and 1988 the number of congenital anomalies increased from 11.8 percent to 19.2 percent. This percentage in the Union comes to between 10 and 13 on the average. In the village of Sarzhal alone there have been more than 40 suicides in recent years, which until 1964 were not registered.

It has now become known that even small doses of radiation are harmful for people. They may facilitate manifestations of other diseases which apparently cannot be directly linked to radiation.

In early 1990 the Statement of a Group of Scientists Working in the Area of Radiation Safety and Radiation Medicine in Conjunction With the Situation Caused by the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station was published, in which "substantiation" of the concept of permissible lifetime doses was provided. The concept asserts that a 35 rem dose of radiation exposure is completely safe for man. This antiscientific and antihuman concept drew sharp criticism from the public. The 35 rem level resulted from the simple multiplication of the maximum permissible dose of 0.5 rem per year by 70 years. In the spring of this year a different concept was adopted (Resolution of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers No. 164, dated 8 April 1991). The concept states that a radiation dose exceeding 0.1 rem per year over and above the level of natural and technical background radiation in a given locality gives one the right to compensation, preferences, guarantees, and other measures (radiation monitoring of the environment and foodstuffs, reduction of the content of radionuclides in the air, water, and soil, reduction of the dosage load in the course of X-ray diagnostics and a reduction of the impact of radon generated by the environment, improved medical and sanitary services, and full-value nutrition). According to the new concept, protective measures should be taken in such a manner that in the future people will be able to be exposed to no more than the lowest permissible level, up to 0.1 rem, or no more than 7 rem in 70 years.

By now the level of background radiation has increased due to nuclear explosions, accidents at military and civilian nuclear facilities, discharges into the atmosphere of the products of coal combustion, which contain radioactive substances, and other technical operations by man. On the average, per person, people in the world are

already exposed to 0.3 rem per year, and in the USSR to 0.4 rem, due to natural and artificial radiation. A mere 0.1 rem is the actual allowance for people in our country. Our ancestors accumulated dosages due only to natural radiation, about 0.1 rem per year on the average. The "radiation-life" biological equilibrium which existed for millions of years has today been upset.

The RSFSR Znaniye society recently published the generalized materials of the State Commission of Experts of the USSR Gosplan [State Planning Commission] concerning state programs to eliminate the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station. This is perhaps one of the few official documents in which the situation entailed by the catastrophe at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station is outlined objectively. In particular, the document said: "The absence of complete and truthful information, keeping the actual state of affairs secret from the people, including the health status of their children, the striving of the medical establishments not to link the incidence of disease among the populace to the consequences of the accident, and other factors have all been reasons for the exacerbation of the catastrophe as many as several years after the accident: the deteriorating health of the populace, the growth of necessary expenditures, and the aggravation of the sociopolitical climate in contaminated territories." We may apply the same words to the many years of silence concerning hundreds of nuclear explosions at the Semipalatinsk test site and the woes they have inflicted on the local population and the environment. The people who have suffered from nuclear explosions have stopped being silent only 40 years later. The Semipalatinsk test site has been silent since October 1989 as a result of the mighty pressure brought to bear by the entire people.

However, the supporters of preserving the test site have not been silent. They have made presentations to the populace and in the press. They have offered their "substantiations" of the need to continue testing and perfecting nuclear weapons. They have called those who are against nuclear explosions and in favor of the policy of strategic arms reductions "traitors," even though the president of the country is at issue here.

It has been calculated that about 15 million people have already suffered from nuclear explosions throughout the world. Academician A.D. Sakharov maintained that an explosion of a one megaton bomb claims the lives of 10,000 people. Data on the correlation of the yield of nuclear explosions on our planet and the specific radioactivity of foodstuffs were quoted in the book: "Radiation. Doses, Effects, and Risks" (Mir Publishing House, Moscow, 1988). Thus, the content of radioactive substances in foodstuffs (grain, meat, and milk) increases sharply in years following the most intensive nuclear tests in the atmosphere. The specific radioactivity of foodstuffs in, for example, Denmark, came to about 9 becquerels per one kilogram of products in 1964 and 1965, following intensive testing in 1961 and 1962. The

Munich Institute for Environmental Studies recommends that adults not use foodstuffs whose contamination exceeds 10 becquerels per kilogram, and that children not use those above 5 becquerels. Therefore, in these years, foodstuffs for children were poisoned even in countries far removed from nuclear test sites. It is to be expected that the content of radioactive substances in foodstuffs produced in the vicinity of the Semipalatinsk test site was no lower than in Denmark.

More than 6 trillion curies of radioactive substances were discharged during the period of nuclear testing at all test sites on our planet (see materials of the International Congress "Voters of the World Against Nuclear Weapons," Alma-Ata, May 1990). One curie unit amounts to 37 billion becquerels. One becquerel amounts to one nuclear disintegration per second. The total yield of nuclear explosions in the USSR comes to 51.1 percent of the total yield of nuclear explosions in all countries, despite the total number of explosions in the USSR being smaller than in the United States ("Radiation. Doses, Effects, and Risks"). Therefore, more than 3 trillion curies of radioactive substances were discharged into the atmosphere in the USSR over many years.

During the Chernobyl disaster, 50 million curies of radioactive substances were discharged into the atmosphere within a very short period of time. The monitoring of foodstuffs was set up in European countries after the disaster. Thus, the Munich Institute for Environmental Studies established that the total artificial dose of radiation in the territory of Germany exceeded the pre-Chernobyl level by factors of between 10 and 100. The institute publishes data on foodstuffs shipped in the bulletin *Environmental Herald* on a weekly basis, indicating addresses where they were produced, including those in other countries. The institute calls for omitting from the menu bilberries (up to 573 becquerels in Austria and 59 becquerels in Germany), German fowl (88 becquerels), forest mushrooms (about 600 becquerels in Austria and 55 becquerels in Poland), and syrup from the USSR (26 becquerels). The institute believes that everything that grows in the forest is unfit for use (wild strawberry, blueberry, cranberry, raspberry...).

The local inhabitants with whom I met do not recall the produce grown by them ever being examined. I cannot assert that the territory of all rayons adjacent to the test site is contaminated. It is necessary to have maps of the radioactive situation both at the test site itself and the territory around it in order to take care of all doubts. A map of areas contaminated as a result of the Chernobyl disaster has long been available. Radiation "spots" on the surface of the Earth may appear hundreds and thousands of kilometers away from the location where radioactive substances were discharged or generated.

This is all the more so because until 1990, underground explosions were effected not only at the Semipalatinsk test site but in many other oblasts of our republic. In Guryev Oblast alone there were about 20 explosions.

In the 25 years between 1965 and 1989 the United States and the USSR detonated about 1,000 underground nuclear explosions.

As was already noted, cases of serious hereditary anomalies have been registered in zones with increased radiation. Given a lifetime dose of exposure equal to 35 rem for parents, about 10,000 such children may be born per 1 million newborns, whereas in subsequent generations continuously residing in a zone of ionizing radiation the rate of mutation may increase by a factor of 10 (materials of the aforementioned commission of the USSR Gosplan).

The overall death rate of the population is now increasing. The growth of the death rate due to the impact of the global fallout of the products of nuclear explosions is likely to continue until the end of our century. The peak of oncological diseases (apart from leukemias) begins to occur approximately 35 years after exposure to a one rad dose. These data are cited in the book mentioned above, "Radiation. Doses, Effects, and Risks." The radioactive contamination of the atmosphere, water, and soil was worst in 1961 and 1962. The highest count of radionuclides in foodstuffs occurred in 1964 and 1965.

Our descendants will not forgive us if we fail to take urgent measures to restore the health of all those who have suffered as a result of nuclear explosions and other ecological calamities, not only in Semipalatinsk Oblast but in many other oblasts also.

It is necessary to develop a state program for eliminating the consequences entailed by detonating nuclear explosions for both military and peaceful purposes. In discussing victims, we should mention the servicemen who directly carried out the orders to test combat materiel. They number in the tens, if not hundreds, of thousands. If the servicemen are treated the way they wanted to treat military reservists who took part in the elimination of the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster, this is hardly a credit to our state. I took part in conferences of workers involved in the cleanup after the Chernobyl disaster, which were called the Chernobyl Union. About 200,000 personnel of the USSR Ministry of Defense were used for extensive decontamination alone. They were exposed to various doses of radiation (7.5 rem per person on the average). Of those drafted by the military commissariats, about 7,000 people died by June 1990, and about 60,000 were crippled. Many of them still did not succeed in obtaining documents certifying that they were victims of radiation. I do not want to name the organizations or give the names of officials who withheld or underreported the doses to which cleanup workers were exposed. Investigations of this and other cases associated with the events in Chernobyl are underway.

In the environment of the strictest secrecy procedures in preparing and carrying out nuclear explosions, individuals (servicemen and civilian) affected by radiation were considered sick for unrelated reasons. This is why the

publicly released statistic of 10,000 affected by radiation among the populace in conjunction with nuclear explosions at the Semipalatinsk test site does not inspire confidence. Articles by direct participants in the holding of the nuclear tests, which have recently begun to appear in the press, clarify the true picture of events at the nuclear test site in less rosy tones than was portrayed to us by the defenders of the test site, for example, USSR People's Deputy Colonel N. Petrushenko.

It is necessary to make an objective appraisal of the situation that has developed as a result of 40 years of nuclear explosions, by way of a program and a law which need to be developed and adopted in order to eliminate the consequences, in terms of human health, of the nuclear explosions at Semipalatinsk and other test sites, and to provide social protection for the citizens affected by these explosions. It is necessary to map out measures to substantially improve social living conditions and health care, taking advantage in the process of the Japanese experience of caring for the people who suffered during the nuclear bombing. Compensation, which must be allocated to the affected areas, should be allocated primarily to building well-equipped medical and other establishments. The people are grateful for the setting up of a diagnostic center in the city of Semipalatinsk. However, having learned what their illnesses are, they are unable to receive treatment because the necessary drugs are lacking. It is necessary to substantially cut back on X-ray diagnostics in health care.

The population should receive full-value nutrition which, in addition, should be continuously monitored. At present, foodstuffs are produced and sold without any control. The people do not possess elementary knowledge of conditions for residing in zones of radioactive contamination. I noticed that many premises are not aired, and naturally occurring radioactive radon gas is accumulated as a result. The people should breathe clean air in all cases, both at home and at work. Special filters should be used when necessary.

It is necessary to drink only boiled water. The naturally occurring radon gas is expelled in the process of boiling; radionuclides and other chemical elements sink to the bottom after a while. We must say that radon gas must be generated in greater quantities than before the beginning of explosions due to the destruction of rock at the Semipalatinsk test site. Recommendations concerning correct food preparation and nutrition should be given to the people. They should be aware of the content of radionuclides in foodstuffs and know which foodstuffs are radiation protectors, that is, are capable of speeding up the expulsion of radioactive substances from the organism.

We should teach the people how to live in a radioactive environment rather than scare them with radiation. This is what we acutely need at present.

Aral Sea Plan Seeks Stabilization at Current Levels

92WN0058A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
24 Jul 91 p 3

[Article by M. V. Mukhamedzhanov, chairman of the Uzbek National UNESCO Committee for the Man and the Biosphere Program and UzSSR Academy of Sciences member: "The Aral Sea Can Be Saved"]

[Text] *From among the studies presented in the Aral Sea competition sponsored by the USSR State Committee for Environmental Protection a jury selected the seven best, including a concept for preserving and restoring the dying sea created by Tashkent scientists M. V. Mukhamedzhanov, S. Sh. Mirzayev and A. A. Rachinskiy. Today we present that concept to our readers in abridged form.*

Before stating my viewpoint on this problem, I would first of all like to give an overview of the Aral Sea's present condition.

The desiccation of the Aral Sea is occurring as a result of serious miscalculations and mistakes made during the stagnation period by the heads of the water management and agricultural organs of the USSR, the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan, as well as by party and soviet organizations. Agriculture and water resource management were developed on an unscientific basis, in an extensive manner which did not take the availability of water resources into account. The region witnessed an excessive expansion of irrigated areas onto poorly suited or unsuitable land, establishment of a cotton monoculture and construction of a large number of necessary and unnecessary reservoirs and other water management facilities. As a result the sea's surface level fell, the sea's total area was reduced sharply and its volume decreased by a factor of three. The Aral region's climate changed markedly: winters became colder and summers hotter. The sea and the rivers which fed it virtually ceased to have any significance as fishing areas, industrial water sources or transport routes. Approximately 2.5 million hectares around the Aral Sea have been transformed into arid salt flats.

According to experts' calculations there are approximately 10-11 billion metric tons of salt in the sea, of which 90-100 million metric tons are lifted up into the air each year and dispersed by the wind, with some of this salty sand falling as far away as the Pamirs.

Catastrophic disruption of the ecological balance has occurred in the Aral region as a result of the sea drying up.

If urgent measures are not taken to preserve the Aral Sea it will be completely lost as a natural site, with all the resultant severe consequences for the region and in particular for the four million people who live in regions adjoining the sea.

The question arises: at what level should the Aral Sea be preserved, and how?

It is no longer possible to return the Aral Sea to its 1960 level. In order to do that the entire flow of both our rivers would have to be channeled into the Aral Sea for several years, with no water at all used for irrigation.

That is impossible. But it is possible and necessary to maintain the sea at its present level, at the 38-40-meter mark; this will ensure that it continues to exist as a natural site with a smaller basin.

From its entire surface the Aral Sea loses 30-35 cubic km of water annually through evaporation. Consequently, in order to maintain it at its present level an equal amount of water must be put into it each year.

Many scientists, experts and officials in water resource management and agriculture in the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan have for a number of years been persistently promoting the idea of bringing in water from outside, specifically by diverting water from Siberian rivers or even from the Caspian Sea. In essence we support that proposal. But this will require the conducting of comprehensive studies. The plans for inter-basin redistribution of water which presently exist are not scientifically justified. We must have basic research on alternative means of supplying water to the Aral Sea basin. Furthermore, the RSFSR has expressed its opposition to any transfer of water.

Under these conditions it would be highly problematic to count on restoration of the Aral Sea through water redistribution, especially since even if this plan were given the go-ahead the water would not reach the Aral Sea for 20-25 years. By that time the sea will have disappeared completely.

That is why the only way to maintain the Aral Sea in its present condition is to find 30-35 cubic km of water in the region from which water now flows into the sea each year. But how can that be done?

We must focus our attention mainly on realization of a series of measures aimed at radical improvement in the condition of all land presently irrigated, in particular on improvement and reconstruction of irrigation and land reclamation systems, land planning, optimization of irrigation grid size, soil desalination, development and application of water-conserving technologies in agriculture, improvement of soil fertility, and so on. All these matters must be discussed thoroughly and resolved rationally, with full consideration given to ecological, economic and social consequences.

In order to reduce seepage of water into the subsoil many experts are recommending that irrigation canals and even the smaller irrigation networks be lined with concrete. We do not share that opinion. What is needed is a differentiated approach and consideration for specific circumstances. Concrete linings are definitely necessary in places where canals and the irrigation network pass through thick layers of gravel and sand, where the amount of seepage and water loss is very substantial; in

other places, which are must more numerous, particularly in fine-grained soils, a concrete lining is not only useless, it is actually harmful. By lining canals and irrigation ditches in the fields with concrete man would be interfering with nature in a major way and disrupting the balance of water in the soil and the microclimate in local areas.

Some seepage of water from irrigation systems into the subsoil is necessary to balance the level and quantity of water in the soil. It is a well-known fact that a groundwater level that is too deep will require frequent waterings, heavy water usage and additional effort to care for plantings. The borders of canals and all small irrigation networks should be planted in trees, including fruit trees. Concrete linings preclude this.

It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of trees in our arid zone. Through their roots they serve as pumps which draw water from the deep subsoil water and transpire it through their leaves, improving the microclimate of the entire area, cleaning the air and on intensely hot days protecting plantings from the harmful effects of wind and the *garmsel* [hot, dry desert wind] reducing the amount of water used for irrigation and the amount of salts in the soil, preventing soil erosion, attracting birds and making increase in their numbers possible; the latter is of great importance in the biological struggle against agricultural pests. All this is of tremendous ecological, economic and social significance.

Optimization of irrigation parcel size is an important matter. In the old irrigation zone parcel size often reaches 25-30 hectares, but in the newly-developed areas parcels are 40-50 hectares, and sometimes as much as 100 hectares. The length of the parcel reaches 1.0-1.5 km, and the length of the irrigation furrows may be 400-500 meters or more. Under these conditions it is clearly impossible to monitor the status of irrigation and moisten a field evenly. These grids use more water by factors of three or four. Consequently these large parcels should be broken up into smaller ones. Yet at the same time we have many parcels which are only 1.0-1.5 hectares in area. There are particularly many parcels of this size in the Fergana Valley oblasts. Those parcels should be expanded to the optimum size.

Optimum size for irrigation parcels in regions with strong winds is 4-6 hectares, and in other areas 8-12 hectares. Furthermore, the edges of all parcels regardless of size should be planted in two rows of fruit-bearing and timber-producing species of trees.

Also worthy of broad application is irrigation by means of inter-row channels, performed with the same furrows up to the end of the growing season. These help maintain soil porosity and reduce soil erosion, speed maturation and increase cotton yield, and most importantly save 15-20 percent of the irrigation water used.

Worthy of attention among the latest techniques to help conserve water with each watering of vegetation is loosening of soil to a depth of 60-80 centimeters and deep tilling of alfalfa to a depth of 50-60 centimeters, done once every 7-10 years.

Our research has determined that on the order of 2,500-3,500 cubic meters of water are used each growing season to obtain a 30-40-hundredweight cotton harvest per hectare in hydromorphic soils, and in sierozems with a deep groundwater level this amount rises to 5,000 cubic meters. If one considers that water losses between irrigation sources and the fields are 30 percent and that an equal amount goes for flushing and reserve waterings, then the average amount of water used per hectare is 6,000-7,000 cubic meters. In actuality the unit use of water per hectare throughout Uzbekistan is presently 12,500 cubic meters per hectare. Water use is roughly the same in the other republics in the Aral Sea region. As we can see, almost twice as much water is being used for irrigation as is necessary. In other words, with a total annual flow of 115-120 cubic km into the Aral Sea basin and water diversion totalling 90-100 cubic km, a total of 45-50 cubic km is being wasted.

Thus with a fundamental change in water resource and agricultural policy and the strictest conservation of water resources in every place and in every way it would be possible to find at least 30-35 cubic km in the affected region and channel it into the Aral Sea, thereby maintaining it in its present state.

In order to do this it is essential that we strictly limit water diversion by the republics and by each farm, that we accelerate the rate at which water-conserving technologies are introduced in all sectors of the economy, and that we consider making farms pay for water use and establish material and moral incentives for water users to conserve.

A reduction of water diversion by each republic by only 15-20 percent would make it possible to channel at least 15 cubic km of water into the Aral Sea.

We must radically reconsider the sector structure and the planting structure. In order to do this we must first and foremost eliminate the last vestiges of monoculture in cotton farming and conduct it on a strictly scientific basis, with proper use of crop rotation everywhere. This will require that the total proportion of cotton sown in the region's cotton-farming complex be reduced from the 1989 level of 68-70 percent to 50 percent.

In the Aral Sea region rice is grown on an area of 300,000-350,000 hectares, of which approximately 160,000 hectares are in Uzbekistan. Most rice is grown by specialized sovkhoses and kolkhoses in Karakalpakstan and Khorezm and Kzyl-Orda oblasts. Rice is the crop which use the greatest amount of water. Each hectare requires 50,000-55,000 cubic meters of water, or more by a factor of five than cotton fields presently do.

Moreover, the specialized farms have a low yield. As a result the majority of them are unprofitable or have a low rate of profitability.

We must do away with specialized rice farms and modify them to grow other crops which have greater economic efficiency. In our opinion the area sown to rice in the Aral Sea basin should be reduced by 200,000-230,000 hectares. This will yield almost 10 cubic km of water conservation, thus yielding a major source of replenishment for the sea. The remaining 120,000 hectares of cultivated area should be used for land improvement purposes, as rice is a major means for desalinating soils and ridding them of wilt and other diseases.

As much as 55 cubic km of water are stored in reservoirs within Uzbekistan and shared with other republics, and of this amount over five cubic km evaporate uselessly. This is where we see a failure on the part of water resource and agricultural organs. There definitely was a need to build certain reservoirs, particularly in the mountains, but there was no reason whatsoever to build the majority of the reservoirs in the foothills, valleys and flatlands, particularly since the construction was done without in-depth and comprehensive scientific study, ignoring the opinions of scientists and specialists, with no consideration whatsoever given to the inevitable degradation of natural conditions or the negative long-range ecological consequences. The fact that the death of the Aral Sea was predetermined was an unforgivable mistake on the part of the former USSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources and water resource organs in the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan.

Reservoirs, especially those such as Andizhan, Karkidon, Tuyamuyun, Shor-Kul, Tuda-Kul, Kopet-Dag, Char-Darya and many others, cause great harm to agricultural output and create ecological problems. Groundwater rises in all adjoining fields because of the reservoirs, as a result of which the fields become saline and swampy. As a rule the water flowing out of the lower sections of reservoirs is cooler than normal river water. When it is used for irrigation the soil is cooled, sharply reducing the number of or killing altogether many useful

microorganisms in the soil and changing the climate; the ecological situation worsens markedly and crop yield declines.

One great shortcoming of reservoirs is the fact that virtually all silt (calculated per hectare, depending upon the river, this equals 20-40 metric tons), rich in micro- and macrocomponents and humus, settles out in the reservoirs, thus depriving irrigated land of one of the most important aspects of structural formation and increased fertility.

It should be taken into account that in the near future many reservoirs will become filled with silt and cease functioning, and over the same period our soils will become completely degraded because they have ceased to receive infusions of silt particles.

In our opinion it would be appropriate to stop storing water in those reservoirs which have caused a marked degradation of the region's land and environment. The remaining reservoirs, with the exception of those which are vitally necessary due to an acute shortage of water or electric power in the region where they are located, should be used from time to time, only in periods of high water flow and in the wintertime. Construction of new reservoirs should be halted.

There is much drainage water in the zones of the Aral Sea region. That water and water from the Daryalik and Ozernoye catch basins should be channeled into the Aral Sea. Necessary measures should also be taken to ensure that drainage water and high-water flows from the Syr-Darya do not drain into the Arnasay-Aydar Depression, but instead are channeled into the Aral Sea. These measures will give the Aral Sea an additional 5-7 cubic km of water.

As one can see from the above, there is a possibility of finding enough water resources within the Aral Sea basin itself to maintain the sea at its present level. That will definitely be a difficult task and will require ambitious efforts by all Union and republic water resource and agricultural organs as well as administrative organs, and the swiftest possible development and implementation of a series of practical measures to preserve the Aral Sea for future generations.

Problems of Internal Refugees Examined**175,000 Registered in RSFSR**

924B0045A Moscow *PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK* in Russian No 37 Sep 91 p 10

[Interview with Mikhail Georgiyevich Arutyunov, member, RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Human Rights and chairman, Subcommittee on Refugee Affairs, by O. Solomonova: "Where Are You, Home for a Large Family?"]

[Text] [Solomonova] As far as I know, letters are being sent to you from Russians living in various republics; these letters contain requests to help them move to Russia and to provide them with work and housing. Persons of mixed nationality frequently write, as well as those with children of mixed marriages. They all pin their hopes on the Union and on Russia. They call themselves refugees, resettlers, or simply people whom nobody needs.... Mikhail Georgiyevich, what has the Russian parliament done to solve this problem?

[Arutyunov] During the last few months the flow of anxious letters has fallen off sharply. There was a time when letters were coming in from the Baltic region, Moldova, and constantly from Armenia. Nowadays the most difficult situation for Russian-speaking people is in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. And a "Migration" Society has already been founded in Tajikistan. It is conducting active work on organizing those members of the Russian-speaking population who wish to leave that republic. But there has been no such signal from Turkmenia. One gets the impression that this matter is not important there, or if it is important, the news has simply not reached us. We want to organize modest-sized groups which would travel about through all the regions and republics without waiting for letters to be sent to us; these groups would acquire information firsthand.

[Solomonova] Do you have at your disposal specific information as to how many people are leaving the various republics?

[Arutyunov] There is no such information. We do know about those who have been registered as refugees; there are 175,000 of them in Russia. For the Union as a whole, there are about 700,000. The actual numbers are considerably more. But an interesting situation has been created: The Union government does not consider that we have any refugees here in our country. This word is not even employed in the documents. Only the Russian parliament recognizes this term or definition, along with those persons who call themselves "refugees." We have prepared a draft law on refugees and forced resettlers. It was discussed at a session but, unfortunately, was not adopted.

[Solomonova] What was the reason?

[Arutyunov] There were two reasons—political and economic. The deputies from the bloc of Russian Communists were very disturbed, for example, by the statute on Russian citizenship. Why so? While working out this law, we proceeded on the basis that state sovereignty had been declared in Russia. That was the essence of the matter. State independence makes it possible to extend the statutes of the international convention on refugees to Russian refugees. In our law refugees are those persons who are forced to flee from another republic or another state, but who are not citizens of Russia. But those persons who are citizens of Russia regardless of where they live who are forced to leave for the very same reasons as the refugees are what we call forced resettlers.

[Solomonova] Why make such a distinction if it is a matter of people being forced to leave for the very same reasons?

[Arutyunov] If I may express myself in an elevated tone or stilted style, Russia—like every sovereign state—must defend and protect its own citizens with all its might. If a citizen of Russia has fled, for example, from Georgia, Uzbekistan, or Moldova, then the Russian state—without waiting for agreements to be adopted with such republics—is obligated to provide that citizen with compensation, a pension, medical assistance, instruction in schools or institutes, nurseries for his small children, etc. And now we come to the economic reason: What funds are to be used for paying out such pensions and compensations? And all the arguments stating that compensations would be paid out only to Russian citizens had no effect on the deputies.

[Solomonova] Have you been engaged in revising this draft law?

[Arutyunov] Not yet. We sent it off to Geneva to the Commissariat for Refugee Affairs and to the International Organization on Migration. An official reply with comments has arrived. In the first place, the specialists noted the humanitarian thrust of our document. In the second place, they consider that the law could be adopted in such a form. Nevertheless, there are a number of comments. For example, our draft did not indicate that the state shall be obligated not to return refugees to those places from which they have fled. I think that such a paragraph should be introduced. Indeed, there have been conversations to the effect that refugees should be returned. And in Krasnodar and Stavropol krais there have been instances whereby the local leaders—not wishing to accept refugees—have ordered their possessions sent back to the regions where they used to live.

[Solomonova] Isn't it somehow possible to separate the legal part of the law from the material, i.e., financial, part? Legal status is the main thing, when a citizen is deprived of all rights—the right to work, housing, education, and so forth. The problem of compensation could probably be solved later. But we cannot refuse a person who is so unfortunate the right to work merely because he has no visa or registration-type document.

[Arutyunov] There is a decree of the RSFSR Council of Ministers No. 257, according to which refugees shall be permitted to work without visas or such documents.

[Solomonova] But how is a person to prove that he is a refugee?

[Arutyunov] That is a very complex problem. Who is to be recognized as a refugee? It's one thing when there is a mass flight of the population from Azerbaijan, for example. In that case everything is clear. These people have been registered as refugees. But it's another matter when there is a creeping, gradual expulsion of Russians, as is the case in the Western Ukraine. How should we approach this problem? In essence, we give bureaucrats the right to define such categories. And that's the worst thing we could have done. Because a great deal depends on how precisely we manage to formulate a definition of the term "refugee." For example, several thousand people have left Tuva, and none of them have been registered as refugees. It is the Ministry of Labor which must register the status of refugee. But it should also decide where to send such a person for work and where there is a possibility for finding housing.

The experience of other countries shows that not so much state organizations as public organizations concern themselves with solving these problems. And in our country too a public fund for assisting refugees has been set up this year. Its task is to organize housing construction and the planned resettlement of this category of citizens. The Baltic republics are prepared to participate in resettling and improving conditions for Russian refugees. Many refugees are also ready to invest their own funds in such construction, although an entire group of persons, the Armenians, for example, have already dismissed all this. They have fundamentally linked their future with emigrating abroad.

[Solomonova] That means that they have no possibility for finding normal work and housing in their own country. But just what can be done to stop this flow?

[Arutyunov] The Russian parliament considers that there is only one solution—to make the transition to a market-type economy and, having freed people up, to furnish them with the opportunity to live and work.

[Solomonova] Is the departure of Russians from the various republics increasing or decreasing? Are there forecasts on that score? For example, I've encountered the following figure: 25 million Russians in the republics intend to leave or are already prepared to do so.

[Arutyunov] Nobody has studied these problems previously. We recently instructed scholars to undertake such research studies. But as to these prodigious, astonishing figures—25 million or even 60 million—they arise very simply. You take the census results, calculate how many Russians live outside the borders of the RSFSR, and there you have it. And if some sorts of disturbances suddenly begin in the republics, then all these people will supposedly begin pouring into Russia. In my opinion,

that's stupid. I consider that the outflow of Russians from the various republics, though it will not decrease, at least will not increase. The government in each republic should understand that the Russian-speaking population constitutes the republic's intellectual, working potential. How did all the conflicts in the Baltic region and in Moldova begin? With the law on language. That's a formal kind of issue. But, of course, all conflicts are based on a political foundation.

[Solomonova] In essence, the adoption of the law on language was a consequence.

[Arutyunov] A consequence, yes, but at the same time a powerful catalyst. The situation in Central Asia is more complicated. There the Islamic factor is added as well. It's high time that we recognized that there are two cultures—the Christian and the Muslim—and they must coexist. However, among certain Russian inhabitants of Central Asia one encounters the attitude that they are practically doing these republics a favor by residing there....

If we are to speak about the situation in Tuva, then the reason for everything lies in the thoughtless economy. They built enormous industrial enterprises, invited specialists there, and provided them with apartments. But what about the local inhabitants?

[Solomonova] But, after all, it is not the Russian specialists who are to blame for this. How can they be protected in situations such as that in Kyzyl?

[Arutyunov] There is one method—to create for the local population the same kinds of conditions that the Russians have.

[Solomonova] Let's return to the subject of the Russian refugees. What, after all, has been done for them?

[Arutyunov] The RSFSR Ministry of Labor is now working out an idea for materially assisting the refugees. They are examining and considering the question of where to carry out construction and to which regions they should send people initially.

[Solomonova] That is, everything is still at the level of research and development, right?

[Arutyunov] Unfortunately, for the time being, that's right. Russia and our parliament will more likely be able to help future refugees, but not those of today. And even that only if the public and the refugees themselves take this matter into their own hands. If they are going to wait until someone helps them, nothing will happen. The state cannot immediately organize public services and amenities for hundreds of thousands of homeless people, when there are 9 million families in need of living space in Russia alone.

Legal Safeguards Urged

924B0045B Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY
VESTNIK in Russian No 37, Sep 91 p 10

[Article by P. Rudnev, deputy chairman, USSR State Committee for Nationality Problems: "Variants, Variants..."]

[Text] Refugees in our country constitute an extremely complicated problem. And people are correct in reproaching the Union government as well as the republics for not solving it up to now. A law is needed. Here we cannot get by with individual, separate decisions by governments, especially as such decisions are frequently in conflict with the laws already on the books.

Therefore, a law which would protect people is simply necessary. Our administration, which was previously included under the USSR Ministry of Labor, has worked out a draft law, and we have submitted it five times to the government for discussion. And finally in June—almost two years after its first presentation, the Cabinet of Ministers Presidium examined and considered our draft but did not submit it to the parliament. As they explained it to us, the adoption of this law would be inexpedient prior to the signing of the Union Treaty.

However, there are reasons why the adoption of this law became bound up in red tape and delays even earlier. If there had been a law, the number of refugees in our country would have doubled at the very least. The resettlers from Tuva, Central Asia, and the Baltic region would have had to be recognized as refugees. Because the law depends neither on the territory nor the cause of the conflict—it is unimportant on what interethnic, religious, or political grounds such a conflict arises. The law provides for everything. It will set up an objectively functioning mechanism, whereas nowadays we are operating on instructions from the government, which has defined things as follows: An Armenian is a refugee, while a Russian from Tuva is not a refugee. Such a differentiation is not permitted by the law. And this is its principal positive feature. Another is that it regulates the relations between the republics and specifies the mutual relations between the Union and the various republics, as well as between the economic and soviet organs. It defines both rights and responsibilities.

To my way of thinking, another reason why this law has not been adopted is because to pass this law would mean to officially acknowledge our own inadequacy. To recognize the presence of internal refugees would mean to acknowledge the powerlessness in this country. The word "refugee" does not exist in our draft. But it is not just a matter of definition. We must not pretend that this phenomenon does not exist. And I, insofar as possible, have been demonstrating everywhere that the law on refugees will only add authority to our state.

Nevertheless, many persons in the government and even in the parliament are saying the following: "Nowadays Russians are being driven out illegally, and we can point

to this, but in the near future will they be driven out on a legal basis?" They understand the law in a reverse sense.

And so it turns out that there is no status of refugee, there is no law, but there are people whom nobody wants anything to do with. The government adopts decisions, the republics refuse to pay compensations, and nothing changes in the lives of these unfortunate persons.

What can be done in this situation? We can set up a state fund for refugees. There are already about 15 public funds, and they, by the way, are operating quite well. But they have limited assets. And significant material outlays are needed. And it is high time that we organized—everybody is afraid to speak about this—camps for refugees. Sweden, for example, has 60 refugee camps; there are also such camps in Germany, Czechoslovakia, and other countries. We must borrow the experience of civilized states. Many problems would be solved without excess tension, without blockading hotels, without shouting for the whole world to hear, without going abroad, etc. And nothing needs to be built for this purpose.

One variant would be to have zones for the so-called provisionally preschedule liberated persons. Many of them are empty. There are normal, five-story apartment houses there with a club, bathhouse, medical center—everything is there. They only need to be renovated, outfitted, and arranged as they should be.

A second variant consists of military posts, some of which have been freed up in connection with the army's reduction in force. To destroy all this, to scatter it to the winds, would be wasteful and uneconomical.

But our state leaders do not wish to talk about this because they are afraid of being accused of wanting to put the refugees behind barbed wire. But if everything were done humanely, people would understand.

If the government were to support these proposals, we would already have accomplished a great deal. They do not reject them, but neither do they support them. They say: Introduce your proposal. We are doing so, and we are waiting. But time is running out.

Number of Women in Public Life Declining

924B0059A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Oct 91
Union Edition p 2

[Article by T. Khudyakova: "Women Are Leaving the Political Stage: Is This Commensurate With the Democratization of Public Life?"]

[Text] Last week the Committee of Soviet Women noted its 50th Anniversary, an event which it marked by registering itself in a new capacity. From now on this organization will be an international, nongovernmental union or league of public, women's associations, but it will retain

its former name. This has been done prior to the conference which will take place at the beginning of next year.

In the words of Alevtina Fedulova, the committee's chairperson, such a change of status will merely consolidate and strengthen this public organization's striving to fight on behalf of genuinely equal rights for women. But a situation has evolved whereby nowadays nobody except the KSZh [Committee of Soviet Women] represents, defends, and protects women's interests at all levels of legislative and executive authority.

At the same time the committees on women's affairs, which were founded with such difficulty in the USSR Supreme Soviet and those of the republics, have been disappearing. There is great doubt concerning the existence of an analogous committee within the government structure. Nomination of deputies to the new parliaments at all levels has proved to be catastrophic for women—their representation has sharply declined. The final data are not in yet, but the preliminary data certainly provide cause for consternation—the republic-level parliaments will have only one, three, six...women deputies.

And it is this which caused the Committee of Soviet Women on the opening day of the session held by this country's Supreme Soviet to issue a protest declaration concerning women being pushed out of participation in political life. Is this commensurate with the proclaimed position of democratizing all spheres of life? Hardly.

Because, after all, the presence of women in the hierarchy of the political and power structures is a unique "calling card," of the society, an indicator showing the presence or absence of democracy.

But once again it is specifically women who have become the victims of the political and economic scrapes being experienced by this country. This kind of thing has already happened more than once withing our "Soviet" memory. When the country needed working hands, women were called upon to take their places at machine tools and railroad ties. But when such a need disappeared, they were reminded of their maternal duties—their top-priority task of caring for husbands and children.

This has also been confirmed by recent figures. According to data of the Moscow Labor Exchange, 79 percent of all persons applying for jobs are women.

In this connection, state officials who are men cite the cruelty of the market, the severity of the new economic conditions under which only the strongest, most skilled, and most efficient persons survive. All that is true. But there is also another truth—women are being fired from enterprises not because they are bad workers. Most frequently the reason is something else—the presence of children who are "prone" to be ill, the need to grant additional leaves, pay compensations in connection with price hikes, and so forth.

But this is just one side of the coin. There is another, no less frightening one. The civilized world has long understood the advantage of developing women's entrepreneurial spirit. The overwhelming majority of small and medium-sized firms in the developed countries are headed up by businesswomen. The state encourages such a form of business by substantial tax breaks, credits on a privileged basis, and legal assistance. In our country, alas, everything is just the opposite. All you hear are sarcastic remarks about women's way of thinking and utterly incorrect (from the men's viewpoint) women's logic.

Our readers should probably be reminded for the umpteenth time that it has already been 10 years since our country ratified the UN Convention on eliminating all forms of discrimination with regard to women. During this time period we managed to achieve some things. But, as people say, happiness was short-lived. Well now, do we have to begin from ground-zero all over again? Do we have to prove once more—as we did at the dawn of the Soviet regime—that women are human beings too?

And there is one more thing to bear in mind. The UN has again recommended that countries now undergoing crisis-type situations should legitimize a quota system for women in parliaments, political parties, and the structural components of executive power so that they may not remain on the sidelines of political life. We have ignored this recommendation, and we will not have too long to wait for a Day of Reckoning.

Number of Disabled on Rise in RSFSR

924B0076A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Nov 91
Union Edition p 2

[Article by T. Khudyakova: "The Number of Disabled Is Increasing. So Is the Number of Problems"]

[Text] The Congress of the All-Russian Society of the Disabled, which brought together more than 200 delegates, as well as guests from other republics and foreign countries—Germany, Britain, China, and Bulgaria—has begun its work in Moscow.

Although the topic of the congress had not been stipulated in advance, it can be defined as an attempt to find means for surviving under conditions when even a healthy man comes to grief. Today Russia lists four and a half million persons officially as disabled, and another 12 million are not counted although actually they are incapacitated. Three million psychically disturbed children and about four million chronic alcoholics should be added to them.

These figures can be questioned, but the harm still lies in the fact that, in the words of A. Deryugin, Chairman of the Central Administration of VOI [All-Union Society of the Disabled], the rate of increase of the disabled surpasses that of population growth. This means that the problem is multiplying in a geometrical progression—and not just for the disabled themselves but also for

society as a whole. Society turns out to be a helpless debtor to people who have forever lost their health and a simply normal life through the fault of society itself.

For a long time it has not been necessary to search for the causes of disablement. It is atrociously poor organization of work that involves a high rate of injury and occupational sickness. It is ecological pollution, the catastrophic state of the railroads and highways, and massive disablement as a result of accidents. It is an extraordinarily low level of public health, especially in regard to protection of motherhood and childhood, which multiplies the ranks of disabled children.

It is well-known with what "coin" the state pays this portion of its citizenry. Low pensions and assistance, primitive social service, an absence of devices for getting about, limited opportunities for obtaining vocational education. The laws and decrees that have been adopted in recent years at the highest level will not help at present. An empty treasury will not permit new life to be breathed into good documents.

It must be remarked that the disabled themselves have understood for a long time that they should rely on their own efforts. Primarily in the sense of material support. Although the law prescribes that enterprises allocate a certain percent of workplaces for the disabled, the contrary has actually proved to be the case. In the last two years alone about 100,000 disabled persons have lost work.

The rate of return of the enterprises' disabled to society at one time was smashed and pillaged by the departments. Industrial cooperation was simply ridiculous. This year 12 enterprises have been returned to the former masters. Meanwhile, at the end of the 1950's, more than 8,000 of them were counted, and 80 percent of the disabled were fed at them.

Of course, even today the process of creating new workplaces at the enterprises, production facilities, and cooperatives that have been created under the aegis of VOI is going on. But the raw and other materials, outfitting parts, equipment, and machine tools—how to get them during the current chaos?

Undoubtedly, today everything can be written off to it—chaos. It is difficult for everyone, they say, and we are not in the mood for mercy, not in the mood for humanism. And society and all of us can repent for an endlessly long time for old sins and hope for a bright future, which will make everyone full and kind. But that is still far off, while the indigent live today and hope not just for a plate of philanthropic soup.

Execution of the laws, tax and credit advantages, a highly organized system of rehabilitation and medical help, and qualified consultancy for the disabled are at the mercy of the state's understanding of this word. And so is the responsibility for high consideration of nonfulfillment of the obligations to people who have been broken and left

at the side of life's road without special hope for ever returning to society as full-fledged citizens.

Inadequacies in RSFSR AIDS Health Care Highlighted

924B0067A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 25 Oct 91 p 2

[Report by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent D. Shevarov: "Once We Dreamed of a Childhood for Our Children, but Now We Awake in Tears"]

[Text] Volgograd—On 8 April 1990 America buried Ryan White, a boy from rural Indiana. When he was 13 he was infected with AIDS as the result of a medical procedure: Ryan was given an injection with a drug prepared, it was later discovered, from donor blood infected with the virus. Ryan died at the age of 18. For all those five years, in addition to his mother, the most well-known Americans were with him. Elton John drove him to Disneyland, and Ryan saw the New Year in with Michael Jackson; the world water skiing champion gave Ryan his gold medals, and he appeared along with Elizabeth Taylor at charity performances. The President and senators inquired regularly about Ryan's health. Barbara Bush went to the funeral and flags were hung at half-mast throughout the state...

A three-year-old boy, Andryusha, recently died in an isolation ward at the Volgograd hospital for infectious diseases. No deputy or priest stood at his bedside. Just his mother, and a hospital attendant, and a Teddy bear with ragged ear and a bandaged neck. And a Volga was there outside the window—huge, like an ocean, and as long as a grown man's life. A week later Andryusha's mother received a 100 ruble [R] one-time payment; the social security department had promised to pay for the funeral...

We Are on Thin Ice

AIDS is a problem for a normal society. In any event, it exists where there are signs of stability and prosperity. For a country in which each month the institutions of power are collapsing, where borders and people are being chopped up, where warheads are being made and people grow old standing in lines—for such a country a plague such as cholera and AIDS are the same.

Nevertheless, in many of us our fears for our children have not been overcome. This is probably our final fear. And with increasing frequency our sleep is shattered in the night as we awake from this dream: We are skating across an endless expanse of thin ice with others, always small people. And it would be better if we did not know that our small ones, helpless and fearless, might disappear before we do... And we move further away from that place and strike out for the shore. Only... what will that shore be for us?...

"... We Christians believe in God, and we know that if an innocent child dies our heavenly Father is calling it to

Him, and when we die we shall be reunited with our child. He could have been treated earlier but then we might die sooner. And so it makes no difference when we depart this life..."

(From a sermon by Sven Jungholm [name as transliterated], a captain in the American Salvation Army delivered to parents of children who were AIDS patients, Volgograd, October 1991).

Within the country 268 children are now infected with AIDS. Almost all of them are from four hot spots that appeared on the territory of Russia in late 1988 and early 1989, namely, Elista, Rostov, Volgograd, and Stavropol. In Volgograd there were 50 HIV-positive children, today 40 remain in the oblast. Aged from three to 14 years. Four children with AIDS have died this year. In four the cases are bad, and the health of the rest is deteriorating rapidly.

The state has paid not a kopek of compensation to the young mothers who have already buried their children, nor to those whose children are fatally ill. No one can replace these losses, but throughout the world governments are responsible for what is happening in state clinics. Lawyers familiar with international practice in this sphere claim that parents who are deprived of their children through the fault of state services should receive through the courts or in compliance with the law, monetary compensation equal to their full status. Here, no one even thought of blaming the body of the state when it still formally existed. Now there is no state, so who will answer for the transgressions of the totalitarian system? The friend of the homeless, "iron" Felix? So drag him down from his pedestal, use your fists to beat the head of the giant, and be happy with your personal life...

Some 18 months ago, after the first statement by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA (the 24 May 1990 issue), war was declared on AIDS at sessions of the oblast and city soviets, and there were many speeches and programs and appeals for charity. And what is the result?

The AIDS center with a sanitation group for infected children was destroyed by the local inhabitants that same summer, and the authorities have still been unable to find premises for it. There is nowhere to examine children and nowhere to hospitalize them. The physicians in the hospital for infectious diseases, built by German prisoners immediately after the war, care for them and nurse them. For an infected child, any infection can be fatal, and so it is simply dangerous for the children to be in this hospital.

The city "Anti-AIDS" program, adopted a year ago, has collapsed. The hard currency account belonging to the city health department opened for donations for sick children, contains the princely sum of 5 (five) dollars.

A third of the children live in the rayons. Almost all the mothers were forced to give up their work two-and-a-half years ago. The fathers of 10 families, unable to sustain the psychological trauma and the persecution at work,

have left. Families have been reduced to total poverty, receiving the miserly grant of R110; that is for both the mother and the child! In some places the authorities have come to their senses, and in October the grant was increased to R250, but in Volgograd the children's fund has been trying to prize loose a monthly share (a kilogram of buckwheat and oil, 250 grams of honey, two cans of condensed milk, chocolate candy, and 50 grams of essential medicine, and black caviar). In the executive committee they deleted condensed milk, candy, and caviar from the list—"there are no funds." There is no caviar on the Volga for children who are fatally ill.

Case No. 18/8101

Three months ago the leaders of the RSFSR Procuracy hurried to announce that an unprecedented case involving the infection of children with AIDS in Volgograd was being passed to the courts. There was even a news conference on the subject in Moscow. But the truth is that no one did try to pass the case to the courts; officially the investigation was never completed, although nothing now remains of the investigating group in Volgograd itself. The case was being handled by a single investigator—Aleksandr Dubrovin. There were a few months of delay in passing the case to the courts, and the case was closed all by itself: For reasons both of carelessness and of violation of the sanitation-epidemiological regime, the period of limitations expired. The 15 volumes on the case can be consigned to the archives and forgotten, all fully in accordance with the Penal Code.

Until recently the main obstacle against completing the case was considered to be the lack of any conclusion by the RSFSR Ministry of Health about the tragedy in the Volga area. While giving the investigators no help, officials procrastinated, evidently aware that a case concerning particular cases of infection at clinics selected at random might end badly for some public health managers—the authors of the instructions and orders—and also for those who were responsible for providing the pediatric clinics with disposable systems. In a meticulous investigation and hearing of the case, the chain of responsibility would lead ineluctably to the Union and republics of that time.

Governments change but it is still advantageous for someone to put the brakes on case No. 18/8101.

The people still live in dumps and are still dying in unheated and dirty hospitals.

According to the latest official figures, standards of sanitation and hygiene are not being observed in 70 percent of Russian hospitals, and in 50 percent of them there is no hot water. It was Rostropovich who promised to build our first decent pediatric clinic. How many Rostropovich's does Russia need in order to survive?...

In Volgograd, where following the 1989 tragedy the leaders in the Ministry of Health promised to stock up on

disposal syringes, today the syringes have almost all been used. The oblast health department has no money.

Yevgeniy Voronin, the chief medical officer at the republic pediatric AIDS center (in St. Petersburg) says this:

"The assurances given by top leaders that the problem of AIDS in children has disappeared cannot be believed. What has happened in Volgograd, Elista, and Rostov can be compared to Chernobyl. Everything is in place for new outbreaks. Even according to optimistic predictions, by 1993 we will have 8,000 infected children; according to pessimistic forecasts the figure is 50,000. I am quite willing to assume that there are regions within the country where AIDS has simply not yet been identified. Infection is building up. It will break through when we reach critical mass..."

But one needs to be a Globa [a clairvoyant] to predict when this will happen. When uncontrolled streams of refugees are on the move and control over the epidemiological situation is completely lost. When as a result of the inevitable hardening of the political regime and destruction of communications, Western deliveries of drugs are cut off and in two weeks all stocks of disposable syringes and systems will be exhausted. We have already had a civil war, but we have never had AIDS and civil war at the same time. Even if we forget about the atomic power stations, it can be said beforehand that there will be no victors. Our exhausted medicine and sick people are not prepared for these kinds of upheavals.

Versions

Neither the medical people nor the investigations have yet come up with a single faultless version of what happened. Primarily because during the years that have elapsed since the first report of the tragedy, no authoritative and competent attempt has been made to investigate at the source the reasons for the outbreak of HIV infections. The RSFSR Ministry of Health commission that in April 1989 flew in to put out "the fire" was purely administrative in terms both of composition and method of work. It was capable only of drawing organizational conclusions. As soon as the patsies had been found the officials washed their hands of it and left. Academic science was not recruited to conduct an analysis, and before July 1991 there was no independent expert investigation. It is difficult now to understand that a commission from the World Health Organization was not invited to the Volga area. For even to this day the outbreak of AIDS in children in the hotbed of Yelista-Rostov-Volgograd-Stavropol remains unprecedented; there was nothing like it anywhere in the world before 1988, nor has there been since.

It is, however, naive to ask such questions. The truth about what happened is still to the disadvantage of the public health leaders and the local authorities. Anatoliy Yegin, former chief of the Volgograd City Health Department, is now deputy chief of the oblast administration.

Thus, all versions are questionable. They can be reduced to three main variations.

The first is well known: Infection of the children with the HIV occurred "as the result of intravenous administration of drugs via subclavian catheters, using the same syringe for several patients." According to this version, the cause of the calamity was that in Volgograd hospital No. 7, which is a regional pediatric center, an infected child from Kalmyk happened to be there. And the roots of the epidemic must in this case be sought in Yelista and Rostov where perhaps virally infected protein preparations were used.

Version two. According to this version, AIDS was present in the Volga area, and particularly in Volgograd, even before the autumn and winter of 1988 (it was precisely in October 1988 that the epidemic started in Volgograd). The buildup of a "critical mass" of infection took not just months but at least one or two years. And in this case the prime cause was not that a little girl from Kalmyk sick with AIDS turned up in a Volgograd hospital on 24 October 1988. It is quite possible that long before that an infected child from among the foreign students had been in the country's pediatric resuscitation center.

According to a third version, the AIDS in the Volga area is not, as an infectious disease expert with whom I am acquainted said, full-blown AIDS. That is, it is not quite what is known throughout the world as acquired immune deficiency syndrome. It is, as it were, a variation on the same theme but with a complete set of distinguishing features. And according to this version, the AIDS is not so much an imported disease but rather the manifestation of a long drawn out response to the change in the global climate and the environment in the region. It is the capitulation of the human body to the onslaught of both known and still hidden ecological catastrophes. For still virtually nothing is known about the consequences of the activity of secret departments and tests conducted with new kinds of weapons during the period lasting from the forties to the sixties.

Some specialists believe that these consequences, of course, cannot be the direct cause of the epidemic, but they were undoubtedly a background burden.

Strictly speaking, the three basic versions do not contradict each other, they merely complement each other. It is more than likely that in the winter of 1988 this logical and tragic course of events did take place. The attitude of medical personnel toward children, who up to then had been "saved" in the hospital for infectious diseases, a deadly ecological background, and finally a little girl sick with AIDS turning up in a clinic are all possible, all part of a single skein that, it seems, years later it is impossible to untangle. Time let slip. Some of the medical documents have disappeared without trace. Even the records of that little Kalmyk girl with whom, according to the official version, the epidemic started in Volgograd, have been lost in extremely strange circumstances. Since they

were acquired for the case, the story has disappeared into the bowels of the RSFSR Procuracy itself, in Moscow.

Perhaps it is already impossible to establish all the truth of all the details.

But it is precisely in these last months that information has surfaced, directly or indirectly confirming my version about a "skein" of causes. Early in July a professor from Leningrad, A. Tsinzerling, and three of his colleagues conducted an expert investigation of the case of the infected children in Volgograd. After familiarizing themselves with the histories of the illnesses and the autopsy records of 35 children from Volgograd who died in local hospitals during the period from October 1988 to the end of April 1989, the specialists established that at least 10 of those children died of AIDS and that 16 had all the symptoms of immune deficiency. From this, A. Tsinzerling concluded that the scale of the outbreak of HIV infection was much greater than stated officially by the local organs of the RSFSR Ministry of Health in April and May of 1989.

Children were dying of AIDS for almost six months, but quite different diagnoses were stamped on the cause-of-death forms; the one used most often was "staphylococcal pulmonary destruction." The Leningrad expert investigation established that even after telegrams confirming HIV infection in the little girl from Kalmyk had been received at Hospital No. 7 on 31 January 1989, nothing was done to halt the epidemic. They continued to use on children catheters that were had been washed in heparin in the same basin, or not washed at all, and to give them injections with dirty syringes. They continued to "stun" dying children with antibiotics—up to 22 different kinds for each child every day! But why this nightmare continued for six months or even much longer was a question that Tsinzerling's expert investigation did not answer. The experts were simply not familiar with the histories of the illnesses of the children who died in hospital No. 7 before October 1988.

As far as the ecology is concerned, Leningraders once again confirmed a fact that was obvious to local specialists, namely, that immune deficiency is being noted significantly more often in the children of Volgograd, including those who are not compromised by being HIV-positive. No one has yet made any serious study of this. And finally, the saddest thing of all: The tragedy of AIDS in children has not been recognized ethically. Even though neither hard currency nor parliamentary commissions are needed for that.

Were We Really Like That?

"... They are only now beginning to learn in the West of that tragedy that occurred here. You will never see it, but I do hope that you know that millions of Christians are praying for you. Although it is very difficult it is necessary continue to live your life, no matter what it may be..."

(From a sermon by Sven Jungholm, Volgograd, October 1991).

Before her son's illness Marina P. was a cleaner in a rural boarding school.

"We gave blood but no one said that the reaction was positive. Two months went by, and suddenly they sent us to Moscow, and it was only there that we learned that the boy was HIV-positive. They admitted my son to a hospital in Volgograd, but sent me home. I returned, and in the sovkhos they said this to me: 'You must go and live in the taiga, go away.' I went to the post office to draw my allowance, but in one voice they said to me: 'What, is your son being discharged? Well, don't try to bring him here!' It is a good thing that I have two sons so that the older one can look out for his brother. As soon as my child came home, they fired me from my job..."

Lyudmila S., who before her daughter's illness was a primary school teacher:

"My daughter was still attending kindergarten when the letter arrived from the sanitation and epidemiological service and the principal issued instructions on how to deal with my child. All the associates were put on a list, but no one thought of confidentiality. And we live only 200 meters from the kindergarten. I went to the procurator's office: 'Can I sue them?' 'No, the investigation has not yet been completed...' I decided to try to move—useless. 'Don't do it, you already have nine meters per person, you're in no position to make an exchange...' After that things went bad with my husband... He started to drink and we were divorced. He lives with a child from his first marriage in one room, I live with my little one in the other room. I have no strength. We have become cripples. And I am only 29!"

Anna M., former cook, boiler maintenance person, milkmaid...

"I remember the first time that he ran home and said: 'Mama, why did Sashka call me an AIDS kid?' Now he is almost 14, and he understands everything. His birthday is soon and I have been dreaming of finding R132 to buy him a guitar as a gift. We saw one together in Leningrad. When he became ill we went to the center in the village, and they thought that he would recover. He had his own milk and cream. I worked there in the boiler room, then on the farm. We had a pair of horses, there was mud and muck, we had to wear boots all winter, there was no school, no doctor, no light. We went back to the city. A 13-year-old boy, we had to sleep in the same bed. There was no room to put another, and nowhere to buy one anyway. The landlord said 'Find yourself another apartment...'"

The Americans from the Salvation Army could not understand why these women had such a horror of publicity, why they so feared the streets, and their neighbors, and the correspondents, the salespeople, and the janitors. Why they so wanted to have their children treated in the West. There are still no drugs in the West

capable of curing AIDS, the Americans said, and they promised to bring into the scientific research everything needed for treatment. In November they are going to bring four AIDS specialists to Volgograd ("They are presently in Zambia and Ghana, but they will come here directly from there..."), along with drugs, toys, and clothing for the children, and even cans of black caviar. When they learned about the sizes of the grants, they swore in their own way, and promised each family a grant, to be paid in rubles. "And what else do you need?" the woman interpreter asked. A hush descended, but there by the hospital window a 40-year-old grandmother, beautiful as a goddess, was silently weeping: "In this country we cannot live... Here, no one wants to live..."

"... So they went off together. But wherever they go and whatever happens to them on the way, in that enchanted place on the top of the forest, a little boy and his bear will always be playing" (A. Milne, *Winnie-the-Pooh* and all-all [as published]).

"The classification of AIDS in children has not been developed... Fatalities in AIDS are quite high..." ("Handbook for the District Pediatrician," 1991).

Once we dreamed of a childhood for our children but now we awake in tears.

Institute of Muslim Civilization Founded in Moscow

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Union Edition p 4

[Interview with Toshpulat Tozhiddinov, president of the Public Academy of Culture and Universal Values, by V. Khovratovich; place and date not given: "Allah Bless the Recently Founded Institute of Muslim Civilization"]

[Text] Hardly anyone today disputes the need for the study of Islam. The question of affirming the genuinely humanitarian principles of the interaction of different religious creeds and their surmounting of involuntary alienation confronts us squarely. It is for this reason that the Institute of Muslim Civilization has been founded in Moscow under the aegis of the Public Academy of Culture and Universal Values.

The school of Russian Islamic studies was once one of the most authoritative in world scholarship. Islam is studied in academy institutes and the higher educational institutions of the country in our day also. What is the need for the founding of a new institute—this was the first question put to Toshpulat Tozhiddinov, president of the Public Academy of Culture and Universal Values.

[Tozhiddinov] Practically our entire Islamic studies of recent times have been subordinated to the ascertainment of the political role of Islam in the modern world and the prospects for interaction with it on precisely these grounds. Interest in it as a world spiritual-cultural phenomenon and in its place in the history of the

development of human civilization has been of an essentially secondary, applied nature. And it may be allowed with a sufficient degree of confidence that, had it not been for the tumultuous outburst of Islamic political activity at the end of the 1970's, Islamic studies would have remained an increasingly thinning stream still flowing in the strictly ideologized channel of our scholarship.

[Khovratovich] But are you not overdoing it a bit? Prior to the "Islamic boom" was there really no search for a constructive dialogue with Islam? Was not the constantly increasing assertiveness of religion and its institutions a consequence of the not unsuccessful nature of this search?

[Tozhiddinov] This was undoubtedly so: Religion, in the person of its senior clergy, had truly become a quite noticeable and even acceptable participant in numerous national and world movements. But the great purposes common to all mankind were advanced, as a rule, inseparably connected with the ideological precepts of one leading political force or another. Under these conditions religion was allotted, at best, the role of authoritative traveling companion, no more. Nor could the idea of the permanent independent value for society either of religion itself or its various institutions have expected, of course, active and concerned support.

[Khovratovich] What specifically are the institute's tasks and what is its significance as a specialized subdivision of the Public Academy of Culture and Universal Values?

[Tozhiddinov] To answer briefly, I see as its main purpose the accomplishment of those tasks which for various reasons the academy institutes or higher educational institutions of our country did not set themselves or were not in principle prepared to fully resolve. I refer primarily to the comprehensive study of Islam as a suprapolitical phenomenon of civilization and the universal spiritual foundation of the social life of millions upon millions of diverse people of different tribes and languages scattered throughout the world.

[Khovratovich] But how do we evaluate the growing politicization of Islam together with other religions in our country? Islamic political parties have been formed, for example. Albeit not in so open a form as the parties, but ultraradical Islamic public movements are essentially becoming increasingly involved in political struggle also.

[Tozhiddinov] Unfortunately this is indeed the case, and this cannot fail to disturb all sober-minded people—both believers and nonbelievers. Of course, religion's substitution for its tasks pertaining to the people's spiritual upbringing of tasks concerning the current political struggle, which is impermissible in principle, has been brought about by a number of objective factors, among which I would give pride of place to the tumultuous process of its unprecedented politicization given the dispiriting overall lack of development of its political culture. People frequently go to the mosque, to church,

and to the synagogue today in the hope of finding answers to purely political questions. His Holiness Aleksey II, patriarch of Moscow and All Rus, deemed it necessary to call attention to this distressing feature of our day when commenting on the well-known appeal of the group of deputies: "For the Cooperation of Constructive Forces." Remember how, complaining about the fact that journalists would address political questions to him, he spoke of his secret hope of hearing during the interview "for all that, the only important question for man, which in the Gospel the young man asks the Savior: 'Lord, what must I do to inherit eternal life?'"

[Khovratovich] Forgive what is, possibly, a tactless question: How appropriate is it for a Muslim to rely also, in addition to the *Koran* and the Sunna (the life of the Prophet Mohammad), on the Gospels or other religious testimony and identify with them?

[Tozhiddinov] Unfortunately, ideas concerning Islam as a closed religion, whose main source—the *Koran*—is implacably opposed to the sources of the other world religions, Christianity and Judaism in particular, have taken root. But sounding like a refrain in the *Koran* is the assertion that both the *Torah* and the Gospels contain for people the true Way and the Light and call on people themselves, regardless of their ethnic, national, and other differences, for mutual cognition, rapprochement, and cooperation based on piety and good deeds for one another.

The institute which we have founded will comprehensively study and popularize the main sources of Islamic philosophy and the way of life past and present based on it. An important place will be occupied by the theoretical and practical study of Arabic and the preparation of teaching aids and methods studies in respect of this language—the principal medium of expression and preservation of the immense riches accumulated by the Muslim peoples.

The value of our manuscript riches is indicated by the proposals concerning cooperation which are constantly addressed to us by leading overseas centers for the study of Muslim civilization, on very profitable terms for us, what is more. We have from Saudi Arabia, for example, proposals concerning the financing of the creation in our country of a physical plant for the automated processing and publication of manuscripts and documents in the languages of the Muslim peoples.

Quite recently we have come to an arrangement with Saudi representatives of the Islamic Bank concerning its participation in the construction of a religious-cultural complex imeni Imam Ali Bukhari and in the expansion of the system of courses and schools for the study of Arabic. We also have proposals concerning the sending of our students and trainees to a whole number of leading scientific and educational centers of Arab and certain other countries of the East.

[Khovratovich] Does the institute possess the necessary resources and, what is most important, personnel for the realization of the program?

[Tozhiddinov] We have these resources. The anticipated financing of our projects from overseas will apply only to spheres of logistical support for our activity which would require of us currency expenditure—no more. For everything else we have the necessary resources, which are entirely sufficient for the enlistment in our work of specialists of the highest qualifications.

[Khovratovich] And how do you see the prospects for scientific cooperation between the Institute of Muslim Civilization and Muslims' theological scientific organizations and religious boards?

[Tozhiddinov] We are very much looking forward to such cooperation inasmuch as we are convinced that without it the activity of a research institution dealing with problems of Islam cannot be considered scientific. After all, invaluable knowledge and experience, which no serious expert, Soviet included, has ever overlooked, are accumulated in theology. The time has come today to pay tribute to the splendid scientific achievements of its outstanding representatives and take a new, positive look at the practical activity of the main religious boards of Muslims and the organizations which they lead and to render them the utmost assistance and support in their selfless labor pertaining to a revival of the spirituality of our people.

Museums Urged Not To Sell National Treasures Abroad

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Union Edition p 7

[Article by Academician D. Likhachev: "It Is Impermissible To Trade in Museum Pieces Even During the Worst of Times"]

[Text] Everybody has heard about the existence of museum storerooms. However, the sense of their existence is far from clear to an overwhelming majority. An unfavorable attitude toward them has become common, and their alleged uselessness has become something that goes without saying. They say: Why are the valuables gathering dust? Is it not simpler to give them to the museums where they will be put to a better use? Calls coming from the largest and most authoritative auction houses of the West are heard increasingly often: "Sell things which are 'dead weight' in your country, and acquire what your museums lack with the proceeds." However, this advice amounts to obvious cunning. If something of an equal value can be purchased with the foreign exchange generated, then how do the auction houses and middlemen get their profits?

Meanwhile, in essence, the storerooms are not at all "dead weight." They are a source for renewing exhibits

and organizing various exhibitions and objects of continuous study because museums do not just "store" and "exhibit" but are also scientific establishments.

There are entire fields of museum valuables with which specialists have to deal only in storerooms. After all, it is impossible to put on display all engravings, water colors, coins, and so on. Visitors get to see only a very small segment of them. At the same time, the significance of these collections is determined by their completeness. How could we give up "spares" which is what domestic and foreign merchants persistently counsel? After all, these "spares" harbor future discoveries. These discoveries will be made one hundred times easier if collections are kept at one location, if it is known where each object is, and if all are accessible. As they propose to sell museum pieces abroad, they argue that we will thus assert the prestige of our art and will make famous the artists whose paintings are kept in our storerooms. Quite the contrary! I recall that antique shops and auction houses do not have a right to name buyers. Collectors and sometimes random purchasers, immediately put works of art under lock and key upon buying them.

A certain "museum theory" was invented when the sale of our museum and private collections was going on (it was particularly intensive in the 1920's and 1930's). They said that, unlike bourgeois museums, proletarian museums are needed for educational and school work rather than for collecting valuables. This is why it is enough to show the "masses" a dozen Rembrandt paintings, while the rest can be sold.

A very important issue is now emerging: Who owns museum pieces in our country? Is it the museum, or the Ministry of Culture? I am profoundly outraged to see the

management of museums or libraries usurping the right to dispose of national treasures in their custody (entrusted to them), in secret even from their staff and the scientific community. That the valuables belong to the nation is not the only point. We should honor the will of the donors. Tremendous "blocks" of collections have been donated to museums on certain terms. A part of the will of their former owners, of those who saved and preserved these donations, is kept alive by the gifts. There is no object without its own history. Do we have a right to violate the will of the donors by selling what is someone else's or handing it out right and left? In general, does our generation have a right to dispose of, as if it were its own property, the entire cultural heritage of the past? After all, if our ancestors strove to preserve something it was not only for our sake but also for the sake of those who will take our place.

I recall a certain episode. On one occasion, the millionaire Shchukin, who had left the Motherland and resided in Paris, was told that the Soviets were selling paintings from his collection. Having heard this, Shchukin said: "I did not collect for myself but rather for the people of Russia. I do not need these things here, abroad." Did his words mean that he authorized the selling of the collection? This is a rhetorical question. However, they sold quite a lot without embarrassment.

It is strange that at present many people have to be convinced that museums, archives, and libraries are not created for the needs of the moment. They are created for all time to come. Eternity means, first of all, stability, security, tradition, and immutability.

Culture does not age, but it cannot be preserved in the absence of stability. All on whom the future of culture depends should be mindful of this extremely important circumstance.

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